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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

PAUL KENGOR examines the influence of the secretary of state in affecting the vice president's role in foreign policy. He focuses on the relationship between Vice Presidents Dan Quayle and Al Gore and the secretaries of state in their administrations. While acknowledging that the president is most critical in determining a vice president's foreign-policy role, Kengor shows that the role of the secretary of state can be a vital factor in the vice president's ultimate level of involvement.

PETER BURNS and JAMES G. GIMPEL examine mass attitudes toward immigration policy in the United States, asking whether widespread restrictionist sentiment is stirred more by economic insecurity, by negative ethnic stereotypes, or by some combination of the two. For some, prejudice is rooted in economic insecurity, but prejudice also has roots that are quite independent of economic fears. Anti-immigrant sentiment will not disappear simply because economic conditions improve.

ANDREW SCOBELL analyzes the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis as a case study in coercive diplomacy. He focuses on the role of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and discusses the implications of the case for the future of cross-strait ties and Sino-American relations.

BRENDA M. SEAVER examines the sources of power-sharing failure in societies afflicted by severe ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic cleavages. Focusing on Lebanon's democratic breakdown in 1975, she argues that inauspicious regional conditions pose the most serious threat to power-sharing arrangements. Specifically, turbulent regional systems undermine the domestic elite consensus upon which power sharing is based and ultimately contribute to institutional failure.

ALFRED HILL contends that the shutdowns of the federal government a few years ago represented an unconstitutional usurpation of power by the legislative branch. He observes that appropriation lapses have been common in American history, but drew little public attention because, to the extent that shutdowns actually resulted, they were apparently of short duration and seemingly without the broad coercive intent that was obvious, and indeed proclaimed, in the most recent shutdowns.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

PSQ made an inexplicable mistake by failing to notice that our printer had dropped the name of George B. Munroe from our list of contributors published in the Spring 2000 issue. In 1999 Mr. Munroe in fact contributed at the Benefactor level, as he has done each year that we have printed the names of our special contributors. I sincerely apologize on behalf of the editorial staff and printer.

DJC

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The Vice President, Secretary of State, and Foreign Policy

PAUL KENGOR

In the post-World War II era, vice presidents have become far more involved in foreign policy. The five most active vice presidents in this regard have been Richard Nixon, Walter Mondale, George Bush, Dan Quayle, and Al Gore.[1] Although there are a number of reasons for this increased role,[2] an early spark came from the Truman-FDR experience. Vice President Harry S. Truman, who saw FDR only eight times during his vice presidency, was left totally uninformed about the most crucial events facing the world in the final days of World War II, from the development of the atomic bomb to the content of FDR's discussions with Churchill and Stalin.[3] Unforgivably, Truman went to Potsdam with no knowledge from FDR of what transpired previously. As Marie D. Natoli notes, Truman spent his first days and months in office learning to be president. That lack of preparation hindered his abilities upon assuming the office under emergency circumstances. Roosevelt had done a disservice to both his vice president and the nation.[4] "It takes time," Truman mordantly

[1] Vice President Hubert Humphrey was active publicly defending, though certainly not making, LBJ's Vietnam policy. During a 10 February 1965 National Security Council (NSC) meeting, he raised questions regarding the advisability of bombing North Vietnam. Soon after began a long period of "exile" of sorts for Humphrey, including his exclusion from LBJ's Tuesday Luncheons. Humphrey reportedly later told Walter Mondale that he never recouped his standing with Johnson after this incident. See Marie D. Natoli, "The Humphrey Vice Presidency in Retrospect," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 12 (Fall 1982): 605; and Finlay Lewis, *Mondale: Portrait of an American Politician* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1980), 231.

[2] For a listing of the various reasons, see: Paul Kengor, *Wreath Layer or Policy Player: The Vice President's Role in Foreign Policy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, Fall 2000).

[3] Harry S. Truman, *Year of Decisions* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), 194.

[4] Marie D. Natoli, "Harry S. Truman and the Contemporary Vice Presidency," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 18 (Winter 1988): 81–83.

PAUL KENGOR is assistant professor of political science at Grove City College. His forthcoming book is *Wreath Layer or Policy Player: The Vice President's Role in Foreign Policy*, published by Lexington Books as part of its Presidential Series edited by Alan Shank. The book is scheduled for publication in the fall of 2000.

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noted in his memoirs, "for anyone to familiarize himself with a new job. This is particularly true of the presidency of the United States."[5] As a result, President Truman took steps, both statutory and informal, to make the vice president more involved in foreign policy, including making him a statutory member of the National Security Council. While the Truman move may not be the most significant reason for the increased foreign-policy involvement by the vice president,[6] it was certainly a step in that direction, and was one among a number sparking the vice president's heightened foreign-policy involvement.

Among other reasons for the rise in the vice president's foreign-policy role since World War II are: the rise in America's and the president's role, especially the prominence of foreign policy during the cold war period and nuclear age; increases in the general size and scope of the U.S. government and demands on presidential time; changes in technology (television, air travel, etc.); the rise of the vice presidency as a springboard to the presidency; and desire of vice presidents for foreign-policy exposure.

Yet, not all post-World War II vice presidents have been active in their particular administration's foreign policy. Moreover, there are varying levels of involvement among those who have been active. For instance, Vice President Bush chaired the crisis-management committee in the Reagan administration—a significant and unique step for a vice president in terms of White House foreign-policy making, whereas Vice President Nixon's attempt to chair a similar group was vetoed by President Dwight Eisenhower.[7]

This article focuses on a key and largely overlooked reason contributing to the differing levels of foreign-policy involvement by our nation's two most recent vice presidents, Dan Quayle and Al Gore: the role of the secretary of state in each administration. Importantly, the role of the secretary of state did not supersede that of the president in shaping each vice president's destiny in foreign policy. Nonetheless, the secretary of state was a significant secondary factor in influencing the vice president's role. This is especially evident in areas like Soviet/Russia policy. While the dynamics of the relationship between these vice presidents and secretaries of state partly derived from the classic bureaucratic-politics rivalry that scholars of political science might expect, they primarily stemmed from the personalities and political ambitions (or lack thereof) of the secretaries of state involved. On a related matter, this reality holds a crucial lesson regarding certain policy recommendations aimed at reforming the vice presidency.

[5] Truman, *Year of Decisions*, 194.

[6] The president still controlled when the NSC met and could even choose not to convene it if, for instance, he wished to exclude the vice president from decision-making meetings.

[7] Stanley L. Falk, "The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy," *Political Science Quarterly* 79 (September 1964): 418 and 426; and William Costello, *The Facts about Nixon* (New York: Viking Press, 1960), 244–5.

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Levels of Foreign-Policy Involvement by Quayle and Gore

Before going into the reasons for the differing levels of involvement, it should be noted that neither vice president was ignored in his administration's foreign policy. Both undertook extensive, impressive roles. The following briefly describes some of the foreign-policy activities of each man.[8]

During the 1990–1991 crisis in the Persian Gulf, Quayle was highly active and played an impressive role that did not receive much media attention. He took part in some very sensitive negotiating and fact-finding missions abroad, including in Latin America and the Middle East. His role during the Gulf crisis was basically four-fold. First, he served as a spokesman for the administration—citing its objectives in the Gulf in a number of speeches, interviews, and statements. He also acted as an emissary/negotiator on trips abroad. Third, he served as a liaison to Congress, monitoring the mood of members key to White House support. Finally, he assumed the role of a point man of sorts, blasting critics of the president's Gulf strategy.[9] When it came to influencing administration policy, it appears the vice president had some impact. For example, he persuaded Bush that the administration could work with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, namely in dissuading the Israelis from being drawn into the Gulf conflict in the event the nation was attacked by Iraqi missiles.[10] The vice president also goaded key U.S. allies, such as Kuwait and Japan, into providing extra financial assistance to help pay for the war effort.[11] Quayle was the first administration member to urge the president to defer to Congress on a war vote.[12] Two defense systems that Senator Quayle championed, the Tomahawk

[8] For lengthy case studies on each man's foreign-policy involvement, see these works by Paul Kengor, "The Role of the Vice President During the Crisis in the Persian Gulf," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24 (Fall 1994): 783–808; and Paul Kengor, "The Foreign Policy Role of Vice President Al Gore," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 27 (Winter 1997): 14–38.

[9] For additional citations and supporting evidence, see Kengor, "The Role of the Vice President During the Crisis in the Persian Gulf," 783–807, esp. 800–1.

[10] Fred Barnes, "White House Watch: Quayle Alert," *The New Republic*, 27 May 1991, 12; author's interview with William Kristol, chief of staff to Vice President Dan Quayle, via telephone from Washington, DC, 28 May 1996; and author's interview with Carnes Lord, former NSA to Vice President Quayle, via telephone from Medford, MA, 11 December 1996.

[11] On Japan, see Vice President Dan Quayle, Office of the Vice President, "Prepared Text of Remarks by the Vice President, Foreign Policy Research Institute Conference," Washington, DC, 18 December 1990, 5–6; interview with Lee Walczak and Douglas Harbrecht, "A Talk with Dan Quayle: 'Washington Loves a Free Lunch,'" *Business Week*, 1 April 1991, 27. On Kuwait, see "Quayle Meets With Saudi Royalty And Seeks More Aid for Military," *New York Times*, 31 December 1990; "Quayle Sees Kuwait Emir on Funding," *Washington Post*, 2 January 1991; Dan Quayle, *Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994), 218–9; and *U.S. News & World Report*, *Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War* (New York: Random House, Times Books, 1992), 197.

[12] Barnes, "White House Watch: Quayle Alert," 12; author's interview with Joe DeSutter, former foreign-policy and national-security adviser to both vice presidents Quayle and Gore, via telephone from Washington, DC, 18 December 1996; interview with Lord; and Quayle remarks from "The Gulf Crisis: The Road to War," American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, Brian Lapping Associates for Discovery Communications, Inc., 1992 (video tape).

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cruise missile and Patriot interceptor-missile, did quite well during the Gulf War and thus vindicated years of work on his part in Congress.[13]

In addition, the vice president's activities in Latin America helped the administration's efforts in the Persian Gulf. To understand this, one needs a sense of Quayle's broader role in the Bush administration's Latin America policy. The vice president accurately stated that he developed into "the administration's most active man for Latin America affairs"—a claim backed by his National Security Adviser (NSA) Carnes Lord and Deputy NSA Jon Glassman (later U.S. ambassador to Paraguay).[14] One might expect Quayle and his staff to make such positive claims, but their assertions are not hyperbole. Quayle was sent to represent the administration several times in Latin America and took part in missions well beyond the ceremonial.[15] Lord took part in five trips to the area with Quayle and told the author the vice president "made some real 'money' diplomatically" in Latin America.[16] Evidence of that diplomatic effectiveness was apparent in the Persian Gulf crisis, during which Quayle served as a successful emissary to Latin America regarding U.S. aims vis-à-vis Iraq.

Specifically, Quayle performed a strong diplomatic role in Latin America in successfully lobbying Venezuela to increase oil production during the Gulf crisis and pushing Brazil and Argentina to stop transfers of missile technology to Iraq. Within days, all three nations had complied with the vice president's requests.[17] Exactly how instrumental a role Quayle played in swaying the Latin American leaders is difficult to ascertain without full information. Glassman, however, suggests the vice president made a difference. He points to Quayle working with Carlos Andres Peres in pushing Venezuela to raise oil production. Asked by the author if the vice president alone made the difference, Glassman responded: "[It's] not always a question of swaying or arm twisting but reasoning with a person. But Peres' mind was not set on the issue before Quayle got there."[18]

The achievements of the vice president's trip cannot be dismissed. Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia all boosted oil production and exports to make up for the Gulf production shortfall, which, according to Assistant Secretary of

[13] For references on Quayle's senatorial and vice-presidential work and views on the Tomahawk and Patriot, see citations listed in footnote 53.

[14] Author's interview with Jon Glassman, former Deputy NSA to Vice President Quayle, in Washington DC at State Department, 24 May 1996.

[15] Quayle made at least eight trips to Latin America during his vice presidency. Ibid; and David S. Broder and Bob Woodward, "Facing Limitations in an 'Awkward Job,'" *Washington Post*, 8 January 1992.

[16] Interview with Lord.

[17] Michael Duffy, "Is He Really That Bad?" *Time*, 20 May 1991, 21; Tom Mathews, "Dan Quayle's Crisis Duty," *Newsweek*, 24 September 1990, 28. Brazil and Argentina referred to such technology as "space-launch technology," but were quite aware of what Hussein was doing with it. Interview with DeSutter.

[18] Interview with Glassman.

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State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard W. Aronson, "was not noted at the time but made a crucial difference in stabilizing prices." Under the military dictatorship that ruled Argentina, the military was developing a medium-range ballistic missile called the Condor Missile Project, financed by the Iraqis and Egyptians. Aronson stated that "had that missile gone into full production and had it been deployed, the conflict in the Gulf would have been very different and not to our benefit."[19]

Vice President Gore's foreign-policy role is likewise impressive, featuring a host of unique and imaginative duties.[20] Within the administration, Gore has been involved in policy formulation on numerous international situations and issues. He met with Secretary of State Warren Christopher every Friday to discuss foreign policy. On Haiti, he seemed to have played a significant day-to-day role in White House policy formulation; likewise with Bosnia. His personal NSA, Leon Fuerth, sits in on meetings of key administration foreign-policy advisers, allowing Gore to monitor national-security decisions and directly influence policy, including a major role the vice president had in a retaliatory U.S. military strike against Iraq.[21]

During the first Clinton term, the vice president was perhaps the administration's main spokesman on Russia, establishing a critical link with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Their ongoing relationship was called the main channel between the administration and Moscow. In a completely unprecedented situation, Vice President Gore co-chaired three foreign-policy groups outside of the White House, including the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. To illustrate what a force the Gore-Chernomyrdin had become, when Secretary of State Christopher met with Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev in Geneva in January 1995, they barely discussed the contentious issue of Boris Yeltsin's unfulfilled pledge to disclose Russia's arms deals with Iran. That was the responsibility of Gore-Chernomyrdin, Christopher's aides said. Gore has signed numerous substantive agreements with Russia and Kazakhstan.[22]

The vice president's busy work within the former Soviet Union has not been limited merely to Russia. Kazakhstan endorsed an international treaty on 13 December 1993 to halt the spread of arms and signed an agreement with the United States to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. The actions, which came during a visit by Gore, were important because Kazakhstan had the third-largest nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet republics, behind Russia and Ukraine. The moves

[19] Statement of Bernard W. Aronson, assistant secretary of state for Inter-American affairs, "Fiscal Year 1992 Foreign Assistance Request for the Western Hemisphere," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 18 April 1991, 4 and 9.

[20] This article does not seek to address or illuminate the potential fund-raising scandals involving Vice President Gore, some of which cross into foreign policy and, if true, pose serious questions.

[21] Kenneth T. Walsh and Matthew Cooper, "A Vice President Who Counts," *U.S. News & World Report*, 19 July 1993, 29.

[22] See Kengor, "The Foreign Policy Role of Vice President Al Gore," 26–8.

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were intended to put additional pressure on Ukraine, whose leaders were adamant in not relinquishing their missiles.[23] There was reportedly no doubt before Gore's arrival that Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev would sign the arms pact, under which Kazakhstan was to begin dismantling its nuclear weapons in return for more than $84 million in aid from the United States, but it was never certain that Kazakhstan would endorse the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Administration officials claimed Gore prodded Nazarbayev to act on the NPT issue.[24] On a separate note, in an article lacking specifics, the *New York Times* stated that Gore also "used his contacts to negotiate an ultra-secret deal with Russia and Kazakhstan to bring more than half a ton of bomb-grade uranium from Kazakhstan to the United States last year [1994]."[25]

Gore has done impressive work in Kazakhstan. Here are some additional agreements that he has signed with Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin: On 27 March 1995, the two leaders inked the U.S.–Kazakhstan Declaration on Trade, Investment and Economic Cooperation, outlining steps for the two countries to develop an expanded, long-term relationship. On trade, they agreed to reduce trade barriers and facilitate market access consistent with trade laws. On economic cooperation, the United States agreed to continue substantial technical assistance to Kazakhstan's program for demonopolization and privatization. Reflecting Gore's own pet interest, the leaders signed two major environmental pacts—an Agreement on Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) and an Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources. The latter results in the creation of a joint U.S.–Kazakhstan Environment, Science, and Technology Committee. On the military security front the two leaders signed a Joint Statement on Peace, Security, and Nonproliferation, and, importantly, a Joint Statement on Cooperation in Promoting the Rule of Law and Combating Crime, which takes steps to curb nuclear materials smuggling.[26]

Finally, another former Soviet republic of interest to the vice president has been the Ukraine. According to Peter J. Boyer, Gore led the secret negotiations with the Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk that resulted in Ukraine's surrender of nuclear weapons.[27] A *Newsweek* article goes so far as to claim that the vice president "persuaded" the Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal.[28] Both of these reports, however, have lacked details.

[23] Richard L. Berke, "Prodded By Gore, Kazakhstan Signs Arms Accord," *New York Times*, 14 December 1993.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Elaine Sciolino and Todd S. Purdum, "Al Gore, One Vice President Who Is Eluding the Shadows," *New York Times*, 19 February 1995.

[26] "U.S.-Kazakhstan Agreements," The White House, Office of the Vice President, 27 March 1995.

[27] Peter J. Boyer, "Gore's Dilemma," *The New Yorker*, 28 November 1994, 105.

[28] See also, Karen Breslau and Bob Cohn, "Al Gore: Talk a Lot, and Carry a Big Stick," *Newsweek*, 31 October 1994, 30.

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Gore has been a key player in administration foreign policy. Additionally, few if any vice presidents have had such influence with a president.[29] Gore rivals only Hillary Rodham Clinton as the president's closest day-to-day adviser. A typical assessment of Gore's remarkable influence with Bill Clinton was provided by Mark Gearan, presidential assistant: "At the end of the day, there is no one who can buck up the president more, who can engage him more on a subject area, who can represent him better. You can search but you won't find one major policy decision in this administration that President Clinton made without discussing it with the vice president. Just doesn't happen."[30]

Reasons for Differing Foreign-Policy Involvement

It is difficult to quantify which vice president was (is) used more by his administration. Although Quayle played a more significant foreign-policy role than is generally appreciated, Gore is more involved in the international sphere based on three key factors. First, the current vice president chairs foreign-policy commissions outside of the White House, which neither Quayle nor any other vice president was permitted to do. Second, he may have the president's ear to an unprecedented degree for a vice president. Third, in general, Gore simply has been permitted to take part in some high-profile foreign-policy areas that Quayle and others were not, such as Russia policy.

Why has Gore been allowed that extra degree of involvement? The most important reason for the differing involvement between Quayle and Gore is the president each man served or serves. No other factor explains differing levels of involvement better among all vice presidents. For example, had it not been for the innovations and flexibility of Presidents Eisenhower, Carter, and Reagan, their vice presidents would not have had the impact they did. Eisenhower was the first to have the vice president preside over NSC and Cabinet meetings in the president's absence. He also sent Nixon on fact-finding trips to Moscow and Latin America, both of which went well beyond the ceremonial.[31] Ike gave

[29] Measuring degrees of such influence is difficult and beyond the scope of this article. In recent years, only Vice President Walter Mondale may have had influence that approaches Gore's—although I cannot state that conclusively. On Mondale's influence, see Steven M. Gillon, *The Democrats' Dilemma: Walter F. Mondale and the Liberal Legacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 181; Hamilton Jordan, *Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency* (New York: G. Putnam's Sons, 1982), 68; Alexander Moens, *Foreign Policy Under Carter: Testing Multiple Advocacy Decision Making* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 44–5; John Dumbrell, *The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993), 38; and Lewis, *Mondale; Portrait of an American Politician*, 241.

[30] Ann Devroy and Stephen Barr, "Gore Bucks Tradition In Vice President's Role," *Washington Post*, 18 February 1995.

[31] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. once aptly noted that much foreign travel of vice presidents was "make work." Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "On the Presidential Succession," *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (Fall 1974): 475–505. Yet Nixon did take a number of serious trips that went well beyond simple make work. On Nixon's Moscow and Latin America trips, see Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 189–90 and 209–12; Richard Nixon, *Six Crises* (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 184–88, 197–203, 211–27, 237–41, 254–55, 265–72, 283–87, and 442–43; Earl Mazo

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Nixon the sensitive task of meeting with Fidel Castro during a Washington visit on 19 April 1958 in order to assess the Cuban leader's views and intentions.[32] Making good on his promise to involve Mondale, Carter right away took the step of signing an executive order making the vice president second in the chain of command for the control of nuclear weapons.[33] Not until Mondale did vice presidents have their own offices in the West Wing of the White House. Not until President John F. Kennedy was a vice president given space even in the Executive Office Building.[34] Immediately after the election, says Carter, Mondale came to him with a well-prepared book of suggestions on how to better use the vice president, and Carter accepted all of them.[35] Likewise, Reagan did not want his vice president to be "standby equipment."[36] Under Reagan, Vice President Bush became the first vice president to chair a crisis-management committee.

Not surprisingly, the style of differing executives helps explain the varying involvement of vice presidents, as do factors like personal relationships and relative strengths and weaknesses of an administration's foreign-policy team. These factors apply to both Quayle and Gore. For instance, while recent vice presidents have been allowed to spread their wings somewhat in foreign policy, few entered a White House leadership vacuum similar to that Gore encountered in the early Clinton administration. The administration itself acknowledged this vacuum. Quayle and Vice President Spiro Agnew, for example, both served under presidents and foreign-policy personnel renowned for their depth in foreign affairs before entering office. Agnew was especially lacking in expertise on foreign policy, having been a one-term governor who did not have congressional experience in global issues. Quayle was hindered in foreign affairs within the Bush administration because of the strength of the president and his

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and Stephen Hess, *Nixon: A Political Portrait* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 166–97 and 208–9; Costello, *The Facts about Nixon*, 254–59; Ralph de Toledano, *Nixon* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956, 1960), 160–62 and 255–57; Jules Witcover, *Crapshoot: Rolling the Dice on the Vice Presidency* (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1992), 134–35; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956–1961* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 408–15, 435–39, 447, and 519–20. On Ike's general innovations, see Marie D. Natoli, "Perspectives on the Vice Presidency," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 12 (Fall 1982): 598 and 602; and Costello, *The Facts about Nixon*, 229.

[32] See Jeffrey J. Safford, "The Nixon-Castro Meeting of 19 April 1959," *Diplomatic History* 4 (Fall 1980): 425–31; Alan H. Luxenberg, "Did Eisenhower Push Castro Into the Arms of the Soviets?," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30 (Spring 1988): 47–9; Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Volume II, The President* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 582–84; Nixon, *Six Crises*, 351–52; Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 7; and Mazo and Hess, *Nixon: A Political Portrait*, 209.

[33] Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 40.

[34] This West Wing office location helped keep Mondale "in the loop" on foreign-policy matters. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 33–35; Paul C. Light, *Vice-Presidential Power* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 76, 154, and 177; Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 40; Jordan, *Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency*, 77; and Gillon, *The Democrats' Dilemma*, 180.

[35] Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 37–9.

[36] Ronald Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).

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team. "I can bring certain facts and things to the table that are important to [Bush]," said Quayle, in a point made by his chief of staff, Bill Kristol, and others, "but he has so many resources on foreign policy and he is so steeped in foreign policy himself."[37] Foreign-policy and national-security adviser, Joe DeSutter, the only staff member who served both Quayle and Gore, confirms this view. DeSutter told me that Bush's expertise in foreign policy meant he was his "own brief" on the subject—which is the opposite of Clinton. DeSutter said Bush could have had "George Marshall or Henry Kissinger" as vice president but still would be his own brief on foreign policy.[38] Clinton, on the other hand, could have a vice president with little experience in foreign policy and still consult with him regularly, because he was not his own brief in foreign policy.

Thus, the extent to which a vice president is involved in foreign policy is always traceable to the president and his foreign-policy team, with the president ultimately deciding the areas of policy his vice president is permitted to handle. However, in the case of Quayle and Gore, an added factor lay with each administration's secretary of state. A salient reason explaining the differing levels of involvement of these two particular vice presidents—although not greater than the issue of the presidents they served—is the influence of the secretary of state, specifically James A. Baker III for Quayle and Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright for Gore. That influence rested on how the secretary of state promoted/hindered vice-presidential activity and how the strength/weakness of the secretary of state allowed room for a vice-presidential role.

The Secretary of State Factor

Judging from the cases in which the vice president was highly active in foreign affairs, looking at the secretary of state can sometimes provide insight in partly explaining his use. For instance, during the late 1950s, Richard Nixon unquestionably became the most foreign-policy active vice president up to that time, due in large part to the innovations and behest of President Eisenhower, as well as Nixon's own initiative and zeal for foreign-policy involvement. However, Ike's strong Secretary of State John Foster Dulles did not seek to hinder or undermine Nixon's involvement. Quite the contrary: Dulles encouraged and aided it. As vice president, Nixon received extensive support from his State Department and greatly benefited from what he viewed as a unique and fruitful relationship with Dulles. Reading Nixon's autobiographies, one senses he was very fond of Dulles and viewed him as somewhat of a foreign-policy mentor. Nixon referred to Dulles as "the man I had sought out for advice throughout my career."[39]

[37] David S. Broder and Bob Woodward, "Facing Limitations in an 'Awkward Job,'" *Washington Post*, 8 January 1992.

[38] Interview with DeSutter.

[39] Some of Nixon's remarks suggest that Dulles played a key role in influencing his world view and perhaps even sparked the early interest that would turn Nixon into the student of foreign policy he became. Nixon, *Six Crises*, 235–43; and Nixon, *Memoirs*, 204–5. Stephen Ambrose's work suggests the

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Nixon truly became the first vice president to be used extensively in foreign policy. While Truman's changes provided an opening for his vice president, Alben Barkley, Nixon was the first to seize them. Natoli has aptly noted, "Extensive vice presidential activity would have to wait for . . . the most dramatic turning point, the Nixon vice presidency."[40] George Sirgiovanni, echoing remarks made by Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess, argues that Nixon became "the first 'modern' vice president," transforming the office "from a 'do nothing' job into one with high visibility and some substantive responsibilities."[41] Eisenhower himself felt that he and Nixon had established for the vice president an "unprecedented association—the Vice Presidency had not historically been afforded an opportunity for an extensive use of a man's abilities."[42]

Yet, Nixon's foreign-policy involvement was also made possible and even facilitated by Dulles. Two events dramatized Vice President Nixon's foreign-policy activities: the infamous yet important South America trip in 1958; and the trip to Moscow in 1959. Dulles was pivotal in both. He convinced Nixon to make the former, twisting his arm, getting Eisenhower to pressure the vice president, and substantially enhancing the itinerary by turning it from a one-stop visit in Argentina to a multicity tour of Latin America.[43] Dulles granted Nixon extensive briefings from the State Department. Similarly, Dulles and the president constructed a serious fact-finding trip to Moscow for Nixon in 1959, packing his itinerary with weighty topics he would address one-on-one with the Soviet premier. The visit culminated in the famous Kitchen Debate with Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Nixon received briefings for the trip from many people, but maintained that the "most memorable . . . came from John Foster Dulles."[44] As Jules Witcover notes, the trip would provide the vice president with "near celebrity status."[45] During his first term, Nixon had generally been a quite unpopular vice president among the public, and a liability to Eisenhower as a whole. However, his stock improved during the second term, especially after the trips to Latin America and the Soviet Union.

Secretary of State Dulles at times cheered on, rather than hindered, Nixon's use in foreign policy. In the case of Vice President Quayle, the following shows Secretary of State Baker to be somewhat of an "anti-Dulles" to his vice presi-

relationship was more complicated. Nonetheless, the aforementioned is Nixon's perception. At the least, it is true that Dulles helped, rather than impeded, Nixon in these cases. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913–62* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 439–42.

[40] Marie D. Natoli, "The Vice Presidency in the Third Century" in James Pfiffner and R. Gordon Hoxie, eds., *The Presidency in Transition* (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1989), 414–5.

[41] George S. Sirgiovanni, "Dumping the Vice President: An Historical Overview and Analysis," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24 (Fall 1994): 75; and Mazo and Hess, *Nixon: A Political Portrait*, 207 and 219.

[42] Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 7.

[43] Nixon, *Six Crises*, 183–4.

[44] Ibid., 235–43; Nixon, *Memoirs*, 203; and Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 408–9.

[45] Witcover, *Crapshoot*, 136.

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dent. In regard to Vice President Gore, Secretary of State Christopher, like Dulles, encouraged the vice president's use in foreign policy and did not obstruct him from playing major roles.

Those vice-presidential/secretary-of-state relationships are explored next. More time is spent on Baker-Quayle, since it involves a more complex and problematic relationship.

Quayle/Baker

An examination of public statements, Quayle's memoirs, and my interviews with Bush administration officials and senior-level Quayle staff confirms that Vice President Quayle and Secretary of State Baker were not especially compatible politically, ideologically, and personally. To some, the topic itself is very sensitive. Of those interviewed, most requested anonymity. When the author asked one source if he could quote a blunt statement, the staffer replied: "If you do, you'll never talk to me again." Most suggest the reasons for the Baker-Quayle friction were political and personal, and Baker's fault. One off-the-record source was asked explicitly by the author: "Did Jim Baker obstruct Quayle's foreign-policy role because of personal-political reasons?" He replied: "It looks to me like that happened." Another replied: "That's true. It's quite right. I think Baker was the reason." One source willing to go on the record, Bill Kristol, replied: "Well, he certainly didn't encourage Quayle's involvement."[46]

Before proceeding, a crucial caveat must be stated: This article relies mainly on Quayle and non-Baker staff members within the administration. The reason is that Baker seems to have been silent on this issue. I am aware that this constraint makes me vulnerable to certain criticisms. To try to make up for any subsequent imbalance, I attempt to speculate from Baker's view when possible, as well as acknowledge the bias of pro-Quayle sources. Even without Baker's direct input, I believe the evidence provided by Quayle and non-Baker sources sustains the article's central thesis: Baker's occasional obstruction of his vice president helps explain why Quayle was less involved in foreign policy than Vice President Gore. Moreover, even if Baker were to deny the whole set of allegations made herein, there is no question the perception was unyielding among Quayle and non-Baker staff, including some who planned and organized the vice president's foreign-policy schedule. Thus, if one side is convinced of the view, there must be a strong element of truth to the charges.

That said, what explains the Quayle-Baker problems? First off, acrimony clearly existed between the two men. They had a testy personal relationship rooted in political rivalry and ideological disagreement. It is usually impossible to separate the two factors. For instance, Quayle's hard line on some foreign-policy matters, such as his skepticism of Gorbachev, stood in contrast to

[46] Interview with Kristol.

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Baker's softer line and appealed to much of the Republican party's formidable conservative base, which was not receptive to Baker. Hence, in this, as in many other issues, the ideological became political.

It must be stressed, however, that Baker may have kept Quayle out of some areas of foreign policy because they were sensitive and involved crucial parts of the world at the time. Carnes Lord, Quayle's first NSA, makes this point: "It could just be that Baker wanted control of the sensitive foreign-policy areas. [Some of those] were hot parts of the world at a key time, and you may not want slightly different views over there [from different members of the administration]." Consequently, the reasons for Baker's obstruction do not all appear personal, although the personal-political component seems undeniable.

Some of the personal difficulties stem from the interaction between the two men during the 1988 presidential campaign. It is well known within Republican party circles that the two, both with their eyes on the presidency, have viewed one another as political competitors angling for differing bases within the GOP.[47] "Quayle had a following among conservatives that made him formidable," said one source who asked not to be identified. "Baker had political ambitions and viewed Quayle as a political rival due to his conservative base." Joe DeSutter, an adviser to Quayle, adds: "I don't think there's any secret about the bad blood between the two, going all the way back to New Orleans and the campaign in 1988."[48] The bad blood is evident in Quayle's memoirs. Of the numerous references he makes to Baker, there is only one obvious compliment: Baker, said Quayle, "was a skilled negotiator." Other than that, Quayle freely levels his "disappointments with [Baker]."[49]

The troubles started on the 1988 campaign trail, where Quayle took a beating from the very beginning. While he doesn't blame this all on Baker, who was the Bush presidential campaign manager, Quayle has misgivings about Baker's performance during this period and how he felt it sometimes directly affected him. Quayle describes the very tense setting surrounding the first day of the Republican convention, during which he had to churn out the performance of his political life amid allegations he was immediately destroying the Bush ticket. He was gearing up for a key press conference where he addressed questions like the National Guard issue. Here's how Quayle describes Baker's actions shortly before the big moment:

> Jim Baker was in the ABC booth. As I was coming into the hall, he pulled out a piece of paper and told the eagerly attentive correspondents, almost verbatim, what I was going to say to the reporters gathered to ask me questions. The intended effect was to show them that he was in charge of me. Baker wanted to signal to the media that I was not really his choice, and that he was making the best of a bad situation. He was putting himself in a win-win position. If I sank the ticket, it was

[47] For examples of Quayle-Baker clashes cited by Quayle, see Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 37, 69, 97, 183–4.

[48] Interview with Joe DeSutter.

[49] Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 101.

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> somebody else's fault, not Baker's. If I didn't, it was because Baker had taken charge of me. Years later, Dan Rather confirmed to me that Baker's demeanor in answering questions (as well as off-the-record comments by some of his people) seemed to indicate that he wasn't comfortable with my selection and that he was trying to distance himself from it.[50]

All along, Quayle seemed to view Baker as scarcely helpful to him during the campaign. In general, Quayle felt that "Baker and his colleagues could certainly have made a lot more positive information about me and my Senate record available to the reporters" at the aforementioned press conference and throughout the campaign.[51]

In another example, in what seems to be a veiled but very valid criticism of Baker, Quayle explains how years later Bush Chief of Staff John Sununu approached him with an idea that may have helped reverse the perception of Quayle as an intellectual lightweight. "We should have sent you up to Harvard to have a debate on arms control with somebody like Sam Nunn," said Sununu to Quayle. "Let the two of you go at it for three hours, talking nothing but arms control, and the press would see that you'd mastered the most complex issue of all. If we'd done that, all this stuff about your being unable to hack it would have just gone away."[52]

In retrospect, the Sununu suggestion was a sound one. During his years in the Senate, Quayle was highly respected for his thorough knowledge of arms control. He had a mastery of both philosophical and theoretical issues of arms control as well as the technical details of weaponry.[53] Quayle was understandably intrigued by Sununu's suggestion and replied, "Did you ever suggest that?" The chief of staff answered: 'Yeah, I mentioned it. But the campaign just wasn't interested."[54] More than likely, "the campaign" is meant as a reference to Jim Baker.

Quayle and his staff were not the only ones suspicious of Baker's treatment of him. The vice president recalls a *Newsweek* blurb, in which the magazine

[50] Ibid., 37.

[51] Ibid., 31.

[52] Ibid., 97.

[53] See Senator Dan Quayle, "Upgrading Our Cruise Missiles: Imperative for the 1990s," *Armed Forces Journal International* 125 (August 1987): 76–77; U.S. Senator Dan Quayle, from an address delivered on the floor of the U.S. Senate, 13 May 1987, during consideration of S. 1174, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, "Should Congress Approve the ABM Treaty Controversy? Con," *Congressional Digest* 66 (November 1987): 275; interview with John G. Roos and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "An Exclusive AFJI Interview with Vice President Dan Quayle," *Armed Forces Journal International* 127 (1 February 1990): 70–72; Fred Barnes, "White House Watch: Brilliant Pebble," *The New Republic*, 1 April 1991, 13; Kengor, "The Role of the Vice President During the Crisis in the Persian Gulf," 785–9; and "Washington Outlook: Now the Right is Taking Potshots at Star Wars," *Business Week*, 20 October 1986, 39. On Quayle's senatorial competence in general, see Richard F. Fenno, *The Making of a Senator: Dan Quayle* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1989).

[54] Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 97.

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stated that Baker had "threaten[ed] to dismiss any Bush aide who trashes Quayle." That remark, in turn, prompted *Newsweek* to ask: "Will [Baker] fire himself?"[55]

Granted, there was a political rivalry, but why was it so personal? Nearly all vice presidents are running for the presidency while they are in office, and some secretaries of state also have their eyes on the ultimate prize. So why was the Quayle-Baker case unusual in terms of personality problems? The answer may lie in Baker himself, who seemed especially difficult toward people he viewed as political rivals, even allies within his own administration. Quayle, obviously, was one of those rivals. But so was Bush's Housing and Urban Development (HUD) secretary, Jack Kemp, who also had the conservative political backing that Baker could only dream of.

Bush administration Deputy NSA Robert M. Gates tells of how Kemp "could aggravate [Baker] with only a word or two." Quayle himself also relays this in regard to Baker and Kemp.[56] Gates illustrates this in dramatic fashion. He says that a "cutting wise crack" by Kemp at Baker one day prompted Baker to shout across the Oval Office, "F—- you, Kemp!" Kemp chased down the hall after Baker. Gates expected a fistfight or perhaps at least a tackle by the former football player, but later heard there "had been no violence."[57] Kemp at least gets mentioned once in Baker's memoirs, which is better than how Quayle fared.[58] Gates proceeds to characterize Baker as "a real piece of work." It is not totally clear if that is meant as a compliment or criticism, although the choice of words suggests the latter. Gates says good and bad things about Baker, but concludes that the secretary of state was not exactly pleasurable to "those he disliked or did not respect."[59]

It is not clear if Baker disliked Quayle and probably impossible to decipher without prying an answer from Baker himself. I asked Quayle staffers if Baker "did not respect" the vice president. Not surprisingly, these Quayle advocates adamantly insist such was not the case. This includes Kristol. One source who asked not to be identified asserted that the problems were personal and political, not due to disrespect or perceived incompetence. "It had nothing to do with ineptness," said the source. "Strictly political." Of course, one should expect Quayle's staffers to defend him against charges of incompetence. Nonetheless, they insist Baker's problems with Quayle were rooted in politics rather than vice-presidential capabilities.

Some of the key staffers in each man's office within the Bush administration simply did not like one another. Kristol and Baker did not appear fond of one

[55] Ibid., 69.

[56] Ibid., 101.

[57] Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 456–7.

[58] James A. Baker III, with Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–92* (New York: G. Putnam's Sons: 1995), 547.

[59] Gates, *From the Shadows*, 456–7.

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another. Kristol commented: "Well, there wasn't any love lost between Baker and Quayle, personally . . . . And I think Baker didn't like me much . . . . Yes, there was a certain amount of tension between State and the VP's office."[60] Much of this tension between the men and their staffs was ideological in terms of foreign-policy views and subsequently became personal and political. "We were just generally more Reaganite and more hawkish than Baker," Kristol explains. He adds: "You know, there were lots of instances where we would sort of pull at the margins of policy, and I think Baker didn't like that much. . . . There was a certain amount of tension; they didn't quite regard us as trustworthy from their point of view at the State Department."[61]

There are examples of foreign-policy remarks made by the vice president that incensed Baker and State, and stemmed from their differing political orientations and world views. For instance, the vice president gave a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on 11 June 1990, where he expressed a considerable degree of sympathy with Israel. He concluded the speech by boldly referring to the occupied West Bank as Judea and Samaria, thereby ignoring long-standing U.S. protocol. While Quayle's comment pleased the Israeli lobby, it incensed the State Department.[62] This is a case where Baker may have been angered at Quayle not simply for personal-political reasons. Quayle was getting press coverage and making hay with the Israeli lobby, which was warm to him but not Baker, but Baker legitimately felt that the vice president's actions went against the State Department's line.

The same might be said for Quayle's comments on Soviet issues, where the differing views of the two were especially evident. "We were more pro-Yeltsin," said Kristol. "[Baker] was more pro-Gorbachev. [The vice president] was more suspicious of Gorbachev . . . . Quayle went to dinner with Yeltsin before Yeltsin became president, that must have been early 1991, and said some nice things about Yeltsin, and that got a few noses at State out of joint because they were still pretty much backing Gorbachev."[63] Quayle himself assesses the divergent views on Gorbachev:

> Baker, who had formed a fast friendship with his counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, favored a Gorbachev-only policy. . . . The president was more skeptical of Gorbachev's intentions, and of his ability to carry the day. . . . That left me to the right of [both]. I had real doubts about Gorbachev's commitment to democracy; I still believe that most of his reforms were simply concessions to political reality at home and abroad. I made little secret of my reservations, and commentators wondered whether Baker and I were in serious conflict, or perhaps coordinating some good-cop/bad-cop strategy toward Gorbachev. A month before the Wall fell, as Baker hailed the Soviet Union's apparent new peacefulness, I was stressing its

[60] Interview with Kristol.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Duffy, "Is He Really That Bad?" 22. See "Text of Remarks by the Vice President to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee on 11 June 1990," *American-Arab Affairs* 33 (Summer 1990): 167.

[63] Interview with Kristol.

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> continuing support for outlaw regimes in countries like Afghanistan and North Korea.[64]

At one point, Quayle made his skepticism about Gorbachev public by assailing him in a speech, angering Bush and Baker.[65] In general, the closest Quayle would get to Soviet policy was the indirect but inevitable route of space policy, which he commandeered via his chairmanship of the president's Space Council. Even this produced some minor fireworks between him and Baker. Quayle, as well as the council's executive secretary, Mark Albrecht, had ideas for joint space missions between the United States and Soviet Union, but were careful not to broaden the scope of cooperation into what they viewed as infringing on the U.S. military-strategic realm. He and Baker had some difficulty on this issue. Quayle recalled:

> Such joint [U.S.–USSR space] possibilities created turf problems between me and Jim Baker, who believed in giving Gorbachev pretty much everything he wanted. I did not like the idea of American satellites being launched on Soviet rockets: we were trying to help develop some commercial launch capability in our own country, and those Soviet rockets would only provide unfair competition. Nonetheless, the idea appealed to Baker. "Who is Mark Albrecht?" he asked me one day, with pursed lips. So now Mark had the Secretary of State on his case. "Congratulations," I told Mark the next time I saw him. "You have really arrived in life. Jim Baker knows your name." Toward the end of the administration, we were preparing a space treaty with Russia, and Baker didn't want anyone negotiating it but himself. I said fine, you'll negotiate, but the Space Council will set the administration's space policy. Sometimes I had to remind Jim that I worked for the President, too.[66]

This difference in opinion, bureaucratic battles over Soviet policy, and possibly the political rivalry have sparked some to speculate that Baker purposely prohibited the vice president not only from deeper involvement in Soviet policy but also from making any trips to Moscow. One source told the author that the glaring lack of a trip by Quayle to Moscow stemmed from obstruction by Baker. "During my tenure Dan Quayle never went to Moscow, and it wasn't because he didn't want to," said the source. Another source, Joe DeSutter, was cautiously vague when asked if he felt Baker had actually obstructed Quayle from traveling to Moscow, but conceded that the author was "probably on the right wave length there."[67]

There may have been similar blockage by the secretary of state right outside Soviet borders. Carnes Lord, Quayle's NSA, notes that the vice president also never went to Eastern Europe and hinted that some feel Baker might have been a reason "The exact reason," said Lord, "I'm not sure."[68] Actually, Lord

[64] Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 164.

[65] On this incident, see Barnes, "White House Watch: Quayle Alert," 12; and Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 92–3.

[66] Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 183–4.

[67] Interview with DeSutter.

[68] Interview with Lord.

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need not be sensitive here, since Quayle himself candidly makes the point. As the dominoes fell in Eastern Europe in 1989–1990, Quayle became very eager to visit the region. He and his staff tried to put together a trip. "We had support from the NSC," said Quayle, "but the State Department and Jim Baker put the kibosh on the idea." In this case, however, Quayle was empathetic to the secretary of state's obstruction, recalling: "Baker wanted to be the first American official to visit that newly free part of the world, and the president, who rarely got involved in these kind of squabbles, came down on Baker's side. So that was that—and if I'd been in Baker's position, I would have done the same thing."[69]

When Quayle did finally get to make a trip to the region—specifically, to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in February 1992—he chalked up his fortune to the fact that Baker and Bush "couldn't be everywhere" at once. In general, because of resistance by State, Quayle tried to work with the NSC in arranging foreign trips for himself.[70]

Finally, DeSutter adds that Quayle, aside from his Desert Storm duties, never went to the Middle East, also a Baker pet interest. "He loved the Middle East and Israel. He was an expert on it and would've liked to have gone there."[71] DeSutter's response on whether Baker halted Quayle trips to the Middle East was similar to his response on the Moscow trips.

Clearly, there were problems between State and the office of vice president, and they extended into Quayle's actual deployment in foreign policy. This showed when it came to scheduling trips for the vice president. However, the effect went beyond just trips. Eventually, the Baker-Quayle relationship would affect Quayle's basic foreign-policy tasks.

One unequivocal example of this was Quayle's role in Latin America. Quayle was not exaggerating when he asserted that he developed into "the administration's most active man for Latin America affairs"—a claim backed by Lord and Glassman, the latter whom Quayle rightly gives a large degree of credit for this development. Glassman, an old foreign-policy hand, urged Quayle to turn Latin America into his area of interest. The deputy NSA, who was a Latin America specialist from the State Department, recognized a vacuum in Latin America that could be filled by the vice president. "I identified a niche for him," Glassman acknowledges.[72] In addition, as Lord notes, it was a "portfolio relatively unattended," and Quayle picked it up. Lord maintains that Quayle was very knowledgeable about the region.[73] Glassman also recognized that Latin America was witnessing an era of fast economic growth, coming out of the depression of the 1980s, and that it could be a "very hot area." He also felt Quayle would be a nice fit because he was young and aggressive, like the

[69] Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 145.

[70] Ibid., 175 and 146.

[71] Interview with DeSutter.

[72] Carnes Lord confirms Glassman's role in this regard. Interview with Lord; Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 146 and 161–2; and interview with Glassman.

[73] Interview with Lord; interview with Glassman.

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new generation of Latin American leaders themselves. Additionally, those leaders would respect the fact that the administration sent the U.S. government's second highest person as a representative. "He was young, like the Latin American leaders, and had a lot in common with them," says Glassman. "Dan Quayle got along very well with these guys. He was viewed as the U.S. leader down there."[74]

But perhaps most important, helping to create a vacuum in Latin America was Baker's understandable preoccupation with Russia, post-cold war Europe, and the Middle East. This was noted by Glassman, Lord, and Quayle himself. The vice president states that the fact that "Baker had no special interest in the area" was one of the primary reasons he sought the Latin America role.[75] Eventually, Quayle's Latin America relationships would benefit him and the administration, particularly during the Gulf War-related trips in 1990, where he met with the leaders of Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina.

Lastly, as an indicator of the friction between Baker and Quayle, there is the issue of what is *not* said. Quayle is not mentioned once in Baker's autobiography, nor are his aides. There is not even a listing for "vice president" in the index. Baker is mentioned at least 60 times in Quayle's book. Perhaps less important but nonetheless worth mentioning is the fact that not one of the numerous photos in Baker's memoir features even a background glimpse of Quayle, many of which include standard shots with members of the president's Big Eight foreign-policy decision makers (which included Quayle).[76] Normally this might be construed as unintentional—and it very well may be—but in this case, we cannot be certain.

This might be contrasted to the treatment of other recent vice presidents by the top foreign-policy players in their administration. Vice President Walter Mondale gets mentioned so often in Zbigniew Brzezinski's *Power and Principle* that the NSA felt it necessary to have a section in his memoir just on Carter's vice president.[77] Reagan's Secretary of State George Shultz's memoirs cite Vice President Bush at least sixty times in the index.[78]

The current vice president, Al Gore, is actually mentioned more in Baker's memoir (once) than Baker's own vice president—as a senator who was among "Israel's strongest backers on Capitol Hill."[79] This mention of Gore hits on the Quayle slight in a compelling way. Baker addresses the issue of Israel's solid supporters, which provided a perfect entree for him to mention Israel's strongest supporter in the Bush White House—Vice President Quayle.

[74] Interview with Glassman.

[75] Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 146–7.

[76] Baker and DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy.*

[77] Brzezinski, *Power and Principle.*

[78] George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Macmillan, 1993).

[79] Baker and DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, 344.

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Baker was keenly aware of this. Some of Quayle's pro-Israel overtures had infuriated the State Department. Throughout the administration, the vice president helped smooth relations with Israeli officials, with whom he had friendlier ties than Bush and Baker.[80] A top Israeli lobbyist said that Quayle was "a friend and a factor."[81] Kristol agrees that Quayle "generally was much friendlier to the Likud government than anyone else in the Bush administration." Israelis never forgot his past Senate support and remarks throughout his vice presidency, such as the Judea and Samaria comments. In the early months of the Gulf conflict, Quayle, against widespread opposition, won approval for a $700 million weapons shipment for Israel.[82] In general, Kristol feels that Quayle helped push the administration "toward a more pro-Israeli Middle East policy." He remarks: "Quayle was more pro-Israel than Bush and Baker. . . . Quayle did, indeed, try to make the administration a little more pro-Israel than it tended to be at some key points. Quayle got in trouble for being a little bit too pro-Israel at times."[83] Among the Big Eight involved in the tightly controlled sessions on the Gulf crisis, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger typically joined Quayle in his pro-Israel sympathies, usually opposed by Baker and State.[84] At one point during Desert Storm, when Israel's Shamir was considering retaliating against Iraq because Saddam had launched SCUD missiles at Tel Aviv, Quayle wrote in his diary: "Cheney and I are only ones sympathetic toward Israel. Baker totally opposed."[85]

Quayle's influence with the president increased during the Gulf crisis. This influence was reflected in his ability to synthesize his friendly relationships with both the president and Israeli leadership in a manner that was extremely productive in key aspects of administration actions in the Gulf. For instance, notes Fred Barnes (in a claim backed by Bill Kristol), "Unswervingly pro-Israeli, Quayle persuaded Bush that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was a guy Bush could deal with. Were Israel attacked, Shamir wouldn't necessarily draw Israel into the Gulf War. Quayle was right."[86] Kristol speaks of how both he and Quayle, because of their strong pro-Israel stance, "had independent contacts with members of the Israeli government" that served the administration well during the Gulf conflict. He states that Quayle exploited his friendly relationship with the Israelis to help persuade them to use restraint in the event of an attack on their home soil. "During the war there was some back channel

[80] Burt Solomon, "War Bolsters Quayle's Visibility . . . But Hasn't Increased His Stature," *National Journal*, 2 March 1991, 522.

[81] Duffy, "Is He Really That Bad?" 22.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Interview with Kristol.

[84] Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 229–30.

[85] Ibid., 229–30.

[86] Barnes also reported that in the post-war period Quayle alone was adamant in telling Bush that the United States had a "moral obligation" to the Iraqi Kurds. "The president came around belatedly," wrote Barnes. This unique concern for the Kurds by the vice president in the post-war period was confirmed by Carnes Lord. Barnes, "Quayle Alert," 27 May 1991, 12; and interview with Lord.

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communications where . . . Quayle used his friendship with [Israeli Defense Minster Moshe] Arens and others to sort of try to keep the Israelis from going off on their own and to be sure the Israelis did the right thing." On the issue of restraint, Quayle prodded both the U.S. and Israeli leadership. The importance of this cannot be underestimated. There was concern that if the Israelis had responded with force to Saddam's SCUD attacks, the Iraqi leader might succeed in drawing Israel into the conflict and splitting the tenuous allied coalition. And yet, in Baker's memoirs, Senator Gore's support of Israel gets more mention than that of Vice President Quayle. None of these actions by Quayle are mentioned. This neglect is so conspicuous by its absence that it seems likely to be intentional on Baker's part.

Baker's lack of mention of Quayle could not stem from a lack of involvement by the vice president in the Bush administration foreign policy. One might expect Baker to at least take the occasion of his autobiography to take a few shots at Quayle. But there's not even a negative mention of Quayle. Why not? While the answer is unclear, it may have to do with their political rivalry. Sometimes the best way to disarm a political rival is to ignore him. Witness popular incumbent presidents who try not to debate their opponents during election periods when enjoying a comfortable lead in the polls. Perhaps Baker tried to deal with Quayle in the same fashion.

Quayle, on the other hand, has not been silent on his problems with Baker. Reiterating a point in his memoirs, Quayle told ABC's Diane Sawyer in 1994 that Baker has always done what is best for Baker, not for President Bush or anyone else. "It is portrayed in the press that George Bush has always needed Jim Baker. It's the other way around. Jim Baker has always needed George Bush." When asked by Sawyer, "Should a man [Baker] like that be president?" Quayle, perhaps seizing an opportunity to get in a campaign barb, replied: "I think that's a good question."[87]

Quayle managed to have a foreign-policy role despite Baker's machinations. This was due to the fact that Quayle had a place at the table, thanks to President Bush and institutional changes made in the post-World War II vice presidency, and he had useful relationships to offer the administration, such as his ties with leaders in Israel and Latin America. These advantages allowed the vice president to occasionally contribute despite Baker's resistance. This demonstrates that while the influence of the secretary of state is a key factor in how the vice president will be used in foreign policy, it is certainly not the only factor, nor the most important.

GORE/CHRISTOPHER-ALBRIGHT

Whereas Baker was an obstacle to Quayle, Christopher was to Gore an encourager, a facilitator, a recruiter, and even a weak, nonassertive, passive presence

[87] *ABC News Prime Time Live*, "Standing Firm," interview transcript, 5 May 1994, 8. For more on Quayle believing that Baker needed Bush rather than vice versa, see Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 101.

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who was seemingly (and willingly) pushed aside by the vice president at times. He was never a hindrance. The beneficence granted to Gore by the secretary of state has not reversed course under Christopher's successor, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. On 6 December 1996, this became apparent almost immediately as Albright, during the press conference in which President Bill Clinton announced her nomination, took the highly unusual gesture of thanking not just the president but also his vice president. While Albright deserves credit for allowing Gore to continue his role, the person who truly enabled Gore's role was Christopher.

A Bush administration official who has met both vice presidents believes each has had historic roles in foreign policy, but that Gore has become more involved. When asked why, the source anonymously told the author: "The explanation is Jim Baker. Jim Baker had political ambitions and viewed Quayle as a political rival due to his conservative base. Why would Baker let Dan Quayle rise any higher in foreign policy if he could prevent it?" On the other hand, the source averred, "Gore doesn't have that problem. Warren Christopher has no political ambitions." At the very least, it is safe to assert that Christopher did not have Baker's presidential aspirations. However, Christopher did not merely step aside; instead, he pushed for an expanded role by Gore, and happily (alarmingly, even) allowed him to usurp some of the secretary of state's own duties.

Gore's emergence can be attributed to the early foreign-policy leadership vacuum that took place within the first term of the Clinton administration. Behind the scenes, Gore himself told Clinton he had to pay more attention to foreign policy, act decisively, and accept the consequences.[88] In mid-October 1993, to address the problem of the leadership vacuum (as well as the president's uneven policy management), Secretary of State Christopher asked President Clinton to commit himself to a weekly meeting with his top foreign-policy advisers. "While the president has agreed," reported a December 1993 article in the *Wall Street Journal*, "the schedule has yet to be regularized. The daily intelligence briefings aren't daily and usually are rushed. And aides say that they are still looking for a way to carve out more 'quality time' between the president and NSA [Tony] Lake."[89]

A vacuum existed in the White House. Weeks before the Gore-Ross Perot NAFTA debate in November 1993, Clinton decided to try to shore up his foreign-policy team as a result of unceasing attacks on his leadership, policy management, and other matters. But the president did not want to fire any of his principals. Consequently, he approached Gore in October and asked him to speak out more on foreign affairs. Gore's two biggest boosters in the White House, David Gergen and Mack McLarty, strongly encouraged it. There were

[88] Breslau and Cohn, "Al Gore: Talk a Lot and Carry a Big Stick," 30.

[89] Carla Ann Robbins, "Gore's Success in Foreign Policy Role Depends on Commitment from Clinton," *Wall Street Journal*, 13 December 1993.

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no formal discussions on the move, nor was there an announcement.[90] Clinton's move was also inspired by Secretary of State Christopher, to whom the charge of missing leadership in international affairs was also being ascribed. Christopher's early stumbles abroad resulted in calls for his resignation by a number of sources, such as the influential *Economist*. Taking a cue from Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Christopher soon learned the fine art of delegation. A beneficiary of that delegation was the vice president, who received an enhanced foreign-policy role in large part at the behest of Christopher. Because of a series of foreign-policy setbacks in fall of 1993, Christopher urged Clinton to give Gore a more active role.[91] "I can only be in one place at a time," Christopher explained. "No Secretary of State can do it all. It would be foolish if he thought he could. One reason I'm so confident is that the vice president is thoroughly reliable."[92]

Larry Sabato commented on the rationale for bolstering the vice president's place in Clinton foreign policy: "Foreign policy is Clinton's weak area, so this makes sense. It's a wise move for [Gore], it's a wise move for Clinton, and it helps all of them in various ways."[93] The vice president helped fill the vacuum. Gore went on to perform tasks that in other administrations were reserved strictly for the secretary of state, national security adviser, and even the president. Moreover, Clinton's early lack of passion for foreign policy, combined with Christopher's willingness to cede vast amounts of his authority to Gore and other agencies, has given the vice president chances in diplomacy. The amount of foreign policy Christopher granted to Gore is quite astonishing. In some ways, Gore went on to dominate areas of foreign policy that were the normal domain of the secretary of state. One striking example is the case of Russia policy. During the first Clinton term, the vice president was perhaps the administration's main spokesman on Russia, establishing a critical link with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Their ongoing relationship has been called the main channel between the administration and Moscow. To illustrate what a force the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission has become, when Secretary of State Christopher met with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev in Geneva in January 1995, they barely discussed the contentious issue of Yeltsin's unfulfilled pledge to disclose Russia's arms deals with Iran. According to Christopher's aides, that was the responsibility of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.[94]

[90] Fred Barnes, "More Gore," *The New Republic*, 6 December 1993, 14.

[91] In his memoirs, Quayle states that Christopher was a friend of Gore's father and "is probably the one who pushed Clinton toward" selecting Gore for vice president. If that is the case, this could be another reason for the faith Christopher had in Gore. Quayle, *Standing Firm*, 338.

[92] "Lexington: The Tortoise of Foggy Bottom," *The Economist*, 8 January 1994, 34; Sciolino and Purdum, "Al Gore, One Vice President Who Is Eluding the Shadows," *New York Times*, 2 January 1994.

[93] Pat Griffith, "Gore Has Revolutionized the Role of the Vice President," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, 26 December 1993.

[94] Sciolino and Purdum, "Al Gore, One Vice President Who Is Eluding the Shadows."

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Gore's influence soon became unmistakable, as recognized by the secretary of state himself. Because of continuing difficulties in scheduling and securing regular meetings with Clinton, Christopher instead arranged to meet with Gore every Friday. "I know he'll be a very influential figure if we talk something through," reasoned Christopher. Gore "is relied on more heavily than any vice president has ever been in the past. Not just in foreign policy, but as far as I can tell, across the board."[95] Of course, this reflects positively on Gore, and says much about his own skills and the strength of his relationship with the president; but it may raise questions about the leadership of the secretary of state and the rest of the Clinton foreign-policy team. It is almost inconceivable to picture Baker accepting a similar situation. At the least, few secretaries of state would concede to their vice president the amount of foreign policy Christopher did to Gore—certainly not Jim Baker or Al Haig, and, to a lesser degree, Cyrus Vance.

According to Fred Barnes, Gore's emergence in foreign policy became a sensitive issue at the White House. Ironically, his job as a major spokesman on foreign policy diminished the role of Secretary of State Christopher. To ease Christopher's fears, White House aides insisted that Gore was not displacing him, just supplementing him. They also worried about the vice president's success coming at the expense of the president.[96] Nonetheless, Christopher himself suggested the role for Gore, and Clinton happily leaned on the vice president for advice. Secretary of State Christopher has since called Gore "the most influential vice president in history."[97] If so, that influence can be attributed to Gore's own doing, circumstances, and his exceptional relationship with Clinton. But Gore can also partly thank Christopher.

Conclusion

Clearly, there are tremendous differences in how the two most recent vice presidents were treated by their respective secretaries of state. One of the more glaring examples is policy toward the Soviet Union/Russia. Quayle appears to have been blocked from getting closely involved in Soviet policy to the point where Baker may have actually impeded vice-presidential visits to Russia during the Bush administration. Gore, on the other hand, was not only permitted to be involved in Russia policy, but was encouraged by his secretary of state and at times took preeminence over Christopher in aspects of Russia policy.

There are striking contrasts in this area. For instance, the very notion of a Quayle-Chernomyrdin Commission, akin to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, would have been anathema to Baker, particularly allowing it to become the main channel between the administration and Moscow. Also, it is hard to

[95] Breslau and Cohn, "Al Gore: Talk a Lot, and Carry a Big Stick," 30.
[96] Barnes, "More Gore," 15.
[97] Sciolino and Purdum, "Al Gore, One Vice President Who Is Eluding the Shadows."

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imagine Secretary of State Baker conceding that the issue of Yeltsin's unfulfilled pledge to disclose Russia's arms deals with Iran would instead be the responsibility of his vice president and Chernomyrdin, as Christopher did in Geneva in 1995.

Despite the work Quayle had done with his Space Council in bringing the United States and USSR toward cooperation on joint space issues, any vice-presidential involvement in the treaty stage was vetoed by Baker. Some might argue that Baker's stance was totally justified, especially as the Quayle work hit the sacred State-Department realm of drafting treaties, which is usually considered State's domain. Gore's secretary of state has not stopped him from negotiating agreements with countries like Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and others.

The Office of the Vice Presidency has been a popular target for reform in recent years. Many scholars have made recommendations.[98] One is relevant here: Former aide to Vice President Bush, C. Boyden Gray, has suggested that the vice president play a coordinating role in assisting the primary executive-level department that runs foreign policy—the Department of State. Gray, using Vice President Bush as an example, lists notable examples of how such a change might benefit policy. While Gray's recommendation has merit and may work effectively at times, the Baker-Quayle case demonstrates how tenuous such an arrangement might be in some cases. If a president decides to allow his vice president a coordinating role in assisting the State Department, he had better ensure that his vice president and secretary of state, as well as their staffs, are politically, ideologically, and personally compatible. Gray's suggestion may have worked for Gore-Christopher but would likely have been disastrous for Quayle-Baker.[99]

This case stands as a strong example of how personality can affect the day-to-day tasks and overall duties of players within a presidential administration. In that sense, this article—aside from perhaps telling a story and offering a comparison that has not been made—may provide a contribution in illuminating one especially salient point. While scholars of the vice presidency have correctly understood that the vice president's use in foreign policy (or any type of policy) is first and foremost dependent upon the president he serves, it can also be influenced by the secretary of state within his administration. On the surface, that might seem obvious, but it has scarcely been as evident as in the examples

[98] Among others, see Kevin V. Mulcahy, "Presidents and the Administration of Foreign Policy: The New Role for the Vice President," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 17 (Winter 1987): 129; Marie D. Natoli, *American Prince, American Pauper* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 183–5; Natoli, "The Vice Presidency in the Third Century," 404; and Ben W. Heineman, Jr., "Some Rules of the Game: Prescription for Organizing the Domestic Presidency" in James Pfiffner and R. Gordon Hoxie, eds., *The Presidency in Transition* (New York: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1989), 45–53.

[99] C. Boyden Gray, "The Coordinating Role of the Vice Presidency" in Pfiffner and Hoxie, eds., *The Presidency in Transition*, 425–29. For a more rigorous analysis of Gray's suggestion, see Kengor, *Wreath Layer or Policy Player.*

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of Quayle and Gore. To my knowledge, this secretary-of-state factor has not been adequately stressed in prior scholarship. Although the chief executive's role is most integral in crafting and deciding a vice president's foreign-policy activities, the role of the secretary of state cannot be ignored and may at times be a key factor in helping to elevate the vice president from one level of foreign-policy involvement to the next. The Bush and Clinton administrations offer an instructive comparison.

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Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy

PETER BURNS
JAMES G. GIMPEL

An infamous yet fictional American once said that in the United States we are all free to live in our own separate sections. Archie Bunker, the mouthpiece for this observation, expressed prejudicial attitudes not only toward blacks, but out-groups in general. If the popular television series, *All in the Family*, had lasted, the character Carroll O'Connor made famous would today be leveling his caustic aim at immigrant groups and calling for Pat Buchanan's great wall. Many supporters of immigration restriction could indeed be characterized as Archie Bunker types. But more respectable restrictionists never argue for reducing immigration on blatantly racist or nativist grounds. From the content of elite discourse and from the rich academic debate on the costs and benefits of immigration, observers would likely conclude that the main rationale for restricting immigration was an economic one.[1] But what lies

[1] George J. Borjas, *Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Gregory A. Huber and Thomas J. Espenshade, "Neo-isolationism, Balanced-Budget Conservatism and the Fiscal Impacts of Immigrants," *International Migration Review* 31 (Winter 1997): 1031–1054; Steven Camarota, "The Effect of Immigrants on the Earnings of Low-skilled Native Workers: Evidence from the June 1991 Current Population Survey," *Social Science Quarterly* 78 (June 1997): 417–431; Julian Simon, *Immigration: The Demographic and Economic Facts* (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 1995); William H. Frey, "Immigration and Internal Migration Flight: A California Case Study," *Population and Environment* 16 (December 1995): 353–375; William

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at the bottom of mass attitudes toward immigrants and immigration? In this article, we use public opinion data to investigate the extent to which economic circumstances and prejudicial stereotypes serve as explanations for attitudes in a highly controversial policy domain.

Racial Prejudice or Economic Insecurity

Many investigators have noted that opposition to immigration rises during recessionary periods.[2] This raises the question of whether public attitudes favoring immigration restriction are volatile because they are rooted in shifting economic circumstances. Alternatively, symbolic prejudices formed in preadult years may create the basis for highly stable, relatively fixed attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy.

Economic self-interest and symbolic prejudice have often been treated as rival explanations for attitudes on a wide variety of issues, but it is plausible that they are complementary on an issue such as immigration. This would be the case if prejudice were caused, at least partly, by economic insecurity. This idea is not especially new. A distinguished line of scholars has explored the idea that economic competition among rival ethnic groups produces hostile and prejudicial attitudes.[3] Historians have noted that hostility to immigrants in the

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H. Frey, "The New Geography of Population Shifts: Trends Toward Balkanization" in Reynolds Farley, ed., *State of the Union—America in the 1990s, Volume II: Social Trends* (New York: Russell Sage, 1995), 271–334; William H. Frey, "Immigration Impacts on Internal Migration of the Poor: 1990 Census Evidence for U.S. States," *International Journal of Population Geography* 1 (January 1995): 51–67; Robert H. Topel, "Regional Labor Markets and the Determinants of Wage Inequality," *American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings* (May 1994): 17; Randall K. Filer, "The Effect of Immigrant Arrivals on Migratory Patterns of Native Workers" in George J. Borjas and Richard Freeman, eds., *Immigration and the Workforce* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); George J. Borjas, *Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S. Economy* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

[2] James G. Gimpel and James R. Edwards, Jr., *The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999); John S. Lapinski, Pia Peltola, Greg Shaw, and Alan Yang, "The Polls—Trends: Immigrants and Immigration," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 2 (Summer 1997): 356–383; Rita J. Simon and Susan H. Alexander, *The Ambivalent Welcome: Print Media, Public Opinion and Immigration* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993); Edwin Harwood, "Alienation: American Attitudes Toward Immigration," *Public Opinion* 2 (June/July 1983): 49–51.

[3] H. D. Forbes, *Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture and the Contact Hypothesis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Scott Cummings, "Racial Prejudice and Political Orientations Among Blue-Collar Workers," *Social Science Quarterly* 57 (June 1997): 907–920; Lincoln Quillian, "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe," *American Sociological Review* 60 (August 1995): 586–611; M. Rothbart and O. John, "Intergroup Relations and Stereotype Change: A Social Cognitive Analysis and Some Longitudinal Findings" in P. Sniderman, P. Tetlock, and E. Carmines, eds., *Prejudice, Politics and the American Dilemma* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Susan Olzak, "Labor Unrest, Immigration and Ethnic Conflict in Urban America, 1880–1914," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (May 1989): 1303–1333; Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); Scott Cummings, "Racial Prejudice and Political Orientations among Blue-Collar Workers," *Social Science Quarterly* 57 (March 1977): 907–920; Scott Cummings, "White Ethnics, Racial Prejudice and Labor Market Segmentation," *American Journal of Sociology* 90 (November 1980):

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northeastern states in the 1840s and 1850s was the result of the competitive pressures put on natives by the presence of cheap immigrant labor.[4] At times, labor market competition resulting from generous immigration policy resulted in displaced hostility toward blacks, because they had less power to fight back.[5] In more recent years, low-skilled and uneducated whites have been found to express the most virulent racism because of the glut of unskilled immigrant and black workers alleged to be ready to take their jobs.[6] According to one tradition of scholarship, prejudice is ultimately an expression of self-interested calculations based on one's economic position; and anti-immigrant attitudes are traceable to economic anxieties.

The literature on racism and negative ethnic stereotyping is so extensive that it is impossible to summarize it in a few pages. Thankfully, the theoretical linkage between prejudicial attitudes, stereotypes, and opinions about immigration is straightforward and should not require elaborate justification. Briefly, stereotypes are widely used to generalize about the characteristics of groups of people through the assignment of simple labels that purportedly represent group traits.[7] Some of the most prominent stereotypes that have been the subject of psychological investigation involve ethnic identity.[8] Prejudiced persons are not prejudiced because they use stereotypes. It is the content of those stereotypes that matters in the determination of prejudice.[9]

938–950; Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market," *American Sociological Review* 37 (October 1972): 547–559; Edna Bonacich, "Advanced Capitalism and Black/White Race Relations in the United States: A Split Labor Market Interpretation," *American Sociological Review* 41 (February 1976): 34–51; Hubert M. Blalock, "Economic Discrimination and Negro Increase," *American Sociological Review* 21 (October 1956): 584–588.

[4] Robert Ernst, "Economic Nativism in New York City During the 1840s," *New York History* 46 (April 1948): 170–186; Ray A. Billington, *The Protestant Crusade, 1800–1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1963).

[5] Olzak "Labor Unrest, Immigration and Ethnic Conflict in Urban America, 1880–1914."

[6] J. R. Kluegel and Eliot R. Smith, "Affirmative Action Attitudes: Effects of Self-interest, Racial Affect, and Stratification Beliefs on Whites' Views," *Social Forces* 61 (March 1983): 797–824.

[7] Galen V. Bodenhausen and Robert S. Wyer, Jr., "Effects of Stereotypes on Decision Making and Information-Processing Strategies," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 48 (August 1985): 267–282.

[8] Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, "Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: The Role of Racial Stereotypes," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (May 1997): 375–401; Eaaron I. Henderson-King and Richard E. Nisbett, "Anti-Black Prejudice as a Function of Exposure to the Negative Behavior of a Single Black Person," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71 (April 1996): 654–664; Joachim Krueger, "Personal Beliefs and Cultural Stereotypes about Racial Characteristics," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71 (September 1996): 536–548; Charles M. Judd, Bernadette Park, Carey S. Ryan, Markus Brauer, and Susan Kraus, "Stereotypes and Ethnocentrism: Diverging Interethnic Perceptions of African-American and White-American Youth," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 69 (September 1995): 460–481; Sniderman, Tetlock, and Carmines, eds., *Prejudice, Politics and the American Dilemma*; Paul M. Sniderman and Thomas Piazza, *The Scar of Race* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1993); Patricia G. Devine and Sara M. Baker, "Measurement of Racial Stereotype Subtyping," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 17 (February 1991): 44–50; Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954).

[9] Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*; W. Edgar Vinacke, "Stereotypes as Social Concepts," *Journal of Social Psychology* 46 (November 1957): 229–243.

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Racial and ethnic stereotypes are relevant to opinion formation about public policy, because they influence information processing and decision making. Those who believe the stereotype that blacks are lazy are likely to be opposed to policies that seek to ameliorate racial discrimination through affirmative action.[10] Similarly, those who believe immigrants to be unintelligent, dirty, unwilling to learn English, or unwilling to work as hard as natives are more likely to oppose immigration than those who do not have such beliefs.

Of course it is well known that the term "immigrant" is increasingly associated with "ethnic minority" in both the United States and Europe.[11] As the immigration stream to the United States continues to be dominated by Asian and Hispanic immigrants, attitudes toward immigration may become even more closely linked to ethnic stereotypes than they were in the late 1990s. The more the term "immigrant" becomes associated with negatively-stereotyped minority groups, the more likely immigration policy will be decided on the basis of peoples' racial attitudes.

An Independent Role for Economic Self-Interest

While we believe that economic insecurity may manifest itself in racial prejudice and restrictionist preferences on immigration policy, it is easy to imagine someone who is economically vulnerable but does not express negative racial stereotypes. For this reason, individual economic fears should be considered a direct influence on attitudes independent of any indirect impact they may have through respondents' racial prejudices. Whether fears that immigrant labor could supplant native workers are well founded is subject to considerable dispute in the academic journals. But information is costly and people rarely form their opinions based on a complete account of the facts. Natives and established immigrants who are unskilled worry that the influx of immigrants may be injurious to their livelihood, even if the reality is otherwise. The fear of labor competition could easily bring about demands for protection even in the absence of racist beliefs.

Whether economic insecurity should be measured with a question about the outlook for one's personal financial situation or with a question about more general economic conditions has been a matter of controversy in voting and opinion studies.[12] One's personal financial position has generally not been as

[10] James H. Kuklinski, Michael D. Cobb, and Martin Gilens, "Racial Attitudes and the 'New South,'" *Journal of Politics* 59 (June 1997): 323–349; Sniderman and Piazza, *The Scar of Race.*

[11] Charles L. Glenn and Ester J. deJong, *Educating Immigrant Children: Schools and Language Minorities in Twelve Nations* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996), chap. 1.

[12] David O. Sears and Carolyn L. Funk, "The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes," *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 24 (1991): 1–91; Donald Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case," *British Journal of Political Science* 11 (April 1981): 129–161; Stanley Feldman, "Economic Self-Interest and Political Behavior," *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (August 1982): 446–466; David O. Sears and Carolyn L. Funk, "The Limited Effect of Economic Self-Interest on the Political Attitudes of the Mass Public," *Journal of Behavioral Economics* 19 (1990): 247–261.

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significant to political behavior as a broader view of national economic performance. Although personal and national economic forecasts are usually related, there are respondents whose personal economic situation is secure but who are fearful for the nation as a whole. Still, the previous literature is explicit in its suggestion that one's personal economic well-being is related to prejudicial attitudes. We hypothesize that attitudes toward immigration levels are more a function of respondents' personal economic situations than of their outlook on the national economy. Since personal and national economic assessments may have an impact on prejudice and on immigration policy, however, we include measures of both in our models.

Education, Income, and Tolerance

The contribution of education to liberal attitudes on racial policies has often been associated with the learning of tolerance.[13] "Educational institutions are regarded as vital propagators of the democratic creed."[14] Education is also related to economic position, such that better educated people earn more money and are generally less threatened by economic downturn than the less educated. But education is not synonymous with either tolerance or economic well-being. Mary Jackman and Michael Muha indicate that better educated people are simply trained to avoid sounding bigoted when they express opposition to racial policies.[15] The well-educated may harbor many of the same views and stereotypes as the less well-educated. Bearing in mind that the survey questions may not be eliciting respondents' true level of prejudice, we still expect the well-educated to express less racist attitudes and express more generous views about immigration policy than the less educated.

We believe that wealth may insulate respondents from the economic pressure of a low-skilled, immigrant labor flow. Higher-income people are more secure in the labor market than the poor. If we conceive of the labor market as segmented, higher-income, better-educated respondents are at the top; immigrants and less well-educated natives are at the bottom. Because the influx of immigrants is unlikely to have much impact on the labor market position of the wealthy and well-educated, these respondents may harbor warmer attitudes toward immigrants than they would if they were on one of the bottom rungs of

[13] Mary Jackman, "General and Applied Tolerance: Does Education Increase Commitment to Racial Education?" *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (May 1978): 302–324; Mary Jackman, "Education and Policy Commitment to Racial Education," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (May 1981): 256–269; Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Licari, "Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 53 (Fall 1989): 285–308; John G. Condran, "Changes in White Attitudes Toward Blacks: 1963-1977," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 43 (Winter 1979): 463–476.

[14] Mary Jackman and Michael J. Muha, "Education and Intergroup Attitudes: Moral Enlightenment, Superficial Democratic Commitment or Ideological Refinement?" *American Sociological Review* 49 (December 1984): 751.

[15] Ibid.

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society's economic ladder. Moreover, some high income respondents in managerial and proprietary positions may readily benefit from the deflationary effect that immigration has on wages. With a cheap labor supply guaranteed by a generous immigration policy, managers and corporate executives can increase the profitability of their enterprises by hiring out of a surplus labor pool consisting of both low-skill natives and immigrants.

Political Ideology

Political ideology, another factor likely to be related to attitudes toward immigration levels, has a distinct role to play in explanations of public opinion, independent of prejudice, self-interest, or education.[16] It is the conceptual tool used to link various public policy positions into a coherent belief system.[17] The terms "liberal" and "conservative" act as abstractions that define the poles on a continuum of favorable or unfavorable judgments about public policy alternatives. Ideology provides political content for events that might otherwise be evaluated in nonpolitical terms.[18] Relatively few voters actually qualify as ideological thinkers, if the standard for ideological thinking is that they be able to define the poles of the continuum.[19] Yet many Americans still identify themselves as liberals or conservatives, and the positions they take on issues are highly consistent with these ideological identifications.[20] If ideology is an expression of peoples' feelings, and not a reflection of an elaborate political knowledge structure, then ideology's impact on attitudes toward racial policies and toward an issue such as immigration may not be limited only to those who are highly sophisticated reasoners. Ideological reasoning has two facets: the traditional one is cognitive, the other is affective.[21]

[16] Jack Citrin, Beth Reingold, and Donald P. Green, "American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change," *Journal of Politics* 52 (November 1990): 1124–1153.

[17] Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1964); Warren E. Miller and Teresa E. Levitin, *Leadership and Change: Presidential Elections from 1972–1976* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1976).

[18] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960).

[19] John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); John E. Chubb, Michael G. Hagen, and Paul M. Sniderman, "Ideological Reasoning" in Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock, eds., *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 140–163; William G. Jacoby, "Ideological Identification and Issue Attitudes," *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (February 1991): 178–205; Ruth Hamill and Milton Lodge, "Cognitive Consequences of Political Sophistication" in Richard R. Lau and David O. Sears, eds., *Political Cognition* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1985).

[20] Chubb, Hagen, and Sniderman, "Ideological Reasoning."

[21] Ibid., 161.

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Immigration and Attitudes Toward Welfare Use

The American public has very little tolerance for handouts.[22] The reality is that welfare use by legal immigrants has been on the rise. But even if that were not the case, attitudes toward welfare use by native-born minorities are likely to influence attitudes toward immigration insofar as it is increasingly the case that many of the immigrants are themselves distinguishable as ethnic and racial minorities.[23] Racial attitudes are generally not sufficiently refined to draw distinctions between natives and immigrants of a particular ethnic group. If one has unfavorable views of native-born Latinos, foreign-born members of this group are likely to be similarly tainted.

Undoubtedly, many citizens are as ambivalent about immigration as they seem to be about race.[24] But ambivalence can quickly turn into negativity if the ambivalent respondent is primed with negative information.[25] Welfare use is exactly the type of information that, like stories about crime, can translate ambivalence toward immigrants into negative emotions.[26] The media is a major source of information about ethnic groups, from coverage of criminal conduct where black and Latino faces are often shown in connection with arrests to stories about the use of welfare and social security benefits by immigrants.[27] One of the major issues addressed in the immigration debate between 1994 and 1996 was the use by immigrants of public benefits to which they were not entitled in the minds of many voters. The association of immigrants with welfare use and the connection between welfare use and negative racial stereotypes underscore how immigration can easily be translated into a racial issue with redistributive undertones.[28] We should not be surprised to find that the negative attitudes that

[22] R. Kent Weaver, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Lawrence R. Jacobs, "The Polls-Trends: Welfare," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Winter 1995): 606–627; Martin Gilens, "Racial Attitudes and Opposition to Welfare," *Journal of Politics* 57 (December 1995): 994–1014; Hugh Heclo, "The Political Foundations of Anti-Poverty Policy" in Sheldon H. Danziger and Daniel H. Weinberg, eds., *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 312–340.

[23] Glenn and deJong, *Educating Immigrant Children: Schools and Language Minorities in Twelve Nations*.

[24] I. Katz and R. G. Hass, "Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict: Correlational and Priming Studies of Dual Cognitive Structures," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 55 (December 1988): 893–905; Gregory R. Maio, David W. Bell, and Victoria M. Esses, "Ambivalence and Persuasion: The Processing of Messages about Immigrant Groups," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 32 (November 1996): 513–546.

[25] Maio, Bell, and Esses, "Ambivalence and Persuasion: The Processing of Messages about Immigrant Groups."

[26] R. Michael Alvarez and John Brehm, "Are Americans Ambivalent Towards Racial Policies?" *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (April 1997): 344–374.

[27] Robert M. Entman, "Blacks in the News: Television, Modern Racism and Cultural Change," *Journalism Quarterly* 69 (Summer 1992): 341–361; Henderson-King and Nisbett, "Anti-Black Prejudice as a Function of Exposure to the Negative Behavior of a Single Black Person."

[28] Martin Gilens, "'Race Coding' and White Opposition to Welfare," *American Political Science Review* 90 (September 1996): 593–604.

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most citizens hold about welfare dependency are at least partly responsible for the widespread hostility toward immigrants and elevated levels of immigration.

Family reunification has long been a bedrock principle of immigration policy in the United States. Since 1968, emigres have been granted visas largely on the basis of family ties to citizens or permanent residents. A history of immigration in one's family influences attitudes on immigration policy, because it reflects the self-interested sensitivity to the experience of those who are closest: one's parents, siblings, and children. "Self-interest encompasses the material interests of the family as well as the material interests of the self."[29] The family is accorded a special place, not just in Western society, but in Eastern societies as well, which explains why Asian-Pacific American interest groups worked so hard to preserve family reunification preferences in the most recent round of immigration reform. We hypothesize that those who have close relatives, in this case parents who are born elsewhere, will be far more supportive of generous immigration policy than those whose parents are native-born.

Social Context, Proximity, and Region

Does the proximity to racial groups other than one's own foster mutual hostility or understanding? This question has perplexed scholars for some time. Some argue that contact reduces negative attitudes between groups while others suggest that proximity breeds polarization.[30] Those believing that proximity reduces intergroup tension base this conclusion on the idea that knowledge and

[29] Donald Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 52.

[30] Hubert M. Blalock, "Economic Discrimination and Negro Increase," *American Sociological Review* 21 (1956): 584–588; Hubert M. Blalock, "Percent Non-White and Discrimination in the South," *American Sociological Review* 22 (1957): 677–682; M. V. Hood and Irwin L. Morris, "Amigo or Enemigo? Context, Attitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigration," *Social Science Quarterly* 78 (June 1997): 309–323; Robert M. Stein, Stephanie Shirley Post, and Allison L. Rinden, "The Effect of Contact and Context on White Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Washington, DC 1997); Lee Sigelman, Timothy Bledsoe, Susan Welch, and Michael W. Combs, "Making Contact? Black-White Social Interaction in an Urban Setting," *American Journal of Sociology* 101 (March 1996): 1306–1332; Lee Sigelman and Susan Welch, "The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Interracial Contact and Positive Racial Attitudes," *Social Forces* 71 (March 1993): 781–795; Donald Kinder and Tali Mendelberg, "Cracks in American Apartheid: The Political Impact of Prejudice among Desegregated Whites," *Journal of Politics* 57 (May 1995): 402–424; Michael W. Giles and Kaenan Hertz, "Racial Threat and Partisan Identification," *American Political Science Review* 88 (June 1994): 317–326; M. Rothbart and O. John, "Intergroup Relations and Stereotype Change: A Social Cognitive Analysis and Some Longitudinal Findings" in P. Sniderman, P. Tetlock, and E. Carmines, eds., *Prejudice, Politics and the American Dilemma*; Mary Jackman and M. Crane, "Some of My Best Friends Are Black. . . : Interracial Friendship and Whites' Racial Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 (Winter 1986): 459–486; Miles Hewstone and Rupert Brown, *Contact and Conflict in Intergroup Encounters* (New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986); Allport, *Nature of Prejudice*, 1954.

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hostility are inversely related. Familiarity breeds not contempt, but friendship.[31] Others, extending as far back as V. O. Key's landmark *Southern Politics*, have been less sure about this.[32] In the South that Key studied, contact with large black populations triggered perceptions of threat among whites and resulted in the most determined efforts by whites to preserve Jim Crow. In more recent studies of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, familiarity does seem to breed contempt under certain circumstances and toward certain groups.[33] Using broad-brush contextual variables for contact, such as the population composition within a respondent's neighborhood or city based on U.S. census data, has generally produced results consistent with Key's early findings. In response to the equivocal nature of the literature, some have argued for more refined measures of group interaction, including an indication of the type of contact respondents have with other groups. Presumably, interaction in the workplace is qualitatively different from interaction in other settings such as neighborhood, church, or school.[34] The data we use here provide a measure of residential interaction based on the dissimilarity index widely used by sociologists and demographers to measure residential integration.[35] Using the dissimilarity index, we hypothesize that contact not only increases negative stereotyping of groups other than one's own but also negative opinions toward immigration, because our specific measure of contact is one of residential proximity. Exposure to out-groups through residential proximity, without correspondingly close social interaction, is likely to increase negative stereotyping.

For most of American history, the nation's largest cities have been the familiar points of entry for immigrants. People from these urban areas are likely to be more accustomed to and more inviting of diversity than those in rural areas. We hypothesize that once we control for related variables such as residential integration, urban areas are more likely to be immigrant-friendly than more rural areas and are less likely to engage in negative ethnic stereotyping.

Immigrants settle in high concentrations in just a few states. In many areas of the country, natives have no contact with immigrants and immigration policy is a nonissue. While having contact with immigrants is not strictly necessary to forming opinions about immigration policy, the ubiquity of immigrants in the border states has fueled a state-level policy debate on top of the issues of national policy making. Grassroots policy petitions aimed at reducing state government benefit levels to legal and illegal immigrants have been circulated in

[31] Thomas F. Pettigrew, *Racially Separate or Together?* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971).

[32] V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1949).

[33] Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations," *Journal of Politics* 59 (September 1997); Hood and Morris, "Amigo or Enemigo?"

[34] Sigelman, Bledsoe, Welch, and Combs, "Making Contact?"

[35] Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Robert M. Jiobu, *Ethnicity and Assimilation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), chap. 5.

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Florida, Texas, California, New Mexico, and Arizona. The movement behind California's Proposition 187 to restrict illegal immigrants from access to certain public services is the best known and most politically successful effort, but restrictionist interest groups continue to press for state-level policy changes. Because of the regional nature of immigrant settlement and the volume of illegal immigration across the southern border, we hypothesize that those living in border states will be more likely than those living elsewhere to negatively stereotype Hispanics and call for reduced immigration levels. Previous research has also shown that residents from southern states are less racially tolerant than those from other states. We therefore introduce a control variable for southern residence.

Several scholars have noted that over time negative stereotypes of certain minority groups have diminished.[36] If racial stereotypes are the product of preadult socialization, then the historical era in which respondents come of age is likely to have a strong impact on their attitudes on a multitude of subjects. A large accumulation of findings points to significant generational differences on a variety of political and policy attitudes.[37] For example, we would expect those who came of age in the post-civil rights era would have more favorable feelings toward the rights of other racial groups compared to those who grew up in earlier times.[38] Negative opinions about ethnic groups may vary with the age of the respondents, with younger cohorts expressing more positive opinions and older cohorts more desultory ones. Theories of modern versus old-fashioned racism also suggest generational differences in racial attitudes may exist. By the 1980s, most white Americans had abandoned the notion that blacks were biologically inferior.[39] Younger cohorts may express racial resentment, but not the baldfaced racism that had been widely accepted prior to the civil rights era.

Findings from a couple of previous studies showed clear differences between the sexes on immigration-related matters.[40] Women have been found to be more supportive of traditional American values than men, and women are more opposed to illegal immigration than men. Other research has pinpointed the growing political conservatism among white males, suggesting that men may be more likely than women to express racial intolerance and hostility toward generous immigration policy. Given these contradictory indications, we control for both gender and the interaction of gender and race.

[36] Rothbart and John, "Intergroup Relations and Stereotype Change"; Marvin M. Karlins, Thomas L. Coffman, and Gary Walters, "On the Fading of Social Stereotypes: Studies in Three Generations of College Students," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 13 (January 1969): 1–16.

[37] Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, *The New American Voter* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

[38] A. Wade Smith, "Cohorts, Education and the Evolution of Tolerance," *Social Science Research* 14 (September 1985): 205–225.

[39] Kinder and Sanders, *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*, 97.

[40] Citrin, Reingold, and Green, "American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change," 144. Also see Thomas J. Espenshade and Charles A. Calhoun, "An Analysis of Public Opinion toward Undocumented Immigration," *Population Research and Policy Review* 13 (February 1993): 189–224.

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Data and Methods

Using the American National Election Studies (ANES) from 1992 and 1996, we evaluate the influence of a number of possible sources of opinion first on negative and positive stereotypes of groups, then on attitudes toward immigration policy. We address the sources of stereotyping first in order to understand the role that economic self-interest, both broadly and narrowly construed, may play in determining positive and negative judgments about rival ethnic groups. While we are working with cross-sectional surveys rather than a panel study, we hope to draw some inferences about attitude change on the issue over a short period of time.

For the first part of the analysis, we investigate the impact of personal and national economic outlook, income, education, ideology, ethnicity, social context, gender, and age on negative stereotypes of Hispanics, blacks, and whites. The data on stereotypes originate from two questions on the 1992 and 1996 American National Election Studies. The first question asked each respondent to rank each ethnic group (whites, Hispanics, and blacks) from 1 to 7 with 1 indicating that the group is typically hardworking and 7 indicating that the group is typically lazy. The second question asked respondents to rank the groups on an intelligence scale, with 1 indicating intelligent and 7 indicating unintelligent. The 1992 study also included a question about dispositions toward violence that was not asked in the 1996 study. The 1996 study asked a question about trustworthiness that was not a part of the 1992 study. Since these questions were not common to the two polls, we excluded them for purposes of our analysis. Because the responses to the two common questions were highly associated, we summed them to create a simple 14 point scale for each of the three groups.[41] Those scoring low on the scale are considered low in prejudice toward a particular group, and those scoring high on the scale were judged to be high in prejudice. Naturally, these questions are likely to be biased toward an underestimation of prejudice, since many respondents know the socially desirable answers. But there was ample variation in response to both questions in both years, suggesting that these queries are not totally without validity as instruments. The variable coding for personal and national economic outlook, attitudes toward welfare recipients, income, education, ideology, age, and contact with other groups is listed in the Appendix. Our measure for contact is the dissimilarity index for the county in which the respondent lives calculated

[41] The ordinal association between the stereotype questions for work ethic and intelligence for each ethnic group for the two years are as follows using both gamma and Cronbach's alpha:

Hispanic	*Black*	*White*
γ = .33 for 1992	γ = .47 for 1992	γ = .43 for 1992
α = .50 for 1992	α = .62 for 1992	α = .48 for 1992
γ = .57 for 1996	γ = .70 for 1996	γ = .71 for 1996
α = .69 for 1996	α = .78 for 1996	α = .76 for 1996

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across census tracts within each county.[42] With the stereotyping scale as our initial dependent variable, we use weighted least squares regression to assess the impact of the independent variables.

Because the dependent variables for racial stereotyping are limited to a range of 1 to 14, and the dependent variables for immigration policy attitudes are truncated on a scale from 1 to 5, we use weighted least squares (WLS) regression to estimate the parameters of each model. These upper and lower limits on the values of the dependent variables violate classic ordinary least squares assumptions, including that of homoscedasticity of the error terms and the possibility that predicted values could lie outside the actual limits of the dependent variable. Weighted least squares addresses the first of these problems by adjusting the regression model according to procedures specified in standard econometrics texts.[43] In the case of predicted values that exceed the bounds of the dependent variables, these are assumed in the WLS framework to be equal to the lowest and highest values of the dependent variable.[44]

Results: Negative Racial Stereotyping in 1992

The results reported in Table 1 show that respondents who are pessimistic about their personal economic situation in 1992 are more likely than those who are optimistic to harbor desultory stereotypes of whites and blacks, but not Hispanics. One's outlook for the national economy has a more consistent impact on negative stereotyping than one's personal economic outlook. One way of understanding the results in Table 1 is that those who are pessimistic about the national economy are especially likely to blame blacks and Hispanics, and those who are optimistic are especially likely to credit whites. People's prejudice, then, is rooted in sociotropic economic fears as well as insecurity about one's own situation, but group interest is more influential than self-interest narrowly construed.

[42] Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, "Residential Distribution and Occupational Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology* 60 (March 1955): 493–503; Lieberson, *Ethnic Patterns in American Cities*; Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change* (New York: Atheneum, 1969); Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*.

[43] Samprit Chatterjee and Bertram Price, *Regression Analysis by Example* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), chap. 5; Damodar N. Gujarati, *Basic Econometrics*, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1995), chap. 11. In this particular case, to obtain our weights for the WLS estimation, we utilized a customary two-stage estimation method, first obtaining the residuals, s_i, from an ordinary least squares estimation of each model, then transformed these residuals to obtain the weights, w_i. The values for w_i are given by $1/s_i^2$. The w_i are then multiplied by the original variables in the model and the resulting parameter values are the WLS estimates. An alternative specification of these models using ordered logit revealed very similar coefficients and significance levels. Given the similarity, and the journal's broad audience, we remained with the simpler, but less technically precise WLS estimation. Readers can obtain the ordered logit results and associated probabilities upon request from the authors.

[44] Gujarati, *Basic Econometrics*, chap. 16.

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TABLE 1

The Effect of Personal Economic Well-Being on Negative Ethnic Stereotyping Controlling for Race and Related Variables, 1992

Variable	*Negative Black Unstandardized Coefficient*	*Negative Hispanic Unstandardized Coefficient*	*Negative White Unstandardized Coefficient*
Pessimistic Personal Economic Outlook	.089	.007	.162
Pessimistic National Economic Outlook	.137	—	.131
Family Income	—	−.008	—
Black	−1.477	−.430	.415
Hispanic	−.307	−1.028	−.513
Support for Welfare	−.018	−.017	−.007
Education	−.020	−.037	.132
Conservatism	.029	—	−.070
Age	.012	—	−.006
Female	−.403	—	−.276
Urban	−.037	−.029	—
Border State	—	−.318	—
Southern State	.151	−.079	−.128
Black-White Isolation	.002	—	—
Hispanic-White Isolation	—	−.005	—
Constant	8.599	9.541	5.390

Regression coefficients from weighted least squares estimation. Source: American National Election Study 1992.

Dependent variable: 1 = positive stereotype of group - 14 = negative stereotype of group.

All listed associations are significant to at least $p < .05$ level.

Race and ethnicity are strong substantive influences on the propensity to stereotype positively or negatively one's own group and other groups. Black respondents have more positive evaluations of blacks and Hispanics than non-Hispanic whites. On average, black respondents evaluated blacks about 1.48 points lower (more favorably) on the stereotype scale than non-Hispanic white respondents. Naturally, blacks are more likely to stereotype whites negatively than non-Hispanic whites are. In evaluating whites' intelligence and work ethic, Hispanics were much more positive than blacks, undoubtedly because many Hispanics are themselves white.

Attitudes toward welfare are more strongly related to negative stereotyping of ethnic groups than personal economic outlook. Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than whites to be the target of negative ethnic stereotypes as the result of attitudes on welfare.[45] A fifty-point increase in one's positive feeling toward welfare recipients as measured by the ANES feeling thermometer scale (which runs from 1-100) reduces negative stereotyping of blacks and Hispanics by nearly 1 point. In other words, those who think the least of welfare recipients

[45] Gilens, "Racial Attitudes and Opposition to Welfare."

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clearly have harsher mental images of blacks and Hispanics than those who are not as critical of the poor.

Ranking behind race and attitudes toward welfare, education is the most powerful influence on the content of stereotypes. Education behaves as expected, with better educated citizens expressing less prejudice toward blacks and Hispanics. The finding for white stereotypes, however, shows that more education is associated with more negative evaluations of whites' work ethic and intelligence. Exploratory work reveals that it is mainly white respondents with lower levels of education who have especially favorable opinions of whites compared to white respondents who are better educated. Poorly educated whites are apparently reluctant to engage in much self-criticism when compared to their better educated counterparts.

Political ideology also has a predictable and statistically significant impact on racial stereotyping once we control for the other variables. More conservative citizens hold more negative stereotypes about blacks than liberals, but conservatives express more positive stereotypes of Hispanics and whites than liberals. While the magnitude of the impact is not especially strong, conservatives do see Hispanics in a more positive light than blacks. This may be due to the perception among conservatives that Hispanics have more intact families, are harder working, and less likely than blacks to use discrimination as an explanation for low economic and educational attainment.

As we hypothesized, older respondents are more likely to harbor prejudicial attitudes toward blacks and Hispanics, and less prejudicial attitudes toward whites than younger voters. Women are much less prejudiced toward blacks than men according to the estimates in Table 1. There is no difference between the sexes in the propensity to negatively stereotype Hispanics.

To no one's surprise, those residing in southern states express more critical attitudes of blacks than those in nonsouthern states. Southern residents more favorably judge Hispanics' intelligence and work ethic, though, than those living elsewhere. Consistent with expectations, urban dwellers are generally less critical of blacks and Hispanics than those living in more rural locales. The social context hypothesis is significant as an influence on stereotypical attitudes toward Hispanics, but it shows that the more residentially integrated an area is, the more hostility there is toward this ancestry group. For example, the coefficient in Table 1 suggests that if we move from an area with a score on the dissimilarity index of 30 (more integration) to an area where the dissimilarity measure is 80 (less integration), respondents in the less integrated area will have slightly more positive evaluations of Hispanics (by a magnitude of .25). This effect is weak, but it is statistically significant. It would appear, at least in 1992, that proximity to Hispanics breeds more hostile rather than benign attitudes toward them. Or, alternatively, distance from Hispanics is consonant with more positive stereotypes of them.

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TABLE 2

The Effect of Personal Economic Well-Being on Negative Ethnic Stereotyping Controlling for Race and Related Variables, 1996

Variable	*Negative Black Unstandardized Coefficient*	*Negative Hispanic Unstandardized Coefficient*	*Negative White Unstandardized Coefficient*
Pessimistic Personal Economic Outlook	.043	.145	−.062
Pessimistic National Economic Outlook	.201	—	.123
Income	—	−.017	—
Black	−1.525	−.848	—
Hispanic	—	−.765	—
Support for Welfare	−.022	−.021	−.003
Education	−.050	−.050	.027
Conservatism	.083	—	−.074
Age	.017	.007	−.004
Female	−.283	—	−.170
Urban	.069	—	.093
Border State	−.116	−.397	—
Southern State	.255	—	−.136
Black-White Isolation	.003	—	−.004
Hispanic-White Isolation	—	—	—
Constant	8.35	8.774	6.39

Regression coefficients from weighted least squares estimation. Source: American National Election Study 1996.

Dependent variable: 1 = positive stereotype of group - 14 = negative stereotype of group.

All listed associations are significant to $p < .05$ level.

Results: Negative Racial Stereotyping in 1996

A lot changed in U.S. politics between the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections, especially with regard to immigration policy. In November 1994, as Proposition 187 passed in California, the Republican party won control of Congress. In the fall of 1996, GOP forces were pressuring President Bill Clinton to sign a sweeping new immigration reform law. The economy had also made a strong recovery, and far fewer people expressed pessimism about their future in 1996 than in 1992. Insofar as prejudice has roots in economic insecurity, we would expect respondents to be far less likely to express negative racial stereotypes in 1996 than in 1992.

Some of these contextual changes help us to make sense of the results in Table 2 for 1996. The personal economic outlook of respondents had some linkage to negative views of blacks and whites in 1992, but there was little relationship to attitudes toward Hispanics. In 1996, however, respondents who have a pessimistic personal economic outlook view Hispanics more harshly, but personal economic circumstances are not highly related to views of blacks and whites. One explanation for this finding is that between 1992 and 1996 Hispanic immigrants came into sharper focus as the primary economic competitors for

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white and black natives. While fewer people were pessimistic about their personal outlook in 1996 than in 1992, those who were worried could more precisely target their negative feelings toward Hispanics in the latter year. Citizens may have learned from the ongoing elite debate that there was an ostensible economic connection between the Hispanic influx and the state of the labor market.[46] The idea that people made a clearer connection between immigration and personal economic insecurity in 1996 than they did in 1992 is bolstered by the results in 1996 for national economic evaluations. Perceptions of the state of the national economy remain influential in shaping attitudes toward blacks and whites in 1996, as they did in 1992, but not toward Hispanics.

Positive attitudes toward welfare recipients are inversely related to negative stereotypes of all three groups in 1996, but more for blacks and Hispanics than for whites. Education decreases the expression of racial prejudice toward African Americans and Hispanics. Just as in 1992, older voters are more likely than younger ones to express negative judgments about the work ethic and intelligence of Hispanics and blacks, but are more positive about these traits in whites. Black voters positively stereotype their own group more than nonblacks and are also more positive toward Hispanics than nonblacks. Blacks in 1996, however, seem rather indifferent toward whites compared to 1992, perhaps a function of the improvement in economic conditions across the four-year period. Hispanics, too, are naturally more favorable to their own group than non-Hispanics, but they are less harsh in their judgments of blacks and whites in 1996 than in 1992. To the extent that prejudice has self-interested or economic foundations, we would expect that prejudice by all groups would dissipate when economic conditions improve. The diminishing propensity of blacks and Hispanics to negatively stereotype others from 1992 to 1996 could easily be attributed to the better overall economic conditions of the latter year.

The variable capturing urbanization reverses direction from 1992. In 1992, those living in urban areas were less likely to negatively stereotype blacks and Hispanics than those in more rural areas. In 1996, however, urban dwellers are more negative than rural voters about all three racial groups. Explorations of the data revealed that the stereotypical attitudes of urban respondents did not shift as much from 1992 to 1996 as did the attitudes of those in small town and rural areas. The volatility of this indicator reflects the way in which rural voters' opinions of these groups improved over the four-year period. About 36 percent of voters in the most rural areas held generally positive stereotypes of blacks in 1996 (scores on the stereotype scale < 7), compared with only 23 percent in 1992. The stereotypes expressed by urban voters remained relatively unchanged.

Finally, in 1996, respondents residing in areas where there is considerable segregation between blacks and whites were far more likely to express negative

[46] Huber and Espenshade, "Neo-Isolationism, Balanced-Budget Conservatism and the Fiscal Impacts of Immigrants."

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stereotypes of blacks than in counties that were more integrated. Moving from an area that scores a 30 on the dissimilarity index (low segregation) to an 80 (high segregation) increases negative evaluations of blacks by about .15 points on the 1-14 scale. This makes sense as black-white segregation and prejudicial attitudes go hand in hand. Areas that are highly segregated also have larger black populations than those that are more integrated. Larger black populations enhance the perception of threat among whites.[47]

Residential segregation between whites and Hispanics has no statistically significant impact on attitudes toward Hispanics in 1996 as it did in 1992. In 1992, respondents who lived in mixed Anglo-Hispanic neighborhoods expressed more derogatory stereotypes of Hispanics than those living in areas characterized by residential isolation. The difference between the two years may be due to the generally healthy supply of jobs throughout the country in 1996 compared to 1992. Fewer people were in economic distress, and competition against rival groups for employment and housing was simply not an issue in most places. Having acknowledged this difference in neighborhood effects, it is also worth noting that those living in border states remain as hostile toward Hispanics in 1996 as they did in 1992. We are also reminded that the coefficient for personal economic outlook in 1996 indicates that those who remain pessimistic about their future are stereotyping Hispanics more negatively than either whites or blacks.

Ethnic Stereotypes, Economic Assessments, and Attitudes on Immigration Policy

Our main goal is to understand attitudes toward levels of immigration in the United States. We hypothesized that ethnic stereotypes play a role in attitudes toward the admission of immigrants given that the foreign-born population consists increasingly of populations originating from underdeveloped countries in Latin America and Asia. We learned from Tables 1 and 2 that race, attitudes toward welfare, education, gender, and age influence negative stereotyping pretty consistently. The impact of personal economic circumstances and national economic evaluations on stereotyping varies. Hispanics (rather than blacks or non-Hispanic whites) bear the brunt of the negative sentiment by 1996. Social context, as measured by residential isolation in the counties where the respondents reside, does not always have an impact on stereotyping, once other variables are held constant. Black-white isolation is associated with negative black stereotypes in 1996, but less so in 1992. Hispanic-white isolation is associated with positive assessments of Hispanics in 1992 but not in 1996. The finding for Hispanics for 1992 is consistent with intergroup conflict theory as put forward by Susan Olzak.[48] Proximity to minority groups breeds competition

[47] Blalock, "Economic Discrimination and Negro Increase"; Giles and Kaenan Hertz, "Racial Threat and Partisan Identification."

[48] Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict.*

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and hostility. If one is isolated from these populations, positive assessments increase. But why is black-white isolation associated with negative black stereotypes if the reverse is true for Hispanics? The answer may be that the black population is an older, more established population and also one that is more negatively stereotyped. Since Hispanics are a newer population, attitudes toward them are less crystallized. In addition, neighborhoods may be segregated in areas of black concentration because whites have a long history of negatively stereotyping an established black population. Viewed in historical perspective, the causal arrow may run from negative stereotypes to segregation, in addition to the other way around. In areas of Hispanic concentration, however, neighborhoods are less likely to have a long history of segregation resulting from negative stereotypes, because the Hispanic population is more recent. In counties where Hispanics and whites are isolated from one another, whites have less contact with the Hispanic population, and this distance has produced less negative stereotyping than in neighborhoods where the Hispanic and white populations do come in contact.

To evaluate the impact of social context, personal economic outlook, and stereotypical beliefs on immigration policy attitudes, we utilize the 1992 and 1996 ANES studies to model opinion on immigration levels using weighted least squares regression.[49] The question producing the dependent variable asks whether respondents favored increasing or decreasing immigration levels. The dependent variable takes on five values: increase a lot; increase some; keep the same; decrease some; and decrease a lot. High values on the dependent variable indicate a desire for reduced immigration. The question on immigration levels is identically worded across both the 1992 and 1996 surveys.

The independent variables include the three indicators of the respondents' attitudes toward the work ethic and intelligence of blacks, Hispanics, and whites; attitudes toward welfare recipients; personal economic outlook; national economic outlook; education; ideology; age; gender; whether the respondents' parents are native or foreign-born; urban vs. rural residence; whether the respondent lives in a southern or border state; and the measures of ethnic isolation for each ethnic group relative to the respondents' ethnic group. (See variable coding in the Appendix.)

Results: Attitudes on Immigration Levels in 1992

Negative stereotypes of blacks and Hispanics are highly associated with a desire for decreased immigration in 1992. It is somewhat surprising that negative black stereotypes play a major role in determining attitudes toward immigrants, because most immigrants are not black. Apparently this is a primitive racism at

[49] An alternative specification of the model using ordered logit revealed very similar coefficients and significance levels. Readers can obtain the ordered logit results, and associated probabilities, upon request from the authors.

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TABLE 3

Racial Stereotypes, Personal Economic Well-Being, and Attitudes Toward Immigration Policy, Controlling for Race and Related Variables, 1992 and 1996

Variable	*1992 Unstandardized Coefficient*	*1992 Standardized Coefficient*	*1996 Unstandardized Coefficient*	*1996 Standardized Coefficient*
Negative Black Stereotype	.077	.271	.029	.139
Negative Hispanic Stereotype	.044	.139	.068	.255
Negative White Stereotype	−.066	−.195	−.064	−.257
Pessimistic Personal Economic Outlook	−.076	−.074	—	.029
Pessimistic National Economic Outlook	.086	.085	.067	.096
Income	.007	.058	—	.004
Black	.328	.103	—	−.026
Hispanic	—	.037	−.122	−.078
Parents Born Abroad	−.108	−.069	−.248	−.189
Support for Welfare	−.007	−.249	−.006	−.234
Education	−.052	−.187	−.041	−.189
Conservatism	.054	.109	—	.026
Age	−.002	−.068	—	.021
Female	.366	.287	—	−.099
White Males (Interaction)	.339	.269	—	−.084
Urban	−.032	−.067	—	−.024
Border State	.181	.106	.133	.141
Southern State	—	−.039	—	−.022
Black-White Isolation	−.004	−.113	−.003	−.108
Hispanic-White Isolation	—	.027	—	.011
Constant	3.44		4.482	

Regression analysis from weighted least squares estimation. Source: American National Election Study 1992, 1996.

Dependent variable: 1 = increase immigration a lot, through 5 = decrease immigration a lot.

All listed associations are significant to $p < .05$ level.

work that does not make clear distinctions among minority groups. Among many whites, blacks and immigrants may count simply as outsiders, and, therefore, attitudes toward both groups may be cued by an underlying prejudice against those who are different.[50] Interestingly, respondents who favorably evaluate the work ethic and intelligence of other whites want to decrease immigration in 1992. This finding is consistent with the idea that ethnocentrism expressed in such positive evaluations of one's own group is consistent with a desire to exclude others.[51]

Once other variables are taken into account, personal economic evaluations have only a modest effect on attitudes toward immigration levels in 1992; here the worse one's personal outlook is, the more a respondent favors *increased* immigration. (See Table 3.) While stereotyping may be partly a func-

[50] Allport, *Nature of Prejudice*, chap. 4.

[51] Samuel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio, "The Aversive Form of Racism" in John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, eds., *Prejudice, Discrimination and Racism* (New York: Academic Press, 1986).

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tion of personal economic outlook in 1992 (see Table 1), immigration policy attitudes are only weakly related to self-interest narrowly construed, and then the effect is in this counterintuitive direction. Using the same data, but specifying a different model, Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong found that neither prospective nor retrospective assessments of personal economic situation were related to restrictionist views.[52] The effect for pessimistic national economic forecasts is stronger and more significant, suggesting that immigration policy is more closely related to sociotropic evaluations of the economy than to narrowly self-interested ones.[53] Family income, like personal economic evaluations, is only weakly associated with attitudes on immigration policy in this model, and the effect is to see a desire for decreased immigration among those with high income. This finding reminds us that income and education are not the same thing. Those with higher education favor increased immigration levels, but not necessarily those with higher incomes. Better educated respondents are apparently less worried about the ethnic diversity brought about by increased immigration levels. Or at the very least, these respondents are better able to cloak their prejudices when confronted with questions about race and ethnicity.[54]

One variable that may broadly reflect self-interested considerations is parental birthplace. It is obvious from the results in Table 3 that respondents with foreign-born parents are more favorable to generous immigration policy than those whose parents are native-born. However, this is not the kind of narrow self-interest one customarily thinks of in terms of short-term economic gains. Identification with immigrants and immigrant family members is a group identification, not an individual one.

Notably, women are among the most decisive supporters of decreased immigration in 1992. This result is consistent with the earlier findings of Citrin, Reingold, and Green.[55] But an interaction term capturing white males shows that they are also more likely to favor restrictive immigration policy. Both women in general and white men in particular were among the constituencies calling for decreased immigration early in the decade. We tested a number of other interactions among the independent variables in Table 3 but none were found to be statistically important.[56]

The social context variables indicate that residents of border states favor decreased immigration levels, compared with those in nonborder states in both

[52] Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong, "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform."

[53] Kinder and Kiewiet, "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case"; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong, "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform."

[54] Jackman, "Education and Policy Commitment to Racial Education."

[55] Citrin, Reingold, and Green, "American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change."

[56] Among the interactions we tested were variables capturing black men, black women, Hispanic men, Hispanic women, and white women. For economic self-interest, we tested all personal economic evaluation by race interactions. None of these interactions was statistically significant for 1992 or 1996.

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years. Residents living in urban areas are marginally in favor of increasing immigration compared with those in rural areas, but this is only true in 1992.

The results for black and Hispanic respondents are striking in 1992. Both blacks and Hispanics are more likely than those of other races to call for decreased immigration. This is consistent with the idea that minority groups are most threatened by the increased competition for jobs, services, and housing caused by increased immigration.[57] Evidently, some established immigrants are inclined to oppose generous immigration policies, expressing a desire to "pull up the ladder." Many whites, on the other hand, are more tolerant of generous immigration policy than either Hispanics or blacks once other variables such as ideology and racial prejudice are held constant.

Results: Attitudes on Immigration Policy in 1996

We have seen that personal economic assessments play a smaller role than national economic evaluation in producing prejudice and that family income has a minor and inconsistent impact. Turning to gauge the direct impact of racial prejudice and economic concerns on attitudes toward immigration policy, there is no question that racial prejudice plays the greater of the two roles in both the 1992 and 1996 surveys. When comparing the results from 1992 and 1996 in Table 3, a couple of differences in the statistical significance of coefficients are worth noting. First, negative black stereotypes play a greater role in determining immigration policy attitudes in 1992 than in 1996. Hispanic stereotypes play more of a role in 1996 than in 1992. In 1992, a more general attitude of prejudice mainly defined by attitudes toward blacks is influencing attitudes toward immigration policy. This shift in focus over four years suggests that people have learned to make the connection between Hispanics and immigration in the latter year. The greater importance of having immigrant parents in 1996 compared with 1992 is one of the other prima facie differences. Although a t-test on the difference in the magnitude of the coefficients[58] does not reach statistical significance, the difference between the standard errors relative to the coefficients points to substantively important differences. Having foreign-born parents is a more consistent predictor of immigration policy attitudes among the 1996 respondents than among the 1992 respondents.

[57] Steven Camarota, "The Effect of Immigrants on the Earnings of Low-Skilled Native Workers: Evidence from the June 1991 Current Population Survey"; Roger Waldinger, *Still the Promised City?*; Peter Skerry, *Mexican Americans: The Ambivalent Minority* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).

[58] To test the difference in the magnitude of the coefficients in 1992 and 1996, we followed the procedure for subgroup regressions spelled out in Melissa A. Hardy, *Regression with Dummy Variables* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993) 48–53. Using this procedure, we found no statistically significant differences in the magnitude of the coefficients across the two years. This does not mean that the explanatory power or statistical significance of the variables were the same across the samples. Important differences are to be found in the standard errors and the statistical significance of coefficients, which we exploit in our discussion of results.

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The explanation for these differences in the predictive power of these variables lies in the changing political context. Specifically, the level of public information about immigration clearly increased between 1992 and 1996, and so did the political threat to pro-immigration interests. Consider the media and campaign messages surrounding the 1994 and 1996 election campaigns. In California, incumbent Governor Pete Wilson ran his 1994 reelection campaign highlighting the costs of immigration to California taxpayers, endorsing Proposition 187.[59] After winning his party's nomination for president in 1996, Republican candidate Bob Dole ran campaign ads against President Clinton accusing him of lavishing welfare, food stamps, and social services on illegal immigrants.[60] Throughout 1995 and 1996, Republican congressional leaders such as Representative Lamar Smith (R–TX) and Senator Alan Simpson (R–WY) pushed for new restrictions on both legal and illegal immigration.[61] These various appeals had the effect of galvanizing pro-immigration interests and raising public awareness of the issues at stake.

In addition, by 1996, the issue of immigration restriction cut across ideological lines, with liberals and conservatives on both sides of the debate. These results show that ideology is not a statistically significant predicator of immigration attitudes by 1996. In this development, the public may have simply followed the tone and content of elite discourse.[62] Some prominent conservatives in Congress aligned themselves with the interests of big business and the high-tech lobby by arguing for more open borders in order to lower labor costs and maintain competitiveness in a global economy.

In most other respects, the results for 1996 are similar to those for 1992. Feelings toward welfare recipients remain highly related to immigration policy attitudes as does education. Voters living in areas of black-white residential segregation continue to be favorable toward generous immigration levels compared to those in more integrated areas, showing that contact with diverse populations is not consistent with warmer attitudes toward immigration.

Implications and Conclusions

The results presented here suggest that attitudes on immigration policy are highly contingent upon stereotypical beliefs about the work ethic and intelligence of other groups, especially among whites. The role of self-interest, as

[59] Amy Wallace and Cathleen Decker, "California Elections/Governor; Brown Begins Marathon Tour of State," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 November 1994; Dan Freedman, "Wilson Assailed as Demagogue on Aliens; Governor's Office, U.S. Spar Over Credit for Sealing Border," *San Francisco Examiner*, 13 October 1994.

[60] Louis Freedberg. "Clinton and Dole's Dueling Immigration Ads," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 7 July 1996.

[61] James G. Gimpel and James R. Edwards, Jr., *The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999).

[62] Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*.

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measured by personal economic forecasts or by one's national economic outlook, is not as important to attitudes on immigration once stereotypical thinking is taken into account. (See Table 3.) Stereotypical thinking does have an economic component, especially during times of hardship, as much of the literature on ethnic conflict and prejudice would suggest.[63] Still, the results presented here show that economic calculations are not the sole foundation of prejudice, or even the main one. The findings presented here are quite different from the results in one of the author's previous works that relied upon data from the early 1980s and alternative measures of prejudice and economic self-interest.[64] Further work would do well to test for the effects of a variety of self-interest and prejudice indicators on attitudes toward immigration across a greater time span. Tables 1 and 2 indicate that other variables such as education, attitudes about welfare use, gender, place of residence, and political ideology play an important role in respondents' unfavorable judgments about the intelligence and work ethic of other groups.

Differences in attitudes on immigration policy between 1996 and 1992 are worth highlighting. In 1992, the immigration issue was not highly salient outside of California, Florida, and a few other port-of-entry states. Many people simply did not have an opinion on the issue, and others were ambivalent about it. Between 1992 and 1996, however, exposure to rhetoric about immigration and immigration policy increased dramatically. First came the furor over Proposition 187 in California, accompanied by a gubernatorial election that prominently featured differences between the candidates on immigration policy.[65] Beginning in 1995, Congress took up a controversial round of immigration reform; and by 1996, the salience of the issue was much higher, particularly among immigrant families who saw their interests threatened by the restrictionist tide.

This increase in the public's knowledge about immigration helps to explain the differences between the results for 1992 and 1996. In 1992, attitudes on immigration policy were highly associated with attitudes toward blacks. Perhaps the term "immigrant" cued more vague notions of outsider status—a crude form of prejudice animated by derogatory notions about blacks that also found its expression in attitudes toward immigration. The impact of these negative black stereotypes on attitudes toward immigration policy fades in 1996, while the impact of negative Hispanic stereotypes increases sharply. The campaign

[63] Olzak, "Labor Unrest, Immigration and Ethnic Conflict in Urban America, 1880–1914"; Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*; Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: the Split Labor Market"; Bonacich, "Advanced Capitalism and Black/White Race Relations in the United States: A Split Labor Market Interpretation."

[64] Gimpel and Edwards, *Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform*, chap. 2.

[65] Karin Macdonald and Bruce Cain, "Nativism, Partisanship and Immigration: An Analysis of Proposition 187" in Michael B. Preston, Bruce E. Cain, and Sandra Bass, eds. *Racial and Ethnic Politics in California*, vol. 2 (Berkeley, CA: Institute for Governmental Studies, 1998); Wallace and Decker, "California Elections/Governor; Brown Begins Marathon Tour of State."

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seasons of 1994 and 1996 focused much attention on illegal immigration, something associated with the southwestern border, and identified closely in peoples' minds with Mexican migration. By 1996, the immigrant concept was given specific content, and respondents' prejudices toward Latinos could be more precisely linked to attitudes on immigration policy—and it is an issue of precision. The magnitudes of the coefficients do not greatly change, but the extent to which Hispanic prejudice explains immigration attitudes clearly does. Even in 1996, many respondents still saw immigration in black-white terms, but by this time many were also able to understand it in brown-white terms. Keeping in mind that we are not working with panel data, we are persuaded that changes from 1992 and 1996 are the result of the increase in information about immigrants and immigration resulting from the debate that was just beginning in 1992 but was to ignite in the following four years.

Immigrants have often faced opposition from natives at the lower end of the economic spectrum.[66] But the views of these natives cannot be understood simply. The findings here indicate that the pathway to anti-immigration attitudes is partly contingent on prevailing economic conditions, but that prejudice has more than an economic foundation. Even when economic conditions improve, one cannot count on natives to give immigrants a warm welcome. Perhaps this is why polls during economic good times show that the public is not very enthusiastic about the prospect of increasing immigration.[67] At most, proponents of a generous and open immigration policy can hope that anti-immigrant sentiment is less intensely felt during times of economic prosperity. The effect of economic hardship is to activate prejudices that are latent, adding fuel to the fire of preexisting views. For scholars and policy makers who are pushing the cause of immigration restriction, it is not encouraging that the public often bases its support for restriction on feelings of prejudice that are not rooted in economic insecurity. Most restrictionists are understandably desperate to avoid the appearance that they have been inspired by Archie Bunker, preferring to cast their arguments in economic and sometimes environmental terms. Unfortunately for these well-intentioned conservatives, the case for limiting immigration is more difficult to air with credibility precisely because a sizable share of the restrictionist sentiment among the masses is motivated simply by prejudice.

APPENDIX

Coding of Variables

Dependent Variable for Stereotyping: 1 = positive stereotype to 14 = negative stereotype.

[66] Olzak, "Labor Unrest, Immigration and Ethnic Conflict in Urban America, 1880–1914"; Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*; Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market"; Billington, *The Protestant Crusade, 1800–1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism*; Ernst, "Economic Nativism in New York City During the 1840s."

[67] Simon and Alexander, *The Ambivalent Welcome: Print Media, Public Opinion and Immigration*; Harwood, "Alienation: American Attitudes Toward Immigration."

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Dependent Variable for Immigration: 1 = increase immigration to 5 = decrease immigration.

Independent Variable for Welfare Recipients: feeling thermometer ranging from 0 = negative feelings to 100 = positive feelings.

Independent Variable for Personal Economic Outlook: 1 = better one year from now, 2 = same one year from now, 3 = worse one year from now.

Independent Variable for National Economic Outlook: 1 = better one year from now, 2 = same one year from now, 3 = worse one year from now.

Independent Variable for Income: 24 ordinal categories.

Independent Variable for Ideology: 1 = very liberal to 5 = very conservative.

Independent Variable for Education: years of formal schooling completed, ranges from 0 to 17.

Independent Variable for Parents' Place of Birth: 0 = both parents born in the U.S.: 1 = at least one parent not born in the U.S.

Independent Variable for Age: continuous variable ranging from 18 to 99.

Independent Variable for Sex: 0 = male, 1 = female.

Independent Variable for White Males: 0 = others, 1 = white males.

Independent Variable for Urban Area: 1 = Rural areas; 2 = Small towns adjacent to metropolitan area; 3 = Small towns within metropolitan area; 4 = Suburbs within metropolitan area; 5 = Small central cities; 6 = Large central cities.

Independent Variable for Border State: 0 = all other states; 1 = AZ, CA, FL, NM or TX.

Independent Variable for Southern States: 0 = all other states; 1 = VA, NC, SC, GA, FL, AL, MS, LA, TX, AR, TN, KY, WV.

Independent Variable for Contact or Group Isolation: continuous variable ranging from 0 to 100. This figure is based on the calculation of a dissimilarity index for counties in which respondents reside. The index of dissimilarity is given by:

$$D_{xy} = .5^{*}\sum|(x_i/X)-(y_i/Y)|$$

Where:

x_i and y_i are the number of X and Y members in census tract i.

X and Y are the total number of X and Y members for the entire county.

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
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Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis

ANDREW SCOBELL

For much of the 1990s, the world was warned of a looming China threat spearheaded by hawkish soldiers.[1] More recently, however, experts contend that China's strategic intentions and military capabilities have been overhyped: Beijing does not have ambitious expansionist goals and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has limited capabilities that are unlikely to improve dramatically anytime soon.[2] While this recent scholarly wisdom does provide a more accurate picture of China's capabilities and the scope of its intentions, it risks minimizing the real hazards this vast country presents to the world.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, China does pose a threat to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps at no time was this threat more evident than in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. A visit to the United States by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui in June 1995 triggered the crisis, which marked a dramatic escalation in the confrontation between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China on Taiwan. From August 1995 until March 1996 the PLA conducted a series of war games, live fire exercises, and missile tests in the vicinity of Taiwan. Beijing's rhetoric and activities raised the specter of a military conflict over a dispute that had seemed to be at a four-decade low.

[1] See, for example, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Knopf, 1997).

[2] See, for example, Michael O'Hanlon and Bates Gill, "China's Hollow Military," *The National Interest*, no. 56 (Summer 1999): 55–62.

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Was China preparing for war in 1995–1996 and was the military leading the charge? I contend the crisis was a case of coercive diplomacy, the result of a civil-military consensus. An important distinction must be made between the terms "bellicose," "belligerent," and "hawkish": the first refers to temperament while the latter two refer to degrees of mental readiness to resort to war. A bellicose leader is warlike in mindset—that is, predisposed to resort to war in most situations. A belligerent leader is one who has crossed a mental threshold in a particular instance and is ready and eager for battle. In contrast, a hawkish leader is one who is prepared to use military means short of war, namely, saber rattling, brinkmanship, and threats of war to achieve a policy goal—in short, to practice coercive diplomacy. Of these terms, hawkish is the most accurate to use to describe the words and deeds of Chinese soldiers. In 1995–1996 the PLA favored displays of military force and threats as core elements of a policy toward Taiwan. By contrast, the words bellicose and belligerent are misleading, because these give the erroneous impression that PLA leaders were spoiling for a fight in the crisis and/or were warlike by temperament.

First the significance of the crisis is explained and placed in historical context. Then the role of the military in the crisis is examined. Lastly, some tentative conclusions are offered.

This case seems worth studying for three reasons. First, the Taiwan Strait crisis is the most plausible location for China to become embroiled in an armed conflict. A respected China scholar, writing in 1998, was of the opinion that the strait had "high conflict potential."[3] Tensions again escalated there in the summer of 1999.[4] More significantly, Chinese researchers contend that the Taiwan issue is the one dispute most likely to drag China to the brink of war in the foreseeable future.[5] Beijing also views Taiwan as the most important issue in its bilateral relationship with Washington.[6] The fallout from the bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 is a reminder that relations between the United States and China continue to be fragile. The issue of Taiwan will not disappear. According to a senior PLA strategist writing in 1998, Hong Kong's return to China in 1997 and Macao's return in December 1999 are parts of a "... great historical trend [that] is bound to exert a significant impact upon" Taiwan.[7] The island is the ultimate prize in Beijing's quest for political control over Greater China (China plus Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao).

[3] Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect" in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *China and the World*, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 289–292.

[4] Michael Laris and Steven Mufson, "China Mulls Use of Force off Taiwan, Experts Say," *Washington Post*, 13 August 1999.

[5] Fan Zhenjiang, "China's Defense Policy into the Twenty-First Century," *Guofang Daxue xuebao* [National Defense University Journal] no. 1 (10 March 1997): 6; Mi Zhenyu, "China's Strategic Plan of Active Defense" in Shi Bike, ed., *Zhongguo daqushi* [Megatrends China] (Beijing: Hualing Chubanshe, 1996), 58–59.

[6] Zhu Chenghu, ed., *Zhongmei guanxi de fazhan bianhua ji qi qushi* [Changing Developments and Trends in China–U.S. Relations] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1998), 194.

[7] Li Jijun, "This Century's Strategic Heritage and Next Century's Strategic Trend," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 28 July 1998 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (hereafter FBIS-CHI), 16 August 1998.

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Taiwan is likely to remain a central issue as China enters the millennium because of the return of Macao to Chinese control and the outcome of Taiwan's milestone presidential election on 18 March 2000. The victor in the race was Chen Shui-bian from the Democratic Progressive party—an organization long committed to Taiwanese independence. The result meant the first island-wide electoral defeat for the Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalists, who had ruled Taiwan for more than half a century. Chen's victory can only be seen as a setback for China. In the weeks leading up to the election, Chinese leaders and the official media fired salvo after salvo of verbal threats admonishing Taiwan not to move toward independence. The clear implication was that a vote for Chen constituted a vote for independence and the blunt message was "independence means war."[8] In fact Chen's campaign was remarkably restrained: He advocated resuming talks with Beijing and made no mention of independence. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders remain deeply suspicious of him. Despite a muted Chinese reaction to Chen's victory in the immediate aftermath of the vote, the future of cross-strait relations is unlikely to be smooth sailing.

Second, China's show of force held considerable potential for escalation into a wider and more serious conflagration. An escalation of the 1995–1996 crisis could have led to U.S. military involvement and/or deployment of nuclear weaponry.

Third, the 1995–1996 strait confrontation is significant because it was the first crisis of the post-Deng Xiaoping era. While Deng was among the living during the crisis, he was too sick to play any role in the decision making.[9] His incapacitation and subsequent death in February 1997 marked the passing of the old guard of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. It signaled the last gasp of the dual-role elite of the Mao Zedong's Long March generation and the emergence of a civil-military dichotomy within China's leadership. One can now speak of a clear distinction between those individuals who are soldiers and those who are civilians. Jiang Zemin, unlike Mao or Deng, has no claim to extensive military experience or expertise. This is not to say Deng became totally irrelevant or that the Long March-era leadership was completely out of the picture. A handful of Long March era leaders did play an important role in the crisis, notably military figures. Particularly important were elderly Generals Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen, both vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Liu was also a member of the CCP's Politburo Standing Committee.

The Context

The origins of the crisis can be traced back to the victory of the CCP in the civil war in the late 1940s. The defeated remnants of the KMT led by General

[8] Also see "Taiwan Independence Means War," *Jiefangjun Bao*, 6 March 2000.

[9] Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 9.

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Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan. The United States has been intimately involved in the China-Taiwan standoff since 1950. After the CCP had taken control of most of the mainland and captured Hainan Island in April 1950, the PLA began to concentrate on the invasion of Taiwan. These preparations were aborted by the outbreak of the Korean War. When President Harry S. Truman decided to intervene on the Korean Peninsula, he also ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. Beijing attached great significance to the insertion of U.S. naval forces into the strait. Mao in particular viewed this as a major event.[10] Forces preparing for the invasion of Taiwan were shifted from Fujian Province adjacent to the strait to Manchuria near the border with Korea to counter the threat posed by U.S. troops. Then in 1955, after the first strait crisis, Washington and Taipei signed a bilateral defense treaty.

Only after Chiang died in 1975 and Mao passed away the following year did an improvement in strait ties become possible. When Deng Xiaoping had established himself as Mao's successor in late 1978, he demonstrated renewed energy and determination to recover Taiwan combined with a healthy dose of pragmatism. Whereas Mao had focused on "liberation" by military force, Deng stressed peaceful unification. Commencing in January 1979, coinciding with the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing, the PLA ceased its symbolic bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu. A new peace offensive was launched in 1981 leading to what soon became known as the "one country, two systems" formula whereby Taiwan could unify with the mainland while remaining autonomous and retaining its existing economic and social systems. While this proposal failed to elicit a positive response from Taipei, the formula did provide the framework for a 1984 agreement between Beijing and London for the return of Hong Kong.

Despite a legacy of rancor, China-Taiwan relations improved dramatically during the 1980s and early 1990s. Burgeoning economic interaction and cross-strait travel by individuals and groups during the 1980s evolved into direct quasi official negotiations between Beijing and Taipei by 1993.[11] From Beijing's perspective, following the summit between the heads of the two quasi-governmental organs on neutral ground, prospects for unification seemed very bright. Unease at voices on the island calling for independence and initiatives abroad to raise Taiwan's international profile seemed relatively insignificant in the face of apparent continued progress toward unification.

Still, some groups in China harbored a profound distrust of KMT leader and Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui and were very suspicious about the motives of the United States. These sentiments appeared to be particularly strong within the military. The rhetoric of former or current U.S. officials seemed to

[10] See, for example, Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 73–78.

[11] See Ralph N. Clough, *Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: People to People Diplomacy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).

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confirm suspicions.[12] In late 1992, PLA leaders were enraged by the announcement by President George Bush to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan. PLA leaders perceived U.S. adjustments in its dealings with Taiwan as a significant policy change. In all these matters Deng reined in PLA leaders and their conservative civilian allies. He played a key role on Taiwan policy and foreign policy more generally. But by 1995, Deng was ailing and no longer actively involved.[13]

PRC President Jiang Zemin's January 1995 Eight Point Proposal was widely deemed synonymous with the phrase "Chinese should not fight Chinese" and was promptly labeled conciliatory. However, the overall alarmist tone of Jiang's address was overlooked. Jiang warned of forces on the island plotting independence as well as "certain foreign forces [that] have . . . meddled in the issue of Taiwan, interfering in China's internal affairs." Jiang intoned that Beijing had not renounced the use of force but that this was not aimed at Taiwan as such but at "foreign forces [that] . . . interfere in China's unification."[14]

The Crisis

The granting of a visa to President Lee of Taiwan in May 1995 to visit the United States the following month enraged the PLA. Still the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) remained restrained. The PLA focused its anger on the MFA and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Finally, in the wake of Lee's bombastic speech at Cornell University, in which he trumpeted the accomplishments of the "Republic of China on Taiwan," military figures acted. In mid-June 1995, after Lee Teng-hui's triumphal return from his U.S. trip, an emergency session of Beijing's top policy-making body on Taiwan, the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG), was called. The two civilian leaders of the TALSG, Chairman Jiang Zemin and Vice Chair and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, were confronted by three irate military men insisting it was time for harsher action. Normally the body has only one military representative, Deputy Chief of General Staff Xiong Guangkai (who sits alongside half a dozen civilians, including Jiang, Qian, Wang Daohan [head of Beijing's quasi-official Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait], and Wang Zhaoguo [director of the CCP United Front Work Department]). Also present this time were the two most senior figures in the PLA—Generals Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen.

[12] Andrew Scobell, "Taiwan as Macedonia? Strait Tensions as a Syndrome," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 21 (April-June 1998): 194–199.

[13] John W. Garver, *Face Off: China, the United States and Taiwan's Democratization* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 52–59.

[14] "Jiang Zemin's Eight Point Proposal," Beijing Xinhua Domestic, 30 January 1995 in FBIS-CHI, 30 January 1995, 85–86.

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These men definitely charged the atmosphere and ensured a swift change of policy.[15]

Between July 1995 and March 1996, China conducted a series of military exercises and missile tests in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. On 18 July 1995, Beijing announced that missile tests would be conducted targeting an area some ninety miles off the coast of northern Taiwan. Then on three consecutive days, 21, 22, and 23 July, a total of six DF-15 missiles were launched from sites on the mainland (two per day). The following month, after a five-day advance warning, PLA naval vessels and aircraft conducted live-fire tests off the coast of Fujian for ten days. Further military exercises were conducted in mid-November to the south of the strait including joint operations involving air, land, and sea arms of the PLA. On 5 March 1996, Beijing announced it would soon begin another round of missile tests. This time they were to be targeted at seas less than fifty miles from Taiwan's busiest ports. On 8 March, three DF-15 missiles were fired from their bases on the mainland. Five days later another DF-15 missile was launched. Finally, also after advance warning, live-fire tests and war games were conducted off the coast of Fujian to the north of the strait and to the south of the strait between 12 and 25 March. The maneuvers included amphibious landing exercises, aerial bombing, and involved some 40 naval vessels, 260 aircraft, and an estimated 150,000 troops.

The military exercises of the summer of 1995 were meant to signal China's displeasure at the visit of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to the United States that June. The maneuvers and tests of March 1996 were meant to intimidate Taiwan before a presidential election and chasten incumbent President Lee, who seemed certain to be reelected, as he was. The more general aim of the full show of force was to deter Taiwan from pursuing independence from China. In both instances, China was also addressing the United States. The message for Washington was that Beijing was deadly serious about Taipei and was prepared to use force if necessary to unite Taiwan with China with or without U.S. intervention. This notice was meant to deter the United States from promoting Taiwan independence.

The Central Questions

How should China's saber rattling be interpreted? And what roles did China's military leaders play? There are a number of different, very straightforward explanations posited regarding the crisis, but none of these seem fully satisfactory.[16] There are two main nuanced and sophisticated interpretations. First, China's response reflected a more aggressive, dangerous turn of policy by

[15] This paragraph is drawn from the following: author's interviews, Beijing and Shanghai, May–June 1998; Ting Chen-wu, "Hawks Dominate China's Policy Toward Taiwan," *Hsin Pao*, 14 March 1996 in FBIS-CHI, 21 March 1996, 12–13; Garver, *Face Off*, 61–62.

[16] See the symposium in *The China Journal* 36 (July 1996); for a critique, see Scobell, "Taiwan as Macedonia?" 183–184.

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Beijing toward Taipei—a serious escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait that raised the specter of real war. This crisis was either the result of pressure by hawkish, hardline soldiers on moderate, mild mannered statesmen for a tougher, more aggressive response to Taiwan or the result of a strong consensus among both civilian and military leaders on the Politburo.[17] The second interpretation is that the response was an elaborately orchestrated and scripted Chinese opera—also the result of a consensus decision by civilian and military leaders. The entire production was carefully planned, and each move was clearly telegraphed well in advance to the other actors. In the minds of China's civilian and military leaders, there was little danger of actual military conflict breaking out. Leaders on both sides of the strait recognized this was a major theatrical event with each person playing a clearly defined role. Once the opera was over, matters went back to normal.[18]

What are the main assumptions implied by each interpretation? The first variant that the military was the driving force behind China's hostile behavior feeds into the stereotype of soldier as warmonger. The second variant of the first interpretation is that the aggressive behavior was the result of civil-military consensus forged by the powerful nationalist appeal of the Taiwan issue. The second interpretation—crisis as opera—is a cultural explanation that fits with the orthodox view of China's strategic tradition. The assumption here is that there is a Chinese cultural preference to avoid actual combat and use dramatic theatrical displays to overawe the enemy. This interpretation is consistent with studies that emphasize that Chinese strategy and tactics since ancient times have consisted largely of seeking to win without fighting and of outwitting the opponent by ruse and stratagem instead of combat.[19]

Each interpretation appears to have a significant element of truth. The crisis does reflect a more hardline approach, but it also represents considerable posturing by individual officials and different bureaucratic actors. The missile tests and war games were undertaken in deadly earnest, but from the beginning the exercises were meant to be strictly limited to a show of force with absolutely no plans to escalate to actual war. In 1995–1996 China was actually more hardline toward Taiwan compared to the 1980s and early 1990s, but it was no more hardline than it had been in the 1950s and 1960s.

A major puzzle is how to explain the hawkishness of the PLA in this instance, since it seems inconsistent with the disposition of military figures in other instances. Recent research on other cases of coercive diplomacy suggests

[17] For the latter interpretation, see Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China's Security: The New Roles of the Military* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 274–279.

[18] Author's interviews in Beijing, Shanghai, and Taipei, May–June 1998; You Ji, "Making Sense of War Games in the Taiwan Strait," *Journal of Contemporary China* 6 (July 1997): 287–305.

[19] Jonathan Adelman and Chih-Yu Shih, *Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840–1980* (Taipei: Institute for International Relations, 1993). For a different view, see Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

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a Huntingtonesque "Chinese military mind," in which soldiers possess a conservative, pessimistic outlook and exhibit a clear reluctance to use force. Analyses of other Chinese cases suggest findings from U.S. case studies hold true for China: soldiers tend to be no more eager, and often much less eager, than statesmen to resort to military action.[20]

How reliable are the accounts of hawkish Chinese military figures in the Taiwan crisis? While some experts question the reliability of these reports, most seem quite credible and consistent.[21] Some Hong Kong newspapers have very good high-level contacts, several in the PLA. Top Chinese leaders talk to these media outlets because they can say things they are unable to say in official mainland publications.[22] Moreover, these reports are consistent with information obtained from interviews I conducted with Chinese researchers in 1998. Every civilian researcher I spoke with agreed that the PLA was more hawkish on Taiwan than the MFA and other nonmilitary actors. Interestingly, military researchers consistently denied this was so, although most spoke more adamantly about Taiwan than did civilians. One might attribute this difference to soldiers more readily rationalizing their outbursts as posturing rather than as belligerence.

While it does seem that the PLA was at the forefront of pushing a hardline approach on Taiwan in mid-1995, by October, a high-level consensus among civilian and military leaders had emerged that a tougher approach was needed. President Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, and National People's Congress (NPC) Chairman Qiao Shi all separately issued very stern statements on Taiwan in mid-October 1995. These announcements seemed to indicate that senior CCP leaders had ". . . reached a unanimity of views on taking an uncompromising stand toward forces favoring Taiwan independence and on dealing relentless blows at any forces trying to break Taiwan from the mainland."[23]

PRC Soldiers: Bellicose, Belligerent, or Hawkish?

These numerous and verifiable reports of soldiers expressing hawkish views on Taiwan do not mean Chinese military leaders are bellicose or belligerent. I con-

[20] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), chap. 3; Andrew Scobell, "Explaining China's Use of Force" (unpublished manuscript, 1999); Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

[21] Michael D. Swaine, *The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 11–14. Others view these reports as quite reliable. See, for example, Garver, *Face Off*; Gurtov and Hwang, *China's Security*.

[22] The Hong Kong newspaper *Hsin Pao* is particularly well connected to the PLA. Garver, *Face Off*, 171, n.17. On the utility and reliability of the Hong Kong media reports on the PLA in the crisis, see ibid., 109, 171, n.15.

[23] Leng Mou, "CPC To Conduct Missile Tests in Taiwan Strait," *Kuang Chiao Ching*, 1 November 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 29 November 1995, 94; You, "Making Sense"; Gurtov and Hwang, *China's Security*.

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tend that PLA figures were in part venting their frustrations, in part posturing, and in part expressing their patriotism. Three factors help explain the hawkishness of military leaders: coercive diplomacy tends to be problematic for soldiers; Chinese leaders had a clear understanding that the military exercises were strictly limited, and in their minds there was little chance of escalation to actual combat; the Taiwan issue evokes intensely emotional nationalism among soldiers.

Civil-Military Relations and Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy is difficult enough for statesmen to practice without factoring in civil-military relations. In coercive diplomacy: "force is used in an exemplary, demonstrative manner, in discrete and controlled increments to induce the opponent to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict."[24] To optimize its chances of success, coercive diplomacy requires attention to both carrot and stick: that is, to demonstrate a credible threat but at the same time to offer some incentive for the other party to comply. Moreover, great care must be taken to make the signals as clear as possible, to ensure that the threat of force is recognized as such and not taken as preparations for imminent attack that might escalate to open conflict. It is complicated further by the fact that diplomats and soldiers see coercive diplomacy from very different perspectives.[25] While both prefer a solution short of war, statesmen favor subtle signals and gradual increases in the pressure applied to an opponent in order to deter or compel them. Soldiers, in contrast, prefer to send a strong, direct, and unambiguous message promptly—a rapid, massive show of force to bring the opponent swiftly to his senses. ". . . [C]oercive diplomacy . . . [requires] just enough force . . . to demonstrate . . . [one's resolve] to protect well defined interests and also to demonstrate the credibility of one's determination to use more force if necessary . . . . [I]f . . . force is actually used, it is employed in a more limited, selective way . . . ."[26]

The MFA's responses to Taiwanese actions and what was perceived as direct U.S. interference were in the PLA's view weak and indecisive. The MFA's escalation of sanctions in the summer of 1995 seemed pathetic and ineffective: the cancellation of ministry-level visits between China and the United States, the recall of Beijing's ambassador from Washington each got no response. The White House had suddenly reversed itself in late May 1995 and issued Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui a visa after Secretary of State Warren Christopher had insisted to his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, a month earlier that this would not happen. The MFA had been played for a patsy in the PLA's view.

[24] Alexander George, "The Development of Doctrine and Strategy" in Alexander George et al., eds., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 18.

[25] Thomas A. Fabyanic, "The Grammar and Logic of Conflict," *Air University Review* 32 (March–April 1981): 23–31.

[26] George, "The Development," 18.

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As Qian later remarked: "I was assured a visa would not be issued. Imagine what I thought and what was thought of me when the visa was granted."[27]

In June 1995, Lee went to a reunion at his alma mater, Cornell University, and gave an ebullient speech trumpeting the virtues of "the Republic of China on Taiwan." In short, his visit was hardly low key. Along with recent changes by the Clinton administration easing up on the strict rules governing contact between U.S. officials and their Taiwanese counterparts, in Beijing's view, Lee's visit marked a significant change in U.S. policy. From Taipei, Lee's government seemed to launch bolder and more aggressive diplomatic initiatives aimed at giving Taiwan a higher profile on the global stage. Lee's speech at Cornell seemed to confirm earlier concern in Beijing that the Taiwanese leader had embarked on a road toward independence. Within Taiwan, avowed proponents of independence grew more vocal and seemed to garner increased popular backing. Furthermore, when viewed by the Chinese military in light of the events of 1994–1995, the conciliatory fifteen-year-old policy of peaceful unification seemed to bring the prospect of union between the mainland and Taiwan no closer. From the PLA's perspective, it was time to show more stick and less carrot.[28]

PLA leaders were particularly dissatisfied with the existing criteria for using force against Taiwan: a formal declaration of independence by Taipei and/or direct support or intervention by an outside power. Senior soldiers reportedly were instrumental in adding a third justification for resorting to war: "covert independence," or "purposeful perpetuation of a state of division" of China, including "deliberate procrastination" by Taipei in talks with Beijing. Military leaders ". . . were frustrated that they could never legitimately start a military action since [Taiwanese leaders] would [never] openly declare independence."[29] This new justification for the use of force was formalized in the February 2000 white paper on Taiwan. The document stated that China would reserve the right to use force not only in the event of a formal declaration of independence or foreign military intervention, but also if Taipei authorities "refuse" to engage in negotiations with Beijing leading to unification.[30]

A Strictly Limited, Carefully Controlled Regional Operation

The July 1995 military exercises were clearly defined, circumscribed in terms of location, duration, and scope. This was explicitly communicated several days in advance to Taipei and Washington without much advance notice.[31] By contrast, preparations for the exercises of March 1996 were undertaken many

[27] Elaine Scolino, "U.S. Offers China Two Olive Branches," *New York Times*, 29 July 1995.

[28] Garver, *Face Off*, 50–64, 72–73; Gurtov and Hwang, *China's Security*, 273.

[29] Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "'Covert Independence Movement' Justifies Invasion," *South China Morning Post*, 28 November 1995.

[30] "The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," Xinhua, in FBIS-CHI, 21 February 2000.

[31] You, "Making Sense," 301.

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months before, and advance warnings were communicated that more saber rattling could be expected. Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu was dispatched to Washington in March on an important mission to make certain that the Clinton administration was aware that China was planning only military exercises and missile tests, not a direct attack on Taiwan. Liu was concurrently director of the State Council's Office of Foreign Affairs and a key member of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, two extremely influential bodies in Chinese foreign policy making. Liu's position has been likened to the post of the U.S. National Security Adviser, and his dispatch to Washington was to ensure that the Clinton administration would be confident he spoke with an authoritative voice.[32]

In order to ensure strong central control, in mid-October 1995, a Headquarters for Operations Targeting Taiwan was established in Beijing under the command of Director of the PLA's General Staff Zhang Wannian. Zhang reported directly to the CMC, of which he was a vice chair. The Headquarters was responsible for directing the exercises and coordinating among the PLA services as well as the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions, and the East China Sea Fleet, which all fell within a specially designated Nanjing War Theater, encompassing the entire Taiwan Strait area.[33] Pains were also taken to ensure no direct contact with the enemy, since actual hostilities were not desired. The live-fire exercises and war games, while held in the vicinity of the strait, were well removed from Taiwan itself. And the use of missiles was to minimize the risk of a direct confrontation between mainland and Taiwanese military forces that might lead to an exchange of fire. Of course, the use of missiles was the most provocative element of the PLA's saber rattling, especially those launched in March 1996 at the sea-lanes some thirty miles off the northern port of Keelung and forty-seven miles from the busy southern port city of Kaohsiung. Yet, in the PLA's view, missiles were almost the ideal option, because they were both a clear demonstration that Beijing's threats were credible. China had the will to use force and the capability to strike Taiwan, but offered little danger of escalation.

Still, Chinese leaders were certainly concerned about the U.S. response, otherwise Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu would not have been dispatched to Washington in early March 1996. This move, unprecedented in the history of the PRC, indicated the high level of importance Beijing attached to making its intentions on Taiwan clear to Washington and reflected a degree of uncertainty by Beijing over the U.S. reaction to the military exercises. The muted U.S. response to the PLA exercises and missile tests of the summer of 1995 gave Chinese leaders the impression that if any response was forthcoming from Washington, it would be simply token. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph

[32] See Barton Gellman, "U.S. and China Nearly Came to Blows in 1996," *Washington Post*, 21 June 1998.

[33] Jen Hui-wen, "CPC Specially Sets up Headquarters to Plan Military Exercises," *Hsin Pao*, 22 December 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 2 January 1996, 37; Lam, "'Covert Independence Movement.'"

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S. Nye visited Beijing in mid-November, and Chinese officials pressed him to find out what a U.S. response to another military show of force in the Taiwan Strait might be. Nye was apparently stern but vague about possible American reactions.[34] As a result, Beijing went ahead with plans for military exercises in late November 1995 and more exercises and further missile tests in March 1996. While Beijing noted the U.S.S. *Nimitz's* December passage through the Taiwan Strait, Washington's signal was ambiguous because no U.S. statement was forthcoming. Although China concluded that the United States might again send one naval battle group to the vicinity, Beijing seemed very surprised when two were dispatched in March 1996. While the U.S. response seemed very low keyed in 1995, to China the American response in spring of 1996 seemed like an overreaction.[35]

In the PLA's view, its actions were not seen as very dangerous or risky, especially to gauge from the muted U.S. response until early 1996.[36] The aim of the exercise was to avoid actual conflict in the future by deterring Taiwan from pursuing independence. The principle underlying this tactic was dubbed by military sources in Beijing: "resorting to force [in order] to press for peace."[37] Thus the harsher and more hawkish the PLA acted and talked, the more effective the exercise would be.[38] The most virulent and threatening rhetoric from military figures came not in the weeks surrounding the initial missile tests and live-fire exercises in the summer of 1995 but, rather, in the months leading up to the operations in the spring of 1996. Since the summer of 1995 actions were more hastily staged and scripted when PLA leaders were most furious, one might expect to hear the most hawkish rhetoric at this time. But the most venomous barrage of threats and condemnations came in the lead up to March 1996, when Beijing and the PLA had months to prepare for both the exercises and coordinate and carefully script the blasts of rhetoric. This suggests the barrage of militant military rhetoric was less an emotional diatribe expressing gut feelings and more a sequence of deliberate and well-rehearsed sound bites. The tough talk by military figures was tempered by assurances that they did not want war with Taiwan. General Zhang Wannian, commander of the operation, insisted during the March exercises that the PLA strongly desired peaceful unification over military conquest.[39] PLA leaders did not want to fight a war they knew they could not or might not win. Therefore, the generals did not want to attack Taiwan if it could be avoided. No Chinese leader, civil or military, wanted to see a war with Taiwan. This was underlined by new signs of substan-

[34] Garver, *Face Off*, 85–86.

[35] See also ibid., chaps. 9 and 10.

[36] Ibid., 63, 104.

[37] Jen Hui-wen, "Communist China Meticulously Plans . . . Targeted at Taiwan," *Hsin Pao*, 1 December 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-236.

[38] You, "Making Sense," 300–301; Garver, *Face Off*, 63.

[39] Speech to PLA soldiers quoted in *Ta Kung Pao*, 27 March 1996, cited in You, "Making Sense," 301.

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tial flexibility at a high-level meeting on the subject of Taiwan policy in May 1998 and the first cross-strait summit in five years held in Beijing in October 1998.[40]

What the exercises of 1995–1996 also reflect, however, is the PLA's interest in focusing on its new doctrine of Limited War under High Technology Conditions on a meaningful, plausible, and tangible scenario. Thus military planners were presented with a golden opportunity to test the effectiveness of weaponry and combined service exercises. The seizure of Taiwan is now a central scenario for the PLA: one on which military planners can concentrate their energies.[41]

Taiwan Evokes Intensely Emotional Nationalism Among Soldiers

That national unification is a deeply cherished dream by virtually all mainland Chinese is widely recognized. Taiwan, of course, is the ultimate prize for Beijing. After the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 and the return of Macao in 1999, only Taiwan remains just beyond Beijing's reach. In asserting that all Chinese are strongly nationalistic, what some analysts seem to overlook is that soldiers in any country tend to be extremely patriotic, far more so than civilians.[42] PLA leaders are super patriots, fiercely supportive of unification, and deeply suspicious of meddling by foreign countries in what are regarded as China's internal affairs. Perceived violations of China's territorial integrity and infringements on its sovereignty are viewed with special outrage, particularly vis-à-vis Taiwan.[43] On the subject of territorial disputes, the PLA was very angry with the MFA for downplaying the most recent squabble over the Diaoyutai or Senkaku islands, claimed by Japan and China. According to Chinese military researchers, the PLA wanted to send warships to the islands in late 1996 and early 1997 to protect activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan, but this proposal was vetoed by the MFA. One retired senior officer expressed a mixture of pride and embarrassment that Hong Kong and Taiwanese compatriots displayed far greater patriotic fervor than their mainland brethren did. Beijing was conspicuous by its silence and inaction, and some Chinese criticized their own government for being too cowardly and overly sensitive to upsetting Japan.[44]

To understand better the hawkish stance of military leaders in the strait crisis, it is useful to draw a parallel with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In the classic study of the crisis, U.S. military figures are depicted as exceedingly

[40] Author's interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, May–June 1998; Bruce Gilley and Julian Baum, "What's In A Name?" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 May 1998, 26–27.

[41] Nan Li, "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, 1985–1995," *China Quarterly* 146 (June 1996).

[42] A significant exception is Garver, *Face Off*, 51.

[43] Author's interviews, Beijing and Shanghai, May–June 1998.

[44] Ibid.; Matt Forney, Sebastian Moffett, and Gary Silverman, "Ghosts of the Past," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 October 1996, 24.

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bellicose, much more than most of the top civilian officials.[45] U.S. soldiers tend to come off looking like the caricature of the bloodthirsty modern day warrior portrayed in some Hollywood movies. Just as one comes away from the Cuban case with a disturbing picture of the Pentagon, so a study of the most recent Taiwan Strait crisis seems to offer an alarming portrait of the Chinese high command. However, neither case is particularly representative of the dispositions of senior soldiers, because Cuba was a very special case for U.S. soldiers, much as Taiwan is for Chinese soldiers. Just as Cuba lies right off the U.S. mainland in the Caribbean in what has long been considered an American sphere of influence, so Taiwan, located just off the coast of mainland China, has been considered a part of Chinese territory for centuries. In 1962 the Kennedy administration viewed the interference of an outside power in Cuba, specifically the basing of Soviet missiles, as a very dangerous development that posed an unacceptable threat to the United States. In 1995 and 1996, the PRC viewed U.S. behavior as flagrant interference in China's internal affairs, which presented them with a grave strategic dilemma. Particularly odious in Beijing's view was the encouragement and support given to Taipei in its quest for independence. An independent U.S.–backed Taiwan would not only shatter China's dreams of eventual reunification, but also pose a direct security threat to the mainland.

Not only is the PLA's attitude toward Taiwan colored by intense nationalism, but it is also affected by the deep-seated belief that the military bears a special responsibility for achieving unification. The PLA's General Political Department has long had a Liaison Directorate to conduct united front work. "The main target [since 1949] of its research and operations has been Taiwan."[46] In Mao's time the PLA was on the front line in the Taiwan Strait with the mission of liberating the last bastion of the KMT. The United States sabotaged invasion plans by intervening in Korea and later forming an alliance with Taiwan. Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the military kept up a regular barrage of the KMT-held offshore islands and grabbed the limelight in the series of crises that punctuated the first two of those three decades. Furthermore, the PLA and its leaders also have been intimately involved in the post-Mao initiative to achieve a peaceful union between the mainland and Taiwan. Two key events that signaled this change from emphasizing a military solution to stressing a peaceful one involved the military. First, the PLA on 1 January 1979 ceased its shelling of the offshore islands, marking the end of an era of conflict and confrontation. Second, Marshal Ye Jianying in September 1981 fired the first full salvo of the peaceful unification offensive by making the initial formal appeal to Taiwan.

After Lee Teng-hui's speech at Cornell, PLA figures pressed for a quick and forceful response by Beijing. It seemed to have been the last straw. China

[45] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), chap. 6.

[46] Lu, *The Dynamics*, 123–124.

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had not vehemently protested when the F-16 sale to Taiwan was announced in 1992, and China had not strenuously objected when Lee Teng-hui was given a visa to visit the United States in May 1995. But the generals drew the line at Lee's inflammatory rhetoric at Cornell.[47] In a September 1995 interview, General Liu Huaqing, at the time China's most senior soldier, stated: "In June, Li Denghui [Lee Teng-hui] went to the United States flaunting his connections with foreigners, openly forsook national interests, brazenly advocated a split, and resisted reunification. This inevitably has increased tension across the Taiwan Strait." Liu continued: "We . . . resolutely oppose any moves by foreign forces to interfere in China's internal affairs and to undermine China's reunification, and resolutely oppose the conspiracy of the Taiwan authorities . . . resisting the great cause of peaceful unification of the motherland. . . . The . . . [PLA] . . . is the powerful defender of state sovereignty and unity and will never permit any part . . . of the motherland to be cut apart. . . . Our army is determined, and has the ability to smash all schemes . . . [promoting] Taiwan independence. . . . [Lee Teng-hui's] . . . irresponsible policy will only bring disaster to . . . Taiwan. . . ."[48]

Moreover, the PLA is highly suspicious of Washington. Many soldiers are convinced that the United States is the chief instigator and supporter of the Taiwan independence movement.[49] Deputy Chief of PLA General Staff Xiong Guangkai delivered a veiled threat to the United States in the course of a heated discussion with former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas. Freeman in early January 1996. Freeman said he warned the Chinese officials that any PLA action against Taiwan would prompt a stern U.S. response. The Chinese military leaders at the meeting retorted that the United States didn't "have the will" to put its forces in harm's way. Xiong reportedly stated: "In the 1950s, you three times threatened nuclear strikes on China, and you could do that because we couldn't hit back. Now we can. So you are not going to threaten us again because, in the end, you care a lot more about Los Angeles than Taipei."[50] The depth of the PLA's suspicion about U.S. motives can be gauged from a more recent example. Many military leaders seemed convinced that the U.S. bombing of the PRC's Belgrade Embassy in May 1999 was no mistake.[51]

There were other factors motivating harsh rhetoric from soldiers. Military men were playing the role of hawks because it was in part expected of them and in part it was much to their advantage to do so. The PLA as an institution is eager to put the memory of Tiananmen Square firmly behind it, and Taiwan provided a heaven-sent opportunity to show the military as the staunch de-

[47] Ting, "Hawks Dominate China's Policy," 12–13; Garver, *Face Off*, 72–73; Lam, "'Covert Independence Movement,'" 92–93.

[48] *Ta Kung Pao*, 4 September 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 7 September 1995, 32.

[49] See, for example, Garver, *Face Off*, chap. 5.

[50] Gellman, "U.S. and China."

[51] Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Urgent US Action Needed to Soothe Beijing," *South China Morning Post*, 10 May 1999.

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fender of the motherland. The virulent and aggressive public statements by PLA figures are plays to public opinion. The cause of reunification with Taiwan is strongly supported by ordinary Chinese people, and most would back a military attack on Taiwan if it were rationalized as preventing Taiwan from separating from China. The massive public support for Beijing's handling of the crisis is evident from the strong approval rating the Chinese government got for "ensuring a strong national defense"—a higher approval rating for all but one other issue. In a poll of Beijing residents taken in December 1995, in the midst of the strait crisis, 64 percent of the respondents gave the government a "good" or "very good" rating in providing for national defense. This positive assessment rose to 95 percent if the category of "fair" was included.[52] While one must be cautious of generalizing from this Beijing sample, it seems very likely that a similar approval rating existed in China's general population.

The crisis also gave the PLA a chance to show that it has a central role to play as the stick element in Beijing's carrot and stick approach to Taiwan. By vocally touting their intense patriotism, soldiers reminded China's civilian leaders of the PLA's indispensability in the serious and ongoing game of coercive diplomacy with Taiwan. General Ba Zhongtan, a career PLA man who had just retired as commander of the People's Armed Police, told delegates to the NPC: "At the moment, economic construction has not given enough consideration to the needs of national defense . . . ." He uttered these words in the immediate aftermath of missile tests of mid-March 1996.[53] Such words were aimed at helping the PLA win larger defenses budgets or at least avoid spending cuts.[54] The timing of the public announcement of the 1996 missile tests, made early on the morning of 5 March, the same day the NPC opened its new session, was probably not coincidental.[55]

Individual interests also motivated hawkish and ultra-nationalist barrages. The saber rattling provided officers from various military regions an opportunity to gain the attention of superiors. The commander of the Chengdu Military Region reportedly remarked that the presence of U.S. aircraft carriers in the region was "no big deal." He explained: "China and the U.S. have fought once or twice before. . . . It's the U.S. that has ended up the loser."[56] They hoped that if they demonstrated great enthusiasm and patriotism, this would enhance their chances for promotion. During the crisis, for example, the CMC reportedly was bombarded with "written requests for battle assignments" from soldiers who

[52] Yang Zhong et al., "Political Views From Below," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30 (September 1997): 479.

[53] Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "'Relentless Expansion' of Army Power Viewed," *South China Morning Post*, 20 March 1996.

[54] You, "Making Sense," 295.

[55] Richard D. Fisher, Jr., "China's Missiles Over the Taiwan Strait" in James Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., *Crisis in the Taiwan Strait* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), 174.

[56] Lam, "'Relentless Expansion'"; Garver, *Face Off*, 108.

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invariably expressed a patriotic desire to fight to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent. What is so unusual about this was both the sheer volume and that ordinary rank and file were requesting frontline duty. Typically, only officers make such requests, which reflect strong nationalistic feelings orchestrated by the central leadership itself in order in part to boost morale and to mobilize support. But the requests were a result of efforts by particular generals "to attract the CMC's attention" by demonstrating the depth of popular enthusiasm and political awareness of their subordinates.[57] Moreover, if by chance there were military conflict and their units saw action, their long-term career prospects would be enhanced.[58] The shocking words of a two-star PLA general during the crisis: "*women dapo Taiwan*!" [We will crush Taiwan] vividly recalled by several Taiwanese scholars, should be viewed in this context.[59]

Conclusion

PLA figures, while hawkish, were not bellicose or belligerent as some have made them out to be. Their behavior is explained partly by soldiers' response to coercive diplomacy, partly by the military's eagerness to apply its new doctrine, and partly by the intense nationalist feelings aroused by Taiwan. The crisis reveals a distinct civil-military dichotomy in terms of viewpoints and perspectives. It also clearly shows a very assertive military elite. On the one hand this case demonstrates the power and influence of the PLA; on the other hand many of the key military figures involved in the crisis are now retired. Thus, while an important precedent may have been set, without Long March era soldiers like Liu Huaquing, future PLA efforts at affecting policy may be far less effective. Although the PLA came close to dictating the use of force in this case, in the final analysis it was a civil-military coalition that settled on the show of force in the strait. Military figures were responsible for building momentum but strong sentiment among civilian leaders resulted in a major consensus rapidly emerging.

The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis stands as a largely successful instance of coercive diplomacy by Beijing.[60] This conclusion seems justified because China achieved most of its goals without resorting to actual warfare: getting Taipei and Washington to take China's warnings seriously and resulting in a more chastened and less boisterous Taiwanese independence movement. Coercive diplomacy fails if war breaks out or the opponent fails to modify his behavior. In this case, war was averted, and Taiwan did moderate its words and deeds, at least for a few years—until mid-1999 when President Lee argued that Taipei-Beijing ties ought to be considered "state-to-state relations." It is more difficult

[57] Author's interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, May–June 1998; "Chinese Military Has Strong Desire to Attack Taiwan," *Tungfang Jihpao*, 3 January 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-008.

[58] This point is also made by Garver, *Face Off*, 51.

[59] Author's interviews in Taipei, May 1998.

[60] Beijing saw the crisis as a victory. Garver, *Face Off*, chap. 14.

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to make a definitive assessment to establish the precise goals of China's coercive diplomacy. However, there is now greater awareness among Taiwan officials and politicians on the need to avoid antagonizing Beijing with public relations ploys aimed at trying to trump China at every turn on the world stage.[61]

But the effort cannot be ruled a total success. Only a month after the crisis, in April 1996, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto signed a joint declaration committing Japan to providing logistical support and assistance to U.S. military forces in East Asia, including in the Taiwan vicinity (not specifically mentioned by name but clearly implicit). Drawing Japan more directly into any future strait tensions is definitely not what Beijing could view as a success.

Significantly, China's general success in the 1995–1996 crisis contrasts with a rather dismal record of failure in other cases of coercive diplomacy. Korea (1950), India (1962), and Vietnam (1979) are obvious examples of failure, because in each instance war broke out.[62] Prior crises in the Taiwan Strait in 1954–1955 and 1958 also count as failures, not because they resulted in wars but because they were not successful in modifying Taiwanese or American behavior.[63] Perhaps the success in the most recent Taiwan crisis can be credited to a process of learning by Beijing on how best to manage coercive diplomacy and/or the fact that dealing with fellow Chinese minimized the potential for misreading Beijing's signals.[64] The story with Washington is radically different.

Although the 1995–1996 crisis amount to a show of force with no intention by China to initiate actual hostilities against Taiwan, it nevertheless gives cause for concern for four reasons. First, this crisis underlines the fact that the PLA is actively preparing to take Taiwan by military means if need be. This does not mean that an attack is imminent, that China is capable of launching a successful invasion of Taiwan or even an effective blockade. What it does mean, however, is that the PLA is likely in time to surmount the challenge of tackling Taiwan. This is because these scenarios are consistent with military doctrine—Limited War under High Technology Conditions—and because the PLA is concentrating its efforts in terms of force structure, training, weapons systems development and acquisition.[65] When an organization focuses all its efforts toward achieving one task, no matter how challenging, it can become very good at this quite quickly. While armies, like all bureaucracies, can be highly resistant to

[61] Author's interviews in Taipei, May 1998.

[62] On Korea, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace," *International Security* 17 (Summer 1992); on Vietnam, see James Mulvenon, "The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 16 (Fall 1995); on India, see Allen Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).

[63] Zhang, *Deterrence*, chaps. 7, 8; Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), chap. 6.

[64] Ramon Myers, personal communication to author, July 1998.

[65] Tai Ming Cheung, "Chinese Military Preparations Against Taiwan Over the Next 10 Years" in Lilley and Downs, eds. *Crisis*, 52.

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change and innovation, once a new strategy has been adopted, tactics, organizational formats, and weaponry can all be tailored remarkably swiftly to fit the required specifications.[66]

Second, if the prospects for peaceful reunification in Beijing's view suddenly deteriorate, the PLA may find the idea of a preemptive attack increasingly appealing.[67] Under the new doctrine of limited war, the key battle is the first one. Moreover, the principle of "active defense," which has been at the core of Chinese strategic thinking for decades, does not preclude offense. If conditions merit it, a preemptive strike may be the optimal form of "active defense."[68]

Third, the crisis highlights the preferred choice of tactics for a PLA attack on Taiwan: missiles, an option that plays to China's strength.[69] While on paper, China has a vast numerical superiority over Taiwan in terms of manpower and hardware, these statistics are very misleading. It would be extremely difficult to bring into play the hundreds of thousands of soldiers needed for an invasion, because China does not have the appropriate ships or landing craft in anywhere near the numbers required. This raises the spectacle of what has been called tongue-in-cheek the "million man swim."[70] Thus to concentrate on demonstrating the futility of launching a full-scale invasion of Taiwan may be to risk "missing the boat," since this scenario is extremely unlikely.[71] Missile technology is one area in which China has clear superiority over Taiwan. The threat by a senior Chinese general to former Assistant Secretary of Defense Freeman that China was prepared to launch one missile a day for thirty days at Taiwan should be taken seriously.[72] Missiles armed with conventional warheads have the potential to do serious damage to Taiwan's defense capabilities. They could destroy the island's airports, grounding Taiwan's air force, or if aimed at civilian targets, they could terrorize and demoralize the public.[73] Even more alarming is the possibility of nuclear escalation.[74]

Fourth, there was a dangerous lack of clear communication between Beijing and Washington during the crisis. The result could have been an unde-

[66] James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

[67] Cheung, "China's Military Preparations," 60.

[68] Mi Zhenyu, "China's Strategic Plan," 53–54.

[69] Fisher, "China's Missiles," 186–187; Cheung, "Chinese Military," 55, 60; Eric McVadon, "PRC Exercises, Doctrine, and Tactics Toward Taiwan: The Naval Dimension" in Lilley and Downs, ed., *Crisis*, 269–272.

[70] McVadon, "PRC Exercises," 249–276; Harlan Jencks, "Wild Speculations on the Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait" and Kenneth W. Allen, "PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment" both in Lilley and Downs, eds., *Crisis*, 131–145, 217–247.

[71] Gill and O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," 58–59.

[72] Patrick E. Tyler, "As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure the U.S. Listens." *New York Times*, 24 January 1996.

[73] Henry Rowan, personal communication to author, July 1998.

[74] Jencks, "Wild Speculations," 151–154. On Chinese discussion of tactical nukes, see Alaistair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking,'" *International Security* 20 (Winter 1995–1996): 5–42.

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sired escalation to direct military conflagration between two nuclear powers. The key issue for the United States was an uncertainty about just how far China was prepared to go in March 1996. Beijing believed it had made its intentions crystal clear: the object was to intimidate Taiwan and to warn the United States not to meddle in Taiwan's affairs; no actual invasion or attack was planned. Washington initially seemed asleep at the wheel, ignoring the crisis and then scrambling to overcompensate in March 1996. As Secretary of State Christopher later wrote: "... the [Clinton] Administration was concerned that a simple miscalculation or misstep could lead to unintended war."[75] China's response to the May 1999 bombing of its Belgrade embassy demonstrates that the potential for misperception and misunderstanding is still there.

[75] Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 427.

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The Regional Sources of Power-Sharing Failure: The Case of Lebanon

BRENDA M. SEAVER

Intercommunal violence and national disintegration are among the most pressing problems facing scholars and practitioners in the late twentieth century. The international media have recently spotlighted several deeply divided or "plural"[1] societies, including Bosnia, Russia, Sri Lanka, Canada, Rwanda, Northern Ireland, India, South Africa, and Lebanon. What makes the persistence of subnational group identity over national identity especially interesting is its occurrence despite powerful homogenizing social and economic forces sweeping many regions. Somewhat surprisingly, the dissemination and popularity of Western ideas, institutions, and values cannot seem to eradicate traditional group ties in many societies.

The central problem facing social scientists and policy makers is how to achieve "democratic stability"[2] in these fragile states. Reducing intercommunal violence in plural societies by creating stable regimes of any kind is clearly the priority. However, engineering democratic arrangements becomes the next goal in many cases because of liberal democracy's widely recognized status as the most legitimate type of political regime. Not only does liberal democracy allow citizens the widest degree of political participation, it also provides for the rule of law, guarantees civil liberties, and supplies states with institutions and conflict resolution norms that reduce the chances of war with other democracies.[3]

[1] Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 34.

[2] Ibid., 228–29.

[3] For more information on the democratic peace literature, which focuses on the absence of war between democracies, see Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986): 1151–61; and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

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The challenge of building democratic regimes in deeply divided societies becomes even more complicated in regions where groups with shared identities transcend state boundaries. The transnational nature of many communal groups has the potential of transforming domestic policy issues into regional crises involving several states (for example, Kurds, Palestinians, Serbs, Tutsis). When intercommunal conflicts become regionalized, the threat of interstate war is superimposed on the existing threat of civil war.

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the debate concerning the prospects for achieving stable democracy in plural societies. Although a vast literature exists that deals specifically with this issue, this article tackles the problem from a different angle: Rather than focus on how to engineer power-sharing arrangements in burgeoning democracies or how to facilitate conditions favorable to building democracies in such states, it emphasizes the determinants of democratic breakdown in deeply divided societies. More specifically, its goal is to examine the failure of consociational democracy. The consociational power-sharing approach has been touted as the most promising model of political mechanisms for achieving sustainable democracy in societies beset by severe communal cleavages.[4]

METHOD

Rather than conducting a comparative study examining various cases of consociational failure (Cyprus, Nigeria), this article will utilize the plausibility probe approach to analyze only one case—the Lebanese civil war of 1975–1990. A plausibility probe is a preliminary test of hypotheses or candidate-theories that is used to determine if more rigorous tests would be worthwhile.[5] The analysis is restricted to a single case for theoretical purposes rather than for the sake of convenience, as Lebanon represents the only durable consociational democracy to date that ultimately resulted in failure. For example, Cyprus's consociational democracy lasted only three years (1960–1963), primarily because the Greek and Turkish elites never quite agreed to cooperate.[6] Nigeria's lasted only nine years (1957–1966) and was only marginally consociational.[7] Although Ma-

[4] Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach" in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 491–509; Arend Lijphart, *Power-Sharing in South Africa* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985); Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics* 21 (January 1969): 207–25; Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," *Comparative Political Studies* 1 (April 1968): 3–44.

[5] Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science" in F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 108–13.

[6] Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968).

[7] John P. Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966).

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laysia has been referred to as an example of consociational breakdown, its power-sharing arrangements never quite collapsed; rather, Malaysia's grand coalition experienced a temporary breakdown during the 1969 riots but was never fully abandoned.[8] The Lebanese consociational system, in contrast, persisted for thirty-two years and endured periods of severe internal strain, including the 1958 civil war and the influx of Palestinian refugees and guerrillas following three critical regional events: the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) expulsion from Jordan in 1970–1971. Moreover, all major consociational principles initially operated in Lebanon, which served as the glue that held the fragmented society together. Although Lebanon's confessional system has always been fragile, it represents the most successful case of consociational democracy in the developing world. Consequently, its breakdown came as more of a surprise than the failure of other consociational democracies in the Third World. Although a single case cannot falsify a hypothesis or theory, it can provide powerful empirical support for a theory, especially when very few cases of a phenomenon exist.

The comparative literature on consociational democracy largely revolves around the work of Arend Lijphart, among others. This literature offers the most promising domestic explanation of consociational failure. For although Lijphart's elite-centered research has emphasized the political determinants of consociational success, it is reasonable to apply it to failure as well. According to consociational theorists such as Lijphart, failure will occur when the elites comprising the ruling coalition cease to cooperate and compromise with one another and/or when the power-sharing arrangements no longer incorporate every significant communal group in the society. Many comparativists interested in democratic transitions, moreover, tend to share Lijphart's emphasis on the strategic choices of key actors and the importance of elite pact-making to the success or failure of nascent democracies.[9]

This article, however, focuses on the following "deeper" hypothesis of consociational failure which links internal regime instability to external (that is, regional) conflicts: "Consociational failure is a product of inauspicious regional factors and turbulent regional systems. Although consociational failure stems from the cessation of elite consensus, regional factors represent important antecedent variables that contribute to elite dissension and ultimately regime collapse."[10]

[8] Karl von Vorys, *Democracy Without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 15 and 386–422.

[9] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions To Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2 (April 1970): 337–63; Guiseppe di Palma, *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

[10] For an excellent interpretation of Karl Popper's definition of theoretical depth, see John Watkins, *Science and Scepticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

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This alternate hypothesis not only incorporates the importance of elite fragmentation for regime failure but goes beyond consociational theory because of its emphasis on how turmoil and developments occurring within the region upset the elite consensus, ultimately triggering regime collapse. In short, this hypothesis subsumes the hypothesis derived from Lijphart's work and represents a better explanation for consociational failure due to its ability to explain the origins of elite fragmentation and the atrophy of power-sharing arrangements. According to Karl Popper, it has more depth, since it specifies an ultimate cause of consociational breakdown rather than emphasizing a more proximate cause.

This research hypothesis is derived from the recent resurgence of regional studies in international relations, which focus on the analytic importance of regional dynamics and subsystems as distinct from the field's more typical emphases on the international and domestic sources of interstate behavior.[11] Moreover, during the 1960s and 1970s there was strong interest in the regional level, both in subsystem research and in integration studies.[12] Although much of the recent literature emphasizes the sources of regional cooperation (often treating regional dynamics as a dependent variable), it is also reasonable to deduce hypotheses from this literature concerning the domestic consequences of regional relations.

The Consociational Democracy Model

Consociational democracies, according to Lijphart, share four general characteristics.[13] First, political elites representing all significant segments of the plural society must participate in some form of grand decision-making coalition. Second, a mutual veto must exist, allowing elites of each group to challenge decisions detrimental to their particular groups. Third, proportionality must be the standard principle of political representation, civil service appointments, and the allocation of public funds. Fourth, each segmental group must be allowed to run its own internal affairs. In his later writings, Lijphart distinguishes between primary and secondary consociational characteristics, with the grand coalition

[11] David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Andrew Hurrell and Louise Fawcett, *The Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Edward Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, *The Political Economy of Regionalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Etel Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle East," *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (June 1994): 305–38.

[12] Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," *World Politics* 10 (April 1958): 408–29; Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., *Regional Politics and World Order* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973). Excellent reviews of the regional subsystem literature are provided by Kay Boals, "The Concept 'Subordinate International System': A Critique" in ibid., 399–411; and William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory," *International Studies Quarterly* 17 (March 1973): 89–117.

[13] Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 25–52.

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and segmental autonomy belonging to the former category and proportionality and the minority veto belonging to the latter.[14]

At the core of his theory is the necessary condition of elite accommodation institutionalized in consociational devices that can produce stability. In his earlier works, Lijphart identifies four prerequisites for elite cooperation: awareness of the dangers inherent in fragmented systems; commitment to system maintenance; ability to transcend subcultural cleavages; and ability to forge appropriate solutions that can meet the demands of the subgroups.[15] In addition to these prerequisites, Lijphart introduces five favorable conditions for elite cooperation and the stable support of nonelites: first, a multiple balance of power—all segmental groups are minorities and three or four subgroups are preferable to two subgroups of roughly equal power or one hegemonic subgroup; second, size of country—small is better; third, the presence of overarching loyalties (moderate nationalism); fourth, segmental isolation (even federalism); and finally, a prior tradition of elite accommodation.[16] In his older works he suggests five other favorable conditions: the unifying effect of external threats; widespread support of the elite cartel system; distinct lines of cleavage; socioeconomic equality among segmental groups; and a low decision-making load on the political system.[17]

Lijphart is careful to caution his readers against perceiving his list of favorable conditions as either necessary or sufficient conditions: "I should like to emphasize that the most important aspect of these favorable factors is they are not *decisive*: They are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the adoption or success of power-sharing. They are merely *helpful* factors. This means that even when all or most of the conditions are favorable, the success of power-sharing is by no means guaranteed. And even when many conditions, or the most crucial ones, are unfavorable, success is still possible."[18] According to Lijphart, consociational devices may or may not produce democratic stability.

Criticisms of Lijphart's Model

Before reviewing some of the criticisms leveled against Lijphart's model, it is only fair to acknowledge its merits. First, consociational theory is able to explain the stability of democracy in the smaller European countries better than other theories that predicted democratic failure in societies lacking overlapping memberships, cross-cutting cleavages, and a considerable degree of homogeneity or cultural-ideological consensus.[19] Lijphart's list of favorable and unfavor-

[14] Seymour M. Lipset, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Democracy, Vol. 3* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1995), 853–65.

[15] Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," 22–25.

[16] Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 53–103.

[17] Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," 25–30.

[18] Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," 54–55. (Emphasis added.)

[19] The importance of cultural homogeneity is emphasized in John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958).

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able conditions, too, is persuasive. Many of the states that experienced consociational failure did lack several of the favorable conditions.

In spite of its strengths, consociational theory has been attacked on a variety of grounds for legitimate reasons. First, political scientists have emphasized that power-sharing devices have not consistently yielded peace and stable democracy, and that the connection between consociational democracy and stability has not been sufficiently demonstrated. All one has to do is glance at the list of consociational failures (Lebanon, Cyprus, Nigeria) to see that consociational devices cannot always prevent intercommunal conflict, especially in the developing world.

Second, many scholars have asserted that some of the smaller European countries from which the model was derived, particularly Switzerland and the Netherlands, are not truly consociational.[20] Switzerland, for example, possesses an initiative and referendum procedure that undermines other consociational devices because of its emphasis on what the majority (mass) desires.[21] Still others have identified factors other than consociational devices that promoted stability in the smaller European cases. High levels of prosperity following World War II, for instance, may have played a greater role in preserving peace in Switzerland and Austria than consociational devices.[22]

Third, social scientists have argued that consociational democracy may exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, intercommunal tensions.[23] In one study, for example, it was argued that the Netherlands became a more deeply plural society after consociational devices were instituted in 1917.[24] Other studies blame Lebanon's collapse entirely on the extent to which its political arrangements embodied, rather than tried to eliminate, confessionalist differences.[25] The confessional schism built into the system, according to one scholar, produced the high level of intercommunal hostility that culminated in the 1975 civil war. A number of social scientists, moreover, assert that consociational devices increase friction in plural societies, because many socioeconomic problems are ignored to avoid intersectarian conflicts. The depoliticization of serious problems renders the decision-making apparatus virtually immobile—an important problem that even Lijphart addresses. When serious policy problems are ignored and therefore unresolved by the bureaucratic machinery, citizens desir-

[20] Brian Barry, "Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October 1975): 481–90.

[21] Jeffrey Obler, Jurg Steiner, and Guido Dierickx, *Decision Making in Smaller Democracies: The Consociational 'Burden'* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, vol. 6, Comparative Politics Series No. 01–064, 1977), 328–29.

[22] Barry, "Political Accommodation," 493–95; Obler et al., *Decision Making*, 337.

[23] Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," *World Politics* 26 (July 1974): 604–21; Judith Nagata, "Review of Lijphart 1977," *International Journal* 34 (Summer 1979): 505–06.

[24] Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," 612–18.

[25] Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis," 114; N. Kliot, "The Collapse of the Lebanese State," *Middle Eastern Studies* 23 (January 1987): 54–74.

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ing changes or reforms become increasingly frustrated, resulting in protests and in some cases violence.

Fourth, several critics have charged that consociational democracy is either not democratic or not sufficiently democratic. The emphasis that consociational theory places on deferential attitudes toward elites and the secretive nature of elite decision making seem to be at odds with normative democratic theory. Certain critics have even referred to consociational democracy as "consociational oligarchy" or "elite conspiracy."[26] Many of these critics dislike the lack of opposition in consociational democracies. Lijphart persuasively defends the democratic nature of the consociational model, however, by emphasizing the degree to which it conforms to Robert Dahl's definition of polyarchy, as well as the fact that minorities are guaranteed representation by the model while majoritarian arrangements deprive minorities of a political voice.[27]

Fifth, Lijphart's favorable conditions have been attacked on the basis that they are not really conditions at all.[28] These critics are frustrated by Lijphart's admission that his conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient. The problem is that when scientists try to falsify hypotheses derived from a theory that includes conditions that may or may not have an impact on the dependent variable, falsification becomes extremely challenging if not impossible. If Lijphart's theory is narrowed to include only its theoretical core—the institutionalization of elite cooperation through certain consociational devices—then it is potentially falsifiable.[29]

Sixth, Lijphart's research has been challenged on the basis that it does not fulfill Imre Lakatos's early criteria of a good research program.[30] According to Ian Lustick, Lijphart rejects precision of concepts and measurement, consistency, and standards of evidence and is therefore practicing "impressionistic" social science. Additionally, Lustick argues that Lijphart has undertaken an epistemological shift away from positivist science and altered his scholarly commitments in the direction of prescription in his later works, particularly in his 1985 book on South Africa and his *American Political Science Review* article on India. Moreover, David Laitin's criticism that Lijphart recommends power-sharing mechanisms irrespective of whether conditions are favorable seems to resemble Lustick's point that Lijphart tends to confuse explanation and prescription.[31]

[26] Samuel P. Huntington, "Reform and Stability in a Modernizing, Multi-Ethnic Society," *Politikon* 8 (1981): 14.

[27] Lijphart, *Power-Sharing in South Africa*, 110.

[28] Adriano Pappalardo, "The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique," *European Journal of Political Research* 9 (December 1981): 365–90; M. P. C. M. van Schendelen, "The Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms," *Acta Politica* 19 (January 1984): 19–55.

[29] For more information on falisifiability and Karl Popper's philosophy of science, see Watkins, *Science and Scepticism.*

[30] Ian S. Lustick, "Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism," *World Politics* 50 (October 1997): 88–117.

[31] David D. Laitin, "South Africa: Violence, Myths, and Democratic Reform," *World Politics* 39 (January 1987): 265.

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Finally, and most relevant for this article, social scientists have argued that elite willingness to compromise is a better explanation for democratic stability in plural societies than are consociational devices, and that the determinants of elite cooperation are consequently more important in explaining stability than specific political mechanisms.[32] Even Lijphart openly admits that elite behavior can be mystifying, which is one of the reasons why he includes his various favorable conditions, which are easier to identify than the determinants of elite behavior.[33] Thus, elite willingness to cooperate may be the only necessary condition. If this is the case, scholars should focus on identifying the sources of elite cooperation rather than on the effects of certain political mechanisms that may not even be necessary for democratic stability, or on myriad conditions that do not even achieve the status of necessary conditions.

Lebanon's Power-Sharing Arrangements

In order to evaluate the Lebanon case and the extent to which it supports the research hypothesis, it is necessary to review briefly the power-sharing arrangements in place in 1975. Prior to the civil war, Lebanon was one of the few liberal democracies in the Middle East. What made its democratic regime extraordinary was its persistence in spite of a multiconfessional society with an overarching Muslim/Christian cleavage and seventeen different sects. Whereas Lebanon's Muslim population consists primarily of three sects (Shi'ite, Sunni, and Druze), its Christian residents are divided into several sects (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, and Armenian Catholic, among others). Protestants and Jews also reside in Lebanon, though in much smaller numbers. The Palestinians that resided in Lebanon at the time were composed of primarily Sunni Muslims (85 percent) and secondarily non-Maronite Christians (15 percent).[34] In the case of the Palestinian Muslims, most were not legal citizens of the state.

When Lebanon achieved independence from France in 1943, two popular Lebanese elites, Bishara al-Khuri (the Maronite president) and Riyad al-Sulh (the Sunni prime minister) devised the National Pact. A carefully-crafted verbal agreement, the National Pact stipulated that the Christians of Lebanon would forego European protection and all military pacts with Western powers, while the Muslims agreed to set aside any pan-Arab desires and accept Lebanon's existing geographical boundaries. Rather than aligning with either the Western or the Islamic camps, the hope was to build a sense of overarching Lebanese national identity that would pacify both Muslims and Christians. In addition, the pact-makers incorporated into the political system a confessional schism when they reconfirmed that future Lebanese presidents would be Maro-

[32] Barry, "Political Accommodation," 500.

[33] Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 54.

[34] William W. Harris, *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 152.

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nite Christians, premiers would be Sunni Muslims, and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies would be Shi'ite Muslim. It was further agreed that Christians and Muslims would be represented in parliament according to a 6:5 ratio (based on the 1932 census), and civil service appointments and public funding decisions would also be made on a sectarian basis.

Lebanon's national covenant supplements the 1926 constitution crafted by the French in conjunction with Lebanese jurists. According to the constitution's provisions, a parliament popularly elected every four years elects a president of the republic who serves a six-year term. The president appoints the prime minister, while the prime minister forms a cabinet that will hold the confidence of the parliament. By the 1970s the president had developed a considerable amount of independence by making use of powers granted him by the French-inspired constitution. These powers included veto authority, the power to dissolve the parliament, decree powers, and the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet. Lastly, the constitution included a general provision that the confessional groups in Lebanon be represented proportionately in parliament.

Prior to 1975 Lebanon's power-sharing arrangements had been praised by policy makers and scholars alike for their ability to sustain a limited democracy and maintain civil order in a deeply divided, modernizing society set in a tumultuous region.[35] Other scholars such as Michael Hudson, however, correctly recognized the weak edifice upon which the regime's political consensus rested.[36] Lebanon's brief civil war in 1958, according to Hudson, was only one indication of the political system's inherent frailty. Modernization and its concomitant force, social mobilization, were more important indicators of instability due to the host of problems they create for democratic regimes. Most notably, these processes increased the decision-making demands on the Lebanese system and contributed to unevenness in regional development within Lebanon, while at the same time elites proved unable to integrate the increasing number of nontraditional interest groups and parties into the system due to their well-justified fear that it would result in a more radicalized Muslim state.

The Outbreak of Civil War

Despite the enduring quality of these power-sharing arrangements, events in 1975 proved too formidable for the regime and its ruling coalition. Two events are widely cited in the historical record as marking the beginning of the Leba-

[35] Elie A. Salem, *Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); Leonard Binder, ed., *Politics in Lebanon* (New York: Wiley, 1966); David R. and Audrey C. Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism* (New York: Elsevier, 1975).

[36] Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Modernization in Lebanon* (New York: Random House, 1968); Michael C. Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics," *Comparative Politics* 1 (January 1969): 245–63.

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nese civil war.[37] The first occurred in February 1975, during which time Lebanese fishermen's unions in Sidon, Tyre, and Tripoli jointly protested the establishment of the Protein Company, a modern high-technology monopolistic fishing company owned in large part by former President Camille Chamoun, a Maronite Christian. In contrast to the Tripoli strike, which passed relatively quietly, the strike in Sidon on 25 February provoked the Lebanese Army, which promptly began firing upon protesters, mortally wounding Ma'ruf Sa'ad, the Sunni Muslim leader of the Popular Nasserist Organization of Sidon. During the following two weeks, demonstrations convulsed virtually all of Lebanon's major cities, with the most intense fighting occurring between troops and gunmen in Sidon. In an effort to prevent the Lebanese Army from taking over the city, Palestinian commandos fought alongside radical Lebanese militiamen. This level of Palestinian-leftist cooperation exemplified the extent to which socioeconomic and political discontent was becoming inextricably intertwined with the Palestinian issue.

The second event erupted on 13 April 1975, at which time Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Maronite-dominated Kata'ib party (the Phalangists) attended the consecration of a new church in the Christian Beirut suburb, Ayn al-Rumana. Unknown assailants approached the church in two cars and opened fire, killing three Christians. Within a matter of hours, a group of Maronite militiamen at Ayn al-Rumana retaliated by ambushing a bus containing mostly Palestinian as well as some Lebanese passengers who were on their way to the Tel al-Za'atar refugee camp after attending a gathering in Sabra. Twenty-seven passengers were killed and twenty others wounded. The incident incited heavy fighting throughout the country between the Kata'ib and the Palestinian militiamen and leftist-Muslims, resulting in over 300 dead in three days.[38]

As a result of the upheaval, Kamal Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist party and leader of the burgeoning Lebanese National Movement umbrella organization, declared a boycott of any government containing Kata'ib representatives, while PLO leader Yasir Arafat took the opposite tack and tried to calm the situation. The Maronite parties (Kata'ib, National Liberal, National Bloc) removed their ministers from the cabinet, which led to Prime Minister Rashid al-Sulh's resignation. Despite their opposition to the political demands made by Jumblatt, the traditional Sunni, Shi'ite and Druze leaders (zu'ama)

[37] Harris, *Faces of Lebanon*; Tabitha Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987); Charles Winslow, *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society* (London: Routledge, 1996); Elizabeth Picard, *Lebanon: A Shattered Country* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1996); Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1979); Iliya F. Harik, *Lebanon: Anatomy of a Conflict* (Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff, 1981); Kamal S. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958–1976* (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1976); Itamar Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon, 1970–1983* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Marius K. Deeb, *The Lebanese Civil War* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980); and Harald Vocke, *The Lebanese War* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1978).

[38] Harris, *Faces of Lebanon*, 161.

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finally sided with Jumblatt a few days later and consequently boycotted the Kata'ib. In the meantime, the country was in the process of polarizing into two broad movements—the "progressive" Lebanese National Movement and the "conservative" Lebanese Front. The Lebanese Front was led by Maronite elites Pierre Gemayel, Camille Chamoun, Suleiman Franjiyeh, and Father Kassis of the Lebanese Monastic Orders, and was backed by the Lebanese Forces. Heavy fighting continued between the two movements through October 1976, at which time general hostilities ceased owing to the assistance of other Arab governments (the Riyadh and Cairo conferences) and the subsequent presence of an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) composed primarily of Syrian troops. Unfortunately for Lebanon, internecine fighting punctuated by interludes of relative calm would continue for fifteen years, largely fueled, but sometimes mitigated, by Syria's dominant presence in Lebanon and Israel's occupation of part of southern Lebanon.

Following the outbreak of civil war and Syria's intervention in 1976, social scientists and area specialists attributed the regime breakdown to a variety of internal factors, including the demographic shift that increasingly favored the Muslims over the Christians; the confessional schism that granted a privileged status to the Maronites over the Muslims; the rise of a radicalized intelligentsia supportive of sociopolitical change and pan-Arabism; and the inability of Lebanese elites to deal effectively with regional development and socioeconomic disparities which generally, though not exclusively, disadvantaged the Muslims. Moreover, many Middle East experts have emphasized that the collapse of the Lebanese system cannot be solely attributed to sectarian hostilities; class and identity cleavages coexisted with the communal cleavage to produce such an unfortunate outcome.[39] In the economic realm, rising prices, declining wages, high inflation, and low national production rates, together with a service- and export-oriented economy and the Middle East oil revolution of 1973–1974, magnified the disparity between the rich and the poor.[40] These adverse economic conditions coalesced with growing social unrest over the lack of attention paid to the poorer regions in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and the Akkar region. In sum, though most scholars place considerable blame on Israel, Syria, the Palestinians, and the cold war for Lebanon's predicament, those focusing on the theoretical aspects of regime failure, as opposed to the civil war's causes, largely emphasize the deficiencies of the political power-sharing arrangement and its inability to regulate elite discord and elite-mass conflict as well as meet the needs of a modernizing country experiencing the forces of social mobilization.[41]

[39] Ibid.; Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon*; Elie A. Salem, "Lebanon's Political Maze: The Search For Peace in a Turbulent Land," *Middle East Journal* 33 (Autumn 1979): 444–63.

[40] Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon*, 126–30.

[41] Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis"; Dekmejian, "Consociational Democracy in Crisis."

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The Impact of Regional Instability

In order to comprehend fully the forces responsible for the Lebanese government's demise, it is necessary not only to identify the internal and external factors that converged to bring about its collapse but also to take the additional step of assessing the relationship between the two sets of influences. Although the elite coalition in Lebanon faced considerable challenges and exhibited signs of fragmentation at various times after 1943, regional disputes and their consequences were the main sources of elite discord that fragmented the fragile ruling consensus and eventuated in regime failure in 1975–1976.[42] In more specific terms, the escalation of the Arab-Israeli dispute after 1967—particularly its Palestinian dimension—and the beginning of the Arab-Israeli peace settlement process in the 1970s increased the load on the Lebanese political system, which divided its masses and subsequently destroyed the elite consensus and Lebanon's proclaimed ideological neutrality. Furthermore, Arab nationalism and the synergy it generated with Palestinian nationalism augmented inter-Arab tensions by producing a shift in the region's balance of power. The new regional power configuration, in turn, accentuated divisions within Lebanese society and culminated in Syria's dominant presence in Lebanese politics, which persists even today. Moreover, the Arab-Israeli dispute, its attendant peace settlement process, pan-Arabism, and inter-Arab discord cannot be viewed as separate regional factors having impact on Lebanon's fate, since they interact with and mutually reinforce one another.

Had there been no Palestinian crisis—an inherently regional problem—the Lebanese regime might have persisted beyond 1975–1976 despite its internal centrifugal tendencies. At the very least, if the Palestinian problem had never existed, there would have been more time for strong elites to emerge who could have dealt with the difficulties of modernization by carrying on the Shihab tradition of social reforms and instituting moderate political reforms (for example, increased power of the prime minister and the cabinet, development projects, greater political representation for the Shi'ite sect) without completely threatening the Maronite population. Most importantly, these reforms would have been enacted in a less ideologically-charged society with far fewer militias and radical groups, since their raison d'etre would no longer exist.

The Palestinian Crisis

Whereas scholars disagree over whether the Lebanese regime would have imploded even if the Palestinian problem had not existed, virtually all Middle East specialists concede that the presence and activities of the Palestinian resistance movement and refugees in Lebanon significantly destabilized the regime in 1975–1976 because of the regime's weak conflict-regulating mechanisms and the pressures of modernization.

[42] Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence*, 101; Harik, "Economic and Social Factors," 209–41.

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The presence of Palestinian refugees on the outskirts of Lebanon's major cities (Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon) and in southern Lebanon after 1948 was enough to weaken the Lebanese government for two reasons: it shifted the Muslim-Christian demographic balance in favor of the Muslims, which threatened the Maronite population; and it presented the host regime with additional social, political, and economic challenges. According to the 1932 census (the last census taken in Lebanon), Christians slightly outnumbered Muslims, and the Maronites constituted the largest sect.[43] By the mid- to late-1970s, however, it was estimated that the Muslims had surpassed the Christians in number due to higher Muslim birth rates.[44] These demographic changes concerned the Maronites, who feared that Lebanon would be converted into a Muslim state if the Muslims increased their political representation. This fear reinforced the Maronites' insecurity, which stemmed from their minority status in the broader Arab world. It was partly this fear that drove the Lebanese government to clamp down on the refugee camps. It sought to maintain order as well as prevent the Palestinians from organizing a nationalist movement that could lead to greater social and political demands by the masses as well as security problems with Israel.

But it was not until the 1967 Six-Day War, a pivotal regional event, that the Palestinians began to play a fundamental role in eroding the stability of Lebanon's regime. Prior to 1967, Lebanon had managed to remain detached from the Arab-Israeli dispute, with the exception of its limited participation in the 1948 war. After the 1967 war, however, the Palestinian population in Lebanon increased from roughly 140,000 to over 240,000, and the *Fedayeen* (Arab commandos) began launching raids across the Lebanon-Israel border with increased regularity, especially after the 1969 Cairo Agreement condoned such behavior.[45] In addition, the Israeli army's overwhelming victory and the unequivocal support provided to Israel by the United States following the outbreak of war mobilized the large Palestinian refugee camp population and its militias by igniting both Palestinian and Arab nationalist feeling. Given the crushing defeat of the Arab armies and the PLO's increasing awareness that the Arab regimes would subordinate the issue of a Palestinian homeland to each of their national interests, the PLO recognized that it was on its own and needed to achieve independence from the Arab regimes in order to fulfill its nationalist goal. Meanwhile, the PLO's guerrilla activities expectedly provoked the Maronite-led government, which sought to avoid a military confrontation with Israel.

Although most Westerners associate the PLO with the centrist al-Fatah organization led by Yasir Arafat, other Palestinian groups, often referred to as the Palestinian rejectionists, were far more extreme than Fatah in both their

[43] Arnon Soffer, "Lebanon—Where Demography Is the Core of Politics and Life," *Middle Eastern Studies* 22 (April 1986): 197–205; and Muhammad Faour, "The Demography of Lebanon: A Reappraisal," *Middle Eastern Studies* 27 (October 1991): 631–41.

[44] Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon*, 71.

[45] Picard, *Lebanon: A Shattered Country* 79–81.

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goals and methods. Whereas the Marxist groups sought to promote social revolution, Fatah's goal was more nationalist in character. Thus, the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), led by George Habash; the Marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), led by Naif Hawatmeh; the PFLP-General Command led by Ahmed Jabril; Sa'iqa, sponsored by the Syrian Ba'athist Party; and the Arab Liberation Front, sponsored by the Iraqi Ba'athist party, all coexisted with Fatah in Lebanon, though not very peacefully. The rejectionist groups frequently organized their own attacks on Israel, often without Arafat's blessing after he became chairman of the PLO in 1969.

The 1967 war also had a direct impact on Syria's relationship with Lebanon, which would have telling consequences for the Lebanese regime nine years later. Syria has always sought to reserve for itself a patronship role over Lebanon, given the belief held by many Syrians that their country's boundary with Lebanon was artificially drawn up by France to suit its colonial interests, and given the presence of approximately 300,000 Syrian workers in Lebanon.[46] The immediate problem, however, was that Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights increased the strategic significance of Lebanon to the Syrian regime. For if the Israeli army was to penetrate southern Lebanon in addition to occupying the Golan Heights, it could potentially attack Syria from two fronts. Thus, if Israel were able to annex or occupy southern Lebanon, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would only have to travel about eighteen miles to Damascus via the Bekaa Valley.

Alternatively, an Israeli/PLO conflict could have led to partition, which was also undesirable in Syrian calculations. Specifically, if PLO operations provoked Israeli intervention in Lebanon, Syria feared the Maronite Christians would solicit support from Israel and possibly create a state of their own in the Mount Lebanon area, while Israel annexed southern Lebanon. The remaining Lebanese territory would then take the form of a leftist guerrilla state supported by Iraq and Libya, which would be an ideal beachhead into Syria. Iraq and Libya directly threatened the Syrian Ba'athist regime, because of their intention to turn Lebanon into a confrontation state against Israel, which would inevitably endanger Syria's security. Another undesirable scenario involved the leftist-Muslim camp defeating the rightist-Maronite camp in a civil war, resulting in a radicalized Lebanon, which again would be permeable to Iraqi and Libyan influence. Consequently, Hafiz al-Assad, Syria's leader prior to and following the civil war, understood that although he needed to support the Palestinian resistance movement, he also needed to exert control over it in order to

[46] For details on Syria's interests in Lebanon, see Reuven Avi-Ran, *The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon Since 1975* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Adeed Dawisha, *Syria and the Lebanese Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980); and As'ad AbuKhalil, "Determinants and Characteristics of Syrian Policy in Lebanon" in Deirdre Collins, ed., *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 123–36.

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preserve the Lebanese regime and forestall Israel's occupation of Lebanon or other adverse outcomes.

The 1970–1971 Jordanian civil war further intensified Syria's interest in Lebanon. During the late 1960s, King Hussein found himself suffering increasing Israeli reprisals for the Fedayeen's commando raids against Israel. As a result, the Jordanian government was teetering on the brink of collapse, impelling King Hussein to confront the Palestinian resistance organizations and ultimately expel them from Jordan. This confrontation triggered widespread fighting between governmental forces and the Palestinian resistance organizations, as well as Syrian intervention designed to aid the Palestinians. Following the Palestinian resistance organizations' relocation to Lebanon, Assad tried to exert control over the Palestinian commandos but often found himself in conflict with Arafat and other Palestinian leaders who opposed foreign manipulation of the Palestinian resistance movement. Moreover, estimates indicate that Lebanon's Palestinian population during this time mushroomed to over 350,000, which made Assad's task of controlling the PLO and Arafat's goal of a united Palestinian front even more daunting.[47]

Finally, Israel's role in the Palestinian crisis and in Lebanon's spiral toward civil war cannot be overstated. In addition to representing a critical part of Syria's calculus, Israel's foreign policy toward Lebanon—namely, its policy of using air strikes, mortar attacks, and incursions to induce a response from the Lebanese government similar to that displayed in Jordan in 1970—played a fundamental role in intensifying conflict within the region as well as promoting instability in Lebanon. For example, Israel's raids on Beirut in 1968 and 1973, its support for the Maronite Christians during the civil war, and its sponsorship of the Southern Lebanon Army (SLA) and its leader, Sa'ad Haddad, dealt a serious blow to the Lebanese regime by fragmenting the Muslim camp and making the Lebanese Army appear impotent and sectarian.

Arab Nationalism, the Palestinian Crisis, and Inter-Arab Discord

In its purest form, the pan-Arab doctrine postulates the existence of a single Arab nation as a present and past reality. Due to the supranationalist nature of pan-Arabism, state boundaries are viewed as artificial constructions. In reality, pan-Arabism has been manipulated by various Arab leaders in a realpolitik fashion to benefit their regimes over others in the region.[48] Regimes in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Egypt have all sought the guardian role of pan-Arabism at various times. Unquestionably, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser was the most successful of the Arab leaders in fostering pan-Arab unity—an effort that culminated in the creation of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria (1958–1961). Following Nasser's death in 1970, Syria and Iraq have competed for the

[47] Picard, *Lebanon: A Shattered Country*, 81.

[48] Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*, 95.

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post, primarily by attempting to gain the leadership role of the Palestinian movement. The fierce competition between the two states stems in part from Iraq's Arab nationalist tradition and the regime's perception of itself as the "legitimate" headquarters of the radical Ba'athist party. Syria also asserts a similar historical claim, as it was Damascus rather than Baghdad that was chosen to host the first brief independent Arab state during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[49] This intense rivalry, however, also stems from another important source of friction addressed earlier: Iraq's preference for a radicalized regime in Lebanon that could serve as a confrontation state against Israel; and Syria's desire to avoid this outcome, since both Israeli-Lebanese military conflict and a Lebanese regime aligned with Iraq would endanger Syria's security.

Despite pan-Arabism's peak in the 1950s and early 1960s under Nasser, regional events have continued to influence its intensity and resonance, particularly with the Arab masses. Whereas the Arab regimes have often possessed equivocal attitudes toward Arab and Palestinian nationalism and have consistently used it as a weapon when national interests dictated, the masses have been extremely receptive. The outcome of the 1967 war and its attendant Arab territorial losses, for example, inflamed Arabs in Israel's neighboring states, resulting in even more fervent pan-Arab and Palestinian nationalist sentiment among many Muslims. This unity also briefly occurred at the regime level, for the war initially united the Arab regimes (including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) in their refusal to grant Israel recognition until their lost territories were regained. Most important for Lebanon, however, the ascendant activism that emerged among the Palestinians coincided with rising protests and discontent that manifested itself among the Muslim lower classes in Lebanon as well as in middle strata, both of which had been virtually shut out of the political system. Hence, the movement for social change quickly became linked with the Palestine liberation movement.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War, in contrast, produced ambiguous results for the Arab nationalist movement. While the war restored a sense of Arab pride and confidence due to a number of Arab military accomplishments early in the war and the power wielded by the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) during the oil embargo, its consequences proved extremely divisive for the Arab regimes. Rejectionist states such as Iraq, Libya, and Algeria continued to advocate the nonrecognition of Israel, while Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and even Arafat began to soften their positions on the existence of Israel, with the intent of focusing on social and economic problems at home and using more diplomatic means to regain their lost territories.[50] In the case of Syria, its focal concern was the return of the Golan Heights. Conse-

[49] Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 256.

[50] Ibid., 373.

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quently, Assad wished to use the recognition of Israel as a bargaining chip to ensure the return of his territory. Meanwhile, Arafat's softened position produced a split in the PLO in 1974 in which the PFLP and Arab Liberation Front formed the Rejection Front.[51] Thus, the Arab nationalist movement began to be overshadowed by individual national interests after 1973.

The 1973 War also contributed to a seminal regional event that would dramatically alter the regional power configuration, divide the Arab world, and further endanger Lebanon's stability: Egypt's decision to chart a separate peace with Israel with the assistance of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. It is no secret that one of Kissinger's primary goals was to break up the united Arab front by using a step-by-step approach, and the Arab states correctly recognized this at the time.[52] Not surprisingly, the Syrian, Iraqi, Libyan, and Jordanian regimes, as well as Arab nationalists and Palestinians residing in Lebanon, opposed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's negotiations with Kissinger over the return of the Sinai to Egypt. One of the most divisive parts of these negotiations, however, involved the second disengagement agreement, the Sinai II interim agreement. The Sinai II negotiations agitated Arab nationalists within and beyond Lebanon's borders, in part because of Egypt's deviance from Arab goals but mostly because the Palestinian problem—the central regional issue—was completely ignored in the agreement. As a result, Assad publicly attacked Sadat for having forsaken the struggle against Israel and demanded that Sadat promote international recognition of the PLO. Shortly thereafter, Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords of 1978 further deepened Egypt's isolation, which would continue to exacerbate sectarian and ideological divisions in Lebanon.

Perhaps most critical for Lebanon's future, however, the 1975 agreement and Egypt's decision to promote a separate peace for itself left Syria to face Israel alone. This development reinforced Syria's view of Lebanon as its protectorate, while it also contributed to Syria's broader strategy to form a new power bloc in the fertile crescent consisting of Syria, Jordan, the PLO, and Lebanon.[53] Syria's strategy, however, met with little success, as Assad could neither control the actions of the fragmented PLO nor exert control over King Hussein, who was increasingly following Egypt's more conciliatory path.

The destabilizing domestic repercussions of Arab and Palestinian nationalism suffered by many of the region's regimes, which stemmed from the Palestinian crisis, also contributed to inter-Arab friction and a negative outcome for Lebanon. Militant Palestinian nationalism in Lebanon posed a formidable challenge to the stability of the regime but also captured the attention of Saudi Arabia and other conservative regimes, which found it in their interests to assist the

[51] Ibid., 375.

[52] William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), 182–222 and 239–43; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1982), 614–66.

[53] Avi-Ran, *Syrian Involvement in Lebanon*, 21; Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, 36–37.

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Maronite fight against the leftist-Muslim camp in order to establish a bulwark against the forces of radicalism. They simultaneously supported the PLO, because public opinion and some elites sympathized with the Lebanese Muslims and the Palestinians. Like Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, the Gulf states increasingly feared the effects of Palestinian nationalism on Muslims living within their own borders. In Jordan, King Hussein's conservative Hashemite regime increasingly tangled with the Palestinians who have represented a majority in the state since 1948, which led to the 1970–1971 civil war and conflict with Syria over a failed Syrian attempt to help the Palestinians during the war. In Syria, as part of the Alawi minority sect, Assad faced a Sunni Muslim majority that was highly sympathetic to Arab causes in general and the Palestinian problem in particular. During the civil war in Lebanon, for example, Assad found himself in the precarious position of having to explain to Syria's Sunni majority why he was trying to undermine the Palestinians in Lebanon, as well as why Syria was aiding the Maronite Christians at various points during the war. The problem was that Assad's regime could not withstand a radicalized Lebanon for two reasons. First, if Lebanon became an Arab confrontation state, Arab nationalism could spill over into Syria, disrupting Assad's more secular regime by animating fundamentalist elements in society and by arousing class consciousness among Syria's deprived groups. Second, during the late 1970s and 1980s, Iraq was a major rival to Syria in Lebanon, and a more radicalized Lebanon would have strengthened Iraq's influence in Lebanon at the expense of Syria's and would have made it easier for Iraq to act against Syria. In short, any regional event that had the potential for stoking the embers of Arab and Palestinian nationalism posed a direct challenge to the legitimacy of several of the region's regimes, impelling leaders to make policy choices that damaged prospects for inter-Arab unity and adversely affected the fragile Lebanese democracy.

Though many regimes in the Middle East experienced the effects of Arab nationalism and inter-Arab tensions in the 1960s and 70s, their consequences were most pronounced in Lebanon. Lebanon's multiconfessional character, ideological divisions, economic crisis, festering problems of socioeconomic inequality, Maronite political preponderance, and proximity to Israel made its regime vulnerable to interference and exploitation by other regional actors. Scholars have often referred to the Lebanese civil war as one of maneuver in which conservative/moderate states in the region (Saudi Arabia, Egypt) sought to deny influence to the radical/progressive states (Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Libya), while both sets of states armed Lebanon's various militias and parties.[54] In the case of Syria, for example, Assad's concerns about the security effects of a weak or radicalized Lebanon and his subsequent decision to intervene in 1976 when the leftist-Muslim camp was on the verge of defeating the rightist-Maronites is only the most obvious example of foreign interference. Israeli retaliation in southern Lebanon and Beirut prior to, during, and after 1975, and its later occu-

[54] Dekmejian, "Consociational Democracy in Crisis," 258–59.

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pation of part of southern Lebanon, represent another salient example of foreign intrusion that would have catastrophic effects for Lebanon. Specifically, although leaders such as Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam would instruct the Lebanese Army to punish the Israelis and protect Lebanon's southern residents (particularly after the 1973 Israeli attack on Beirut), the army's fear of disintegration along communal lines prevented it from acting.[55] Consequently, the Israelis attacked with impunity; and many Muslims and some Christians increasingly believed the Maronite-led army was plotting to destroy the resistance movement, thereby fueling Muslim discontent and radicalism.[56]

Another form of interference involves the degree to which other regional regimes supplied Lebanon's factions with materiel and capital, both voluntarily and upon the request of the various factions. The conservative Gulf states provided the Lebanese government and the Palestinian combatants with financial and military assistance, while Iraq, Libya, Syria, Algeria, and Israel, among others, provided the various militias with a substantial amount of capital and weaponry. In terms of material assistance, Lebanon's militias came to possess more weapons than did the Lebanese Army, largely because of foreign suppliers. The collapse of the Lebanese state has not been attributed to the prevalence of militias per se, because they were largely a consequence of the Palestinian crisis and the inability of the Lebanese Army to control the situation. Yet, the militias should be accorded some causal status, because they increased the probability of a violent outcome to Lebanon's problems and contributed to the war's longevity.

The assistance provided by Israel to the Maronite-rightist camp warrants special mention. The Israeli government viewed a weak Lebanon, permeable to influence by radical Palestinian groups as well as Syria, as a major threat to its security. In order to enhance its security, the Israeli government established ties with Major Sa'ad Haddad in southern Lebanon in 1976, where Christians were suffering at the hands of Palestinian resistance groups, as well as with Christians in the north aligned with Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun. The intention of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's government at the time was not to rid Lebanon of the PLO and the Syrian presence, but rather to help establish a military force in Lebanon capable of standing up to the PLO.[57] And the best way to accomplish this goal was to supply the Lebanese Forces and the Kata'ib with light and heavy weapons and munitions, later supplemented by military training. However, the assistance provided by the Rabin government did not produce Christian militias strong enough to curb Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel, and it further enraged the leftist-Muslim camp in Lebanon.

[55] Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon*, 99–103.

[56] Ibid., 142.

[57] Ze'ev Schiff, "Lebanon: Motivations and Interests in Israel's Policy," *Middle East Journal* 38 (Spring 1984): 220–27.

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Regional Turmoil and its Consequences for Lebanon's Elite Coalition

Unfortunately for Lebanon, the mutually reinforcing nature of the Palestinian crisis, pan-Arabism, and inter-Arab discord fragmented the Sunni-Maronite ruling coalition to the extent that it effectively dissolved in 1975. Put another way, the divisive nature of leftist-Muslim sociopolitical demands and the Palestinian issue together made it impossible for the Sunnis and Maronites to maintain common policy positions over time. Although both the Maronite leaders (Franjiyeh, Chamoun, Gemayel, Father Kassis) and the Sunni oligarchs (Karami, al-Sulh, Salam) agreed that the Sunni-Maronite ruling formula should not be altered, the Palestinian issue ultimately proved fatally divisive. While the Sunni leadership supported the Palestinians' commando raids against Israel, the Maronites were busy plotting their confrontations with the PLO. And in April 1973, the Sunni-Maronite partnership was seriously weakened after Israel raided Beirut, resulting in Prime Minister Salam's resignation. After this point, the Muslim half of the coalition was no longer effective, and it was only a matter of time before civil war would erupt.

Although the Palestinian and social reform issues fragmented the Christian elites to some extent, they divided the Muslim elites to a much greater degree. The main reason for this disparity is that the Maronites have traditionally been the sole representatives of the Christian camp. In effect, Christian elite solidarity was tantamount to Maronite elite cohesion. And although the Maronite elites that comprised the Lebanese Front (Chamoun, Gemayel, Franjiyeh, and Kassis) competed with and tried to undercut one another for the presidency on an ongoing basis, and they also had different views on collaboration with Syria and how to deal with the Palestinians, they maintained a relatively united front in 1975.

In the case of the Muslims, however, elite cooperation is complicated by the presence of three sects (Shi'ite, Sunni, and Druze) with strong leaders. Though the ruling formula prior to the civil war privileged the Sunnis over the Shi'a, Sunni elites could not discount entirely the policy positions of Shi'ite elites, especially since the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies was always a Shi'ite, and figures such as Imam Musa al-Sad'r commanded significant followings. Although they tried to, Sunni elites could not completely ignore the revolutionary demands made by Jumblatt. In short, while Sunni elites such as Prime Minister Salam struggled to maintain the sociopolitical status quo, Jumblatt was busy trying to foment a sociopolitical revolution, al-Sad'r was trying to improve the living conditions and representation of the Shi'ite population, and Kamel al-As'ad was seeking to maintain his power as speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, disagreeing with fellow Shi'ite elites including both al-Sad'r and Jumblatt.

In addition to fragmenting the elite ruling coalition, regional developments contributed significantly to the erosion of elite-mass solidarity within both the Christian and Muslin camps by 1975. The disintegration of subgroup cohesion

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was partly responsible for the growing elite dissensus. On the Muslim side, subgroup cohesion began to crumble as the intelligentsia, students, workers, unions, and peasants became increasingly radicalized following four seminal regional events that exacerbated Lebanon's social, economic, and political domestic problems: the 1967 war, the arrival of the PLO in Lebanon and its consequent Israeli reprisals, the spread of Arab nationalist and Palestinian nationalist ideologies, and Egypt's negotiations with Israel and the United States. Tension between the Muslim oligarchs and the radicalized masses was largely fueled by disagreement centered around social and economic changes desired by the leftists, as well as their political demands favoring greater Muslim representation in executive, military, security, and high-level administration positions. Furthermore, Muslims and the lower class residing in southern Lebanon and Beirut were becoming increasingly enraged by the Lebanese government's inability to protect them from recurrent Israeli mortar attacks, air strikes, and incursions. Hostility on the part of the oligarchs, on the other hand, centered around the militant activities of the radicals towards Israel, which Sunni Prime Minister Salam correctly recognized would unravel the Lebanese government because of the Israeli retaliation it provoked. Once the newer elites representing the leftist-radical Muslim groups recognized that they would not be integrated into the political system, they began to undercut establishment Muslims, weakening the clientelist foundations of Lebanese political culture.

Meanwhile, a large segment of the Sunni oligarchs' client base shifted its allegiance to the groups and militias comprising the National Movement. The disintegration of the Muslim camp was further amplified by Jumblatt, who made it his mission to deconfessionalize the political system so that he could have the opportunity to become president or prime minister. However, the most serious threats to subgroup cohesion were the members of the Marxist rejectionist Palestinian militias (PFLP, PFLP-General Command, DFLP) and Lebanese leftist groups, including Arab nationalist (Arab Liberation Front), Syrian nationalist (Sa'iqa, Syrian Social Nationalist party), communist, and other Nasserite groups. Like Christian militias such as the Phalangists and the Tigers, these Palestinian militias were notorious for undermining cease-fires at the beginning of the civil war. In addition, they were responsible for initiating and supporting Palestinian shelling and raids on Israel prior to the war.

On the Christian side, the Palestinian problem also placed considerable strain on intra-Christian elite-mass solidarity. At the same time Maronite elites such as Franjiyeh and Chamoun were publicly attempting to hold the ruling coalition together, militias controlled by some of these very same elites were undercutting elite cooperation and any beleaguered attempts to stave off civil violence. Specifically, President Franjiyeh controlled the Liberation Army of Zgharta, while Gemayel headed the Phalanges, and Chamoun's son, Dany, controlled the Tigers. Even Father Kassis was believed to sponsor a militia referred to as The Organization. The intent of many of these militias was to exert control over the Palestinians and maintain the privileged status of the Maro-

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nites in Lebanese politics. And unlike the Maronite elites who were trying to maintain the ruling coalition, the militias were in a less constrained position and could therefore use more aggressive means to accomplish these goals. Although experts on Lebanon have argued that Maronite elites who headed these militias were to some degree in control of them, experts also acknowledge that these militias often seemed to act in defiance of the Lebanese Front's leadership.[58] For example, they frequently refused to obey agreed-upon cease-fires, and they occasionally went "completely berserk" as happened to the Phalangists in December 1975, when they massacred 200 Muslims in Beirut allegedly in retaliation for the killing of four Phalangists.[59]

Other groups within the Christian camp that disagreed with the policy positions of the Lebanese Front included the student population, the Caucus of Committed Christians, and a group of moderate Christian politicians. As early as 1969, Catholic and Orthodox students, who were aroused by the violent campaign against the Palestinians in the late 1960s, began to support publicly the Palestinian resistance movement.[60] The Caucus was created by Christian clergy, theologians, and intellectuals. It offered an alternative to the fascistic line increasingly followed by a significant part of the Maronite community.[61] In general, it sought to combat the propagation of fear by the Maronites, while it also supported the Palestinian cause. In the case of the moderate Christian politicians, these leaders were willing to concede a large share of power in the confessional system to the Muslim communities and to reach some type of accommodation with the Palestinians in order to preserve the Lebanese state. Elias Sarkis, the former Shihabi politician who would become president in 1976, was the most prominent figure in this group, while Raymond Edde, formerly opposed to Shihab reformist policies, found himself being drawn closer to traditional Sunni politicians such as Sa'ib Salam and Rashid Karami.[62] Like Sarkis, Edde advocated compromise and moderation.

Conclusion: Prospects for a Post-Ta'if Lebanon

Although the Lebanese case confirms Lijphart's theory that elite consensus backed by consociational mechanisms is crucial for stable democracy in divided societies, the case also corroborates the deeper alternate theory proposed in this article that addresses the regional sources of elite fragmentation. Specifically, the Lebanese civil war supports the hypothesis that a turbulent regional system can strain the domestic elite consensus upon which power-sharing is based and can ultimately contribute to regime collapse. This finding, however, suggests two important questions: First, if regional developments are important

[58] Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon*, 70–71.
[59] Ibid., 71.
[60] Petran, *The Struggle Over Lebanon*, 152–53.
[61] Ibid., 152.
[62] Rabinovich, *The War for Lebanon*, 72–74.

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in explaining consociational failure, what does this mean for the future of Lebanon now that the confessional schism has been reaffirmed—albeit in modified form—in the 1989 Ta'if agreement? Second, would a majoritarian system be more durable in deeply divided societies that face regional instability than political arrangements based on power-sharing principles?

With regard to the first question, the 1989 Document of National Understanding that emerged from the Ta'if negotiations strengthened Lebanon's confessional political system in a number of respects. First, the Ta'if agreement shifted executive authority from the Maronite president to the cabinet, thereby increasing the power of the Sunni prime minister. This represents perhaps the most important modification to the confessional system in that it increases the representation for the Muslim majority in Lebanon. Second, the agreement elevated the status of the Chamber of Deputies at the expense of the president. Specifically, it stipulated that the nomination of the prime minister by the president would require consultation with the speaker of the Chamber, who conveys the results of binding parliamentary consultations. Third, the 6:5 ratio of parliamentary seats, which had previously favored the Christians, was replaced by parity—a demand which has been made by the Muslims ever since the 1970s. Accordingly, nine new Muslim seats were added to the Chamber, creating a 54–54 seat balance. Fourth, the agreement eliminated sectarian criteria for recruitment of public servants with the exception of high-level posts. Fifth, the agreement required the dissolution of militias and the withdrawal of Syrian forces to the Bekaa Valley within six months and two years, respectively, of the Chamber's ratification of the agreement. Sixth, the document called for implementation of UN Resolution 425, which demands the withdrawal of Israeli troops. An Israeli withdrawal, however, has not yet occurred. Seventh, like the National Pact, it states that institutionalized sectarianism is only intended to be transitional, while deconfessionalization remains the ultimate goal. Overall, while the Ta'if agreement improved the status of Muslims vis-à-vis the Maronites, it also benefited the Sunni Muslims more than the Shi'a, as the Shi'a gained only three of the new appointive seats. It also granted a privileged status to Syria, as it did not call for Syrian withdrawal from all of Lebanese territory.

Despite these institutional improvements, they have not made the Lebanese regime significantly less vulnerable to regional instability. Rather, the future of Lebanon and the success of the Ta'if agreement depend to a greater extent upon the current regional climate in the Middle East. Generally, the region is more stable now than it was in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, many Palestinians (excluding Hezbollah and other extremist groups) now support Arafat's Palestinian Authority and its attempt to find a political, rather than a military, solution to the problem of Palestinian autonomy. In addition, inter-Arab friction—between Syria and Iraq, in particular—is less intense today, which is due in part to Syria's successful bid to remove Iraqi influence from Lebanese politics. The Iranian government also has made a number of overtures to the West in general and to the United States in particular in an attempt

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to normalize relations and become less of a pariah state in the world community. Finally, the Israeli government led by the Labor party and Prime Minister Ehud Barak has demonstrated a commitment to promoting peace in the region by renewing negotiations with Syria and the Palestinian Authority.

Although the Middle East region is presently more stable than in the early 1970s, there are still reasons for pessimism when evaluating the stability of the Middle East and its impact on Lebanon's present power-sharing arrangements. First, the Gulf War of 1990–1991 temporarily divided the Arab world and impelled Syria to sign a mutual defense pact with Lebanon in May 1991.[63] Instead of helping to restore Lebanon's independence, the pact merely reflected the intimate relationship of the two states and virtually guaranteed the persistence of Lebanon's dependent status. Second, although the Ta'if agreement largely restored peace to Lebanon and the disarming of the militias has been moderately successful, Hezbollah remains intact and continues its war with Israel in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. The terrorist tactics of Hezbollah continue to undermine peace efforts by making it more difficult for the Israeli government to advance the peace process, as evidenced by the policies of Prime Minister's Benjamin Netanyahu's government between 1996–1999. Such policies include the expansion of Jewish settlements in Jerusalem and the West Bank, the decision not to withdraw from Lebanon, and the stalemate in negotiations with Arafat and the Palestinian Authority over the implementation of the 1993 Oslo Accord and the subsequent 1998 Wye River agreement. More recently, Barak discovered that any attempt to exchange land for peace with either the Syrians or the Palestinians would elicit a violent response from Hezbollah.[64]

Clearly, what is most important for the future of Lebanon is the resolution of the Palestinian crisis, for it is this problem that will continue to promote friction within and between Lebanon's Christian and Muslim populations. Until agreements such as the Oslo Accord are upheld granting the Palestinians autonomy in designated areas of the occupied territories, prospects for an independent Lebanon free of Syrian guardianship and Israeli interference remain dim. The seemingly intractable dilemma, however, is that whenever the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government make progress on the issue of Palestinian autonomy, it triggers an automatic response on the part of Jewish, Islamic, and Palestinian extremist groups who are opposed to it, undermining any prospects for peace in the region. The most poignant example of this dilemma is, of course, the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 at a point when Palestinian self-rule in areas of the West Bank began to appear imminent. Though the present regional conditions may not be adverse enough to destroy Lebanon's modified power-sharing arrangements, they will continually endanger its stability and virtually guarantee Syria's presence in Lebanon for

[63] Maila, "The Ta'if Accord," 40–42.

[64] "Israel Willing to Talk with Syria despite Hezbollah Attacks," *CNN World*, 1 February 2000.

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the foreseeable future. In short, until the Palestinian problem is resolved (assuming it can be resolved) the Lebanese regime will remain unstable and will be vulnerable to any regional developments that may promote future Hezbollah-Israeli violent exchanges, that may further ignite leftist-Muslim sympathy for the Palestinian cause, and that will maintain the firm grip Assad has on Lebanese politics.

Would the implementation of a majoritarian (winner-take-all) system in Lebanon be more durable in the face of regional problems such as the Palestinian crisis? The simple answer to this complex question is probably not. Although the maintenance of elite consensus would no longer be problematical, an even graver problem would emerge—namely, the Muslims would in all likelihood continually dominate Lebanese politics due to their majority status, which would threaten the security of the Christians. Many Christians are already insecure because of their minority status in the Middle East. One thing the civil war made clear to most observers is that when the power of the Maronite Christians in Lebanon is in jeopardy, they, like other threatened minorities, will rely upon violence to strengthen their position and ensure their survival. A majoritarian system—even one that conferred basic minority and individual rights—would only exacerbate the effects of their minority status, which would increase the probability of civil violence in Lebanon.

In sum, it is more critical for the international community and regional actors to devise a solution to the Palestinian problem than for Lebanon to dramatically alter its political institutions at this point. A majoritarian system would be more problematical than power-sharing arrangements in a country as divided as Lebanon and would further complicate an already precarious situation. However, from an institutional standpoint, only the implementation of all of the Ta'if provisions would be beneficial to the regime.*

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Opinion: The Shutdowns and the Constitution

ALFRED HILL

The government shutdowns in the 1990s represented a tactic new to the American political experience and raised serious constitutional questions. Massive shutdowns are not likely to recur because of the strong negative reaction by the electorate.[1] But there remains a possibility that the tactic may yet be employed in modified form by any of the political parties in a manner thought to involve less risk. Even if this is unlikely to happen, the subject warrants at least a brief historical note.

The Congress elected in 1994 claimed a mandate to make fundamental changes in the character of the federal government and in the level of federal taxation. But the election did not give it veto-proof majorities to accomplish these objectives over the opposition of the president. Congress therefore resorted to withholding appropriations as a measure in a war of attrition to move the president toward acceptance of its programs.[2]

[1] It became evident as the second shutdown dragged on that Congress was the loser in public opinion. Adam Clymer, "G.O.P. Revolution Hits Speed Bump," *New York Times*, 21 January 1996; Robert O. Hershey, Jr., "G.O.P. Talking of Abandoning Weapon in Budget Battle," *New York Times*, 15 January 1996. The national convention of the Republican party that convened in August 1996 was conspicuous for its silence on the shutdowns and on the "Contract with America" that had been invoked by the Republicans in the House as support for this policy. See David H. Rosenbaum, "The Republican's Congress: Party Seeking to Transform Harsh Image of Its Congress," *New York Times*, 14 August 1996.

[2] This was particularly evident in the House of Representatives. "Defiant House Republicans said Thursday they are united in their determination to keep part of the government shut down 'until hell freezes over' if that's what it takes to get a seven-year balanced budget." Bob Dart, "Battle of the Budget,"*Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 22 December 1995. The House Republican whip said on *Meet the Press*: "We're going to fund only those programs we want to fund . . . We're in charge. We don't have to negotiate with the Senate. We don't have to negotiate with the Democrats. If we don't want a program, we just won't bring it up on the floor." Adam Clymer, "Battle Over the Budget," *New York Times*, 8 January 1996.

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The first shutdown, affecting many of the principal departments and agencies of the government, occurred in November 1995. It lasted six days, and 800,000 federal employees were furloughed, out of a total of 2,000,000. The second shutdown started 16 December 1995, and lasted twenty-one days. This time only 280,000 employees were furloughed, as a number of appropriation bills for the full fiscal year had become law between the two shutdowns. But the departments still affected included Commerce, Housing and Urban Affairs, Interior, Justice, State, and Veterans Affairs.[3] Each of these shutdowns was ended by stopgap legislation. The crisis was not resolved until 26 April 1996, with adoption of a bill containing permanent appropriations for what was left of the fiscal year.[4]

Under the Constitution, legislative power is divided between Congress and the president. No bill can become law unless approved by the president or unless his veto is overridden by a two-thirds vote in each house of Congress.[5] This may well be the most important aspect of the system of checks and balances that the Framers wrote into the Constitution. It seems made to order for the situation in which a newly-elected Congress seeks to bring about something so fundamental as a reversal in the direction taken by the federal government for the previous sixty years. Arguably, such precipitate change, effected by Congress over presidential opposition, without the supermajorities required by the Constitution, is the very kind of thing the Founders sought to prevent. However, the Constitution also provides that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."[6] This language is unqualified and is what Congress relied on in its struggle with the president. The provision was thought by Congress to constitute its "trump," as the Speaker of the House called it.[7]

It is important to consider not only what this clause says but also what it does not say. It says that no money shall be spent absent an appropriation. It does not say that Congress may withhold appropriations for any reason it pleases. The Constitution makes clear that the discretion of Congress to withhold appropriations is not unlimited. Thus it provides that the salaries of the president[8]

[3] See Adam Clymer, "3rd U.S. Shutdown Averted by Bill on Stopgap Plan," *New York Times*, 27 January 1996; Jerry Gray, "Measure to Avoid a Third Shutdown is Passed in House," *New York Times*, 26 January 1996; Stephen Barr and Michael A. Fletcher, "Government Shuts Again After Talks Collapse; This Time Fallout May Be Greater," *Washington Post*, 16 December 1995; Todd S. Purdum, "Battle Over Budget: The Overview," *New York Times*, 20 November 1995.

[4] Robert Pear, "With New Budget, Domestic Spending Is Cut $24 Million," *New York Times*, 27 April 1996.

[5] U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 7. If, after receiving a bill, the president does not veto it within ten days (Sundays excepted), it becomes law without his signature, if Congress is still in session.

[6] U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 9, cl. 7.

[7] Glenn Kessler, "Gingrich Rebuked on Budget/G.O.P. Revolt Blocks Talks," *Newsday*, 21 December 1995.

[8] U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 1, cl. 7.

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and the justices of the Supreme Court[9] shall not be reduced during their terms of office. Surely this provision would be violated by congressional refusal to pay any salaries at all, even if back pay is afforded at some later time that Congress thinks appropriate.

Consider also the constitutional provision that the "President . . . shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."[10] The House of Representatives is completely shut out of the treaty-making process. May the House nevertheless inject itself into that process by refusal to appropriate? Bearing in mind that an appropriations bill requires the concurrence of both chambers of Congress, may the House deny funds to pay for the salaries and expenses of presidential agents engaged in treaty-making, unless the president agrees in advance that he will not enter into treaty negotiations with countries specified on a list handed to him by the House leadership? Clearly, in doing so the House would be encroaching upon the constitutional prerogatives of both the president and the Senate.[11]

Or suppose Congress denies funding for judges and employees of the federal judicial system (other than the justices of the Supreme Court), unless the Supreme Court within a specified period overrules its decisions on abortion, school prayer, or both? An enactment to this effect, even if signed by the president or passed over his veto, would obviously be unconstitutional. Does the Constitution contemplate that a bare majority in either house can accomplish the identical result by refusal to appropriate funds?

In these situations Congress (in one instance, the House of Representatives) is without power to accomplish its purposes directly or indirectly, because the subject is beyond its constitutional powers. But the matters on which Congress was contending with the president during the recent crisis were in all respects *within* its constitutional powers. Thus Congress clearly has legislative competence with regard to the level of taxation, the welfare system, environmental protection, and so forth. But it does not follow that Congress may achieve its ends unilaterally in such matters by withholding appropriations.

Consider that the two shutdowns left the federal judiciary without funds, apart from its revenue from fees which were available only by reason of earlier legislation. On 22 December 1995, the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, speaking as chairman of the steering committee of the Judicial Conference, said that a "breakdown of constitutional order" was threatened unless an appropriation for the judiciary was made by the first week in January, at which time money from fees would be exhausted.[12] He said fur-

[9] Ibid., art. 3, sec. 1.

[10] Ibid., art. 2, sec 2, cl. 2.

[11] The power of Congress to affect foreign affairs through the spending power is not settled. See Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1996, 2nd. ed.), 74–75.

[12] Robert D. Hershey, "Judge Says Budget Impasse Could Shut Nation's Courts," *New York Times,* 23 December 1995.

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ther that "if the judiciary shuts down, you can't arrest people for federal crimes because you can't bring them to court."[13] This last remark is explainable by the constitutional requirement of speedy trial[14] and the statutory requirement of speedy arraignment.[15] If federal prisoners are denied such rights, a nonoperational judiciary could do nothing to protect them or to provide remedies for other violations of constitutional or statutory rights.

Preventing the lower courts from functioning for lack of funding results in suspension of the operation of two kinds of laws: those that prescribe the extensive duties of these courts, and those whose enforcement depends on these courts.

Denial of funding has a similar effect on the executive branch, insofar as the pertinent laws depend on federal personnel for their implementation. Thus the federal antitrust laws outlaw monopolistic practices; absent funding, private persons would still be able to obtain judicial relief, assuming the courts to be open. But at the heart of the antitrust laws is provision for enforcement activity by federal personnel. If this is prevented for lack of an appropriation, the operation of those laws is suspended in major part.

To name only a small number of additional instances where lack of funds produces a similar result, consider environmental protection and pollution control, inspection of food and drugs, operation of the veterans hospitals, the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the prevention of securities fraud, and the collection of economic data by various government agencies, without which effective budgeting is hardly possible. That many or most of these operations may be unaffected at any one time is immaterial. The Constitution is equally implicated when only a single government program mandated by statute is suspended by unconstitutional means.

With some repetition, the controlling constitutional considerations are as follows: First, under the Constitution, ours is a government of laws. The operation of a law cannot be suspended except by enactment of another law, which must be approved by the president unless his veto is overridden by a two-thirds vote in each house of Congress. A simple majority in either or both houses cannot achieve the identical result by a withholding of appropriations.

Second, to suspend the operation of the laws in this manner is to frustrate the president's constitutional duty to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed."[16]

Third, if, as has been here suggested, suspension of the operation of the laws through denial of funding is essentially legislative in effect, any device that permits a single house of Congress to accomplish this result is unconstitutional

[13] Ibid.

[14] U.S. Constitution, amend. vi.

[15] Timetables for speedy trial and arraignment are set out in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161 (2000).

[16] U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3.

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for violation of the Constitution's provision that the concurrence of both houses is needed for the enactment of legislation.[17]

Mention may be made of some additional points bearing on the constitutional issue: During the recent shutdowns, activities like the operation of the veterans hospitals were exempt.[18] This is explainable by the fact that the statute that outlaws the incurring of obligations absent an appropriation makes an exception for emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property.[19] If the civilian air controllers, or for that matter the armed forces, should face paralysis for lack of funding, the emergency doctrine would presumably be invoked to avoid such calamities.

But it must be emphasized that the emergency doctrine is based on statute, not the Constitution. All statutes are subject to repeal. In the above instances, repeal would produce dire consequences in the event of a broad shutdown. This should be borne in mind in determining whether it is compatible with the constitutional scheme that such disasters could be produced, not by legislation, but by deliberate inaction on the part of either of the two houses.

It was also apparent during the recent shutdowns that social security payments continued without interruption. This is because the governing statutes grant permanent authority for resort to trust funds established for financing of the social security program.[20] Similarly, the Treasury Department, by statute, has permanent authority to make payments on the national debt.[21]

Permanent spending authority is created by statute and may be terminated by statute. Assuming such termination, the question again is whether it is compatible with the Constitution that a bare majority of a single house of Congress should have power to accomplish something so momentous as stopping payment on the national debt or stopping social security payments. That having been said, it must be noted that the Constitution does not require the president and Congress to resolve their differences with dispatch. Nor does our constitutional system bar logrolling, which is an inevitable and perhaps indispensable aspect of the legislative process. There is no reason to believe that it is improper in relations between Congress and the president. Thus, arguably, Congress acts compatibly with its constitutional duties when it offers a renewal of appropriations for one or more departments on condition of a general tax cut, and even when, as happened in the recent crisis, the condition is that the president accedes to Congress's seven-year budget plan. Brief lapses in appropriations arising from differences between the president and Congress are probably un-

[17] In fact the second shutdown was prolonged by the House after the Senate had agreed on terms for ending it. Adam Clymer, "Leaders in House Drop G.O.P. Plan on U.S. Workers," *New York Times*, 5 January 1996.

[18] See Stephen Barr and Bill McAllister, "Some Just Won't Stop Working," *Washington Post*, 25 November 1995.

[19] 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1342 (2000).

[20] 42 U.S.C. Sec. 401 (2000).

[21] 31 U.S.C. Sec. 3123 (2000).

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avoidable, and the Constitution ought not to be read as condemning them. The critical question is how long Congress may insist on its conditions, whatever those conditions may be. Insistence unduly protracted violates the Constitution for the reasons stated above.

It may seem odd that an appropriations lapse that at its inception and for at least a short time thereafter is compatible with the constitutional scheme should become incompatible with the passage of time. But other constitutional issues also turn on the passage of time. Thus the Constitution is violated by a regulatory scheme that threatens excessive delay in the issuance of a permit to show a movie.[22] Similarly, a special constitutional rule applies when a person suing for defamation is a public figure, but attainment of that status may in some circumstances involve the passage of time.[23]

There is no anomaly, then, in a constitutional principle that after a sufficient time has elapsed condemns congressional refusal to provide appropriations in that it suspends operation of the laws and undermines the functions of the executive branch, the judicial branch, or both.

A more troublesome problem arises if congressional threats to withhold appropriations are successful because the president capitulates. Consider the following scenario: Congress offers timely adoption of a stopgap funding measure (expiring by its terms after two weeks), if the president will accede to a minor aspect of the congressional program. Since the alternative is a major shutdown, the president accepts. Toward the end of the two-week period, Congress offers to adopt another stopgap measure, of similar duration, if the president is willing to accept yet another minor feature of the congressional program. Again the president accepts.

If this practice is continued for the entire fiscal year, Congress will have largely succeeded in achieving its substantive goals at minimum political cost. It is no wonder, therefore, that this practice is precisely what the House leadership had in mind after failure of the second shutdown to bring the president to heel, and prior to resolution of the crisis by permanent funding of the affected departments.[24] Speaker Gingrich himself spoke of biweekly or monthly intervals.[25]

If such a strategy succeeds, all government operations would have been funded, except those denied funding by a statute signed by the president. There would have been no suspension of the operation of the laws and, arguably, no intrusion upon the president's executive functions. But would the requirements of the Constitution have been satisfied?

The strategy would fail if at some point in the chain of temporary authorizations the president rejects the preferred terms and a shutdown occurs. At least

[22] *Freedman v. Maryland*, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).

[23] *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

[24] Helen Dewar, "Playing Favorites May Be GOP's Next Step on Budget," *Washington Post*, 16 January 1996.

[25] Ibid.

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during the period of the shutdown, the Constitution would be violated, assuming the foregoing analysis to be valid. But is rejection the only course open to the president? Assuming the courts to be available for resolution of this kind of constitutional dispute, would it not be wise for the president to accept short-term funding and promptly seek judicial relief, operating prospectively, against what he claims to be an unconstitutional course of conduct by Congress? It is submitted that the prospect for success would be substantial.

To be sure, courts have more than once made uncritical statements suggesting that the power of Congress in the matter of appropriations is unlimited.[26] But this is an obvious exaggeration. At most, such statements are valid only to the extent that when Congress acts within its constitutional powers, what it does is of no concern to the courts. The fact is that Congress is never free to act in violation of constitutional limitations. The broad judicial statements referred to above were not made in cases involving this issue.[27]

There have been shutdowns before, and they did not provoke constitutional debate. The question is why this is so. That the problem has been a continuing one is evidenced by an 1820 statute that in effect prohibited certain named departments from incurring contractual obligations during an appropriations lapse, including, presumably, obligations for payment of salaries.[28] In 1870, this prohibition was extended to all federal departments.[29] An 1884 statute went further, providing that even "voluntary services" were not to be accepted during such a period.[30] The apparent purpose was to forestall back pay-

[26] Thus, in *Hart's Case*, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1880), aff'd sub nom. *Hart v. United States*, 118 U.S. 62 (1886), the court said, "The absolute control of the moneys of the United States is in Congress, and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great power only to the people." The claimant had supported the Confederacy during the Civil War, had received a presidential pardon, and had then presented a claim against the government based on pre-war transactions with a federal department. But a statute had been enacted providing that, "until otherwise ordered, no person in the circumstances of the claimant could receive payment in claims against the United States." It was in regard to this statute that the court made the statement quoted above. The court observed that the effect of the statute was to preclude payment from "general appropriations" but that the claimant could still "come to Congress for relief." Earlier, in *Reeside v. Walker*, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 (1850), the United States had brought suit for overpayment on a contract, and the defendant had tried to interpose a set-off. The latter was held to be a claim against the United States, which could not be sustained on the ground of sovereign immunity. The United States could not be sued "unless by its own consent, under some special statute allowing it, which is not pretended to exist here." Ibid., 290. In effect, Congress does not violate the Constitution when it chooses not to waive sovereign immunity. The Court added that even if the claim were allowed, it could not be satisfied for "want of any appropriation by Congress to pay this claim. It is a well-known constitutional provision, that no money can be taken or drawn from the Treasury except under an appropriation by Congress." Ibid., 291. In *Hart's Case* supra, there was in place a statutory consent to suit that had been withdrawn for a class of persons of which the claimant was a member.

[27] See discussion in fn. 26.

[28] Act of May 20, ch. 52, sec. 6, 3 stat. 567, 568 (1820).

[29] Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, sec. 7, 16 Stat. 230, 251 (1870). The current version appears in 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1341 (2000).

[30] Act of May 1, 1884, ch. 37, 23 stat. 15, 17 (1884). The current version appears in 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1342 (2000).

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ments, out of a sense by Congress of moral obligation, which the attorney general had warned would be the consequence of such a practice.[31] These prohibitions have remained continuously on the books.

If even voluntary services are unlawful, this means that during an appropriations lapse an affected department must shut down. But frequently, the affected departments used to stay open, apparently staffed by "volunteers." This is manifested by the fact that when funding was later restored, Congress often ratified obligations incurred during an appropriations lapse. Since obligations legally incurred would not have needed ratification, the obligations approved retroactively were evidently of the "moral" kind.

How often Congress did this is difficult to determine. It is possible that the general state of affairs was reflected in an attorney general report to the effect that of seven appropriations lapses occurring between 1952 and 1979, subsequent congressional ratification was provided for no less than six of these periods.[32] Clearly, in these instances Congress was condoning earlier violations and incidentally sending a message that future violations would not be taken seriously.

Matters came to a head in 1980, when the comptroller general announced in effect that government offices could remain open during an appropriations lapse.[33] Relying on what he called Congress's "general"[34] practice in regard to ratification, he concluded that "Congress expects the various agencies of the government to continue to operate and incur obligations during a period of expired appropriations."[35]

Within a month, this view was sharply rejected by the attorney general in an opinion addressed to the president.[36] The practice of "ratifying" obligations contracted during a lapse was said by the attorney general to show that Congress understood these obligations to be illegal when incurred.[37] He concluded that under the governing law, government offices were required to *close* during a lapse, except as otherwise authorized by law (the emergency exception, and so forth).[38] Further, he announced that future violators would be prosecuted, although past violators would not because of the confused state of the law.[39]

This announcement had the intended effect. Thus, between 1981 and 1990, when there were no less than ten appropriations lapses, all resulted in shut-

[31] 19 Op. Att. Gen. 209, at 5 (1877). Cf. 30 Op. Att. Gen. 51, at 5 (1913) ("moral compulsion"). See also the congressional discussion referred to in Kate Stith, "Congress's Power of the Purse" *Yale Law Journal* 97 (1988) 1343, 1376 n. 159.

[32] 43 Op. Att. Gen. 24, at 5, 8–9 (1980).

[33] Decision of the Comptroller General, 1980 U.S. Comp. Gen. Lexis 3567 (3 March 1980).

[34] Ibid., 6.

[35] Ibid.

[36] 43 Op. Att. Gen. 24 (25 April 1980).

[37] Ibid., 9.

[38] Ibid., 11. However, he said that existing law would permit incurring "those minimum obligations" necessary to closing the affected agencies "in an orderly way."

[39] Ibid., 11–12.

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downs.[40] But there was little disruption in public service, for the shutdowns lasted no longer than one to three days, usually spread over weekends.[41]

What is striking is that for the period of nearly 200 years prior to 1980, it is difficult to find any public discussion, or for that matter public notice, of actual shutdowns. Such mention is not made even in scholarly studies that focus on congressional efforts over the years to prevent government operations in the absence of funding.[42] It does not follow that shutdowns did not occur. But it is hardly possible that massive and extended shutdowns or threats of such shutdowns as measures to force broad congressional policies on the president would have escaped attention. In short, the congressional conduct in this regard during 1995 and 1996 appears to have been unprecedented.

A question that inevitably arises is how Congress can be compelled to provide funding if it does not want to. Coercive measures against a noncomplying Congress are hardly feasible, apart from the fact that members of Congress receive special protection from the Constitution.[43] But Supreme Court precedents make clear that a potential of extreme difficulty in the enforcement of a decree is not of itself a sufficient reason to decline to render a decision. Thus when President Richard Nixon refused to honor a subpoena for the production of some critical Watergate tapes, giving executive privilege as his reason, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to overrule the claim of executive privilege.[44] The Court's opinion in the case did not even allude to the problems of enforcement in event of resistance by a president who by virtue of his position is commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[45] A more troublesome question is whether the courts will take the case in the first place, if what is requested is a ruling that the Constitution requires Congress to provide funding in the kind of situation that recently confronted the nation. It is at least possible that a judicial remedy would be unavailable by reason of the political question doctrine, under which jurisdiction might be declined on the ground that the controversy is one for the political branches to resolve.[46] But the contours of the doctrine are

[40] See GAO Shutdown Study, at 7–8. These are reported on a table headed, "Appropriation Funding Gaps." But it is evident that shutdowns occurred during these gaps, because the text immediately below the table remarks that prior to 1980 "agencies had continued to operate and incur obligations for necessary operations" pending provision of funding.

[41] Ibid., 7.

[42] Stith, "Power of the Purse," 35; Louis Fisher, *The Presidential Spending Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Lucius Wilmerding, *The Spending Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943).

[43] In general, they are immune from arrest, and from imposition of sanctions for remarks made in either house. U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 6.

[44] *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

[45] In *Powell v. McCormack*, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), the Court sustained a plea for reinstatement by a representative who had unlawfully been deprived of his seat in the House. The relief granted was a declaratory judgment, which the Court assumed without discussion would be honored by the House.

[46] Paul M. Bator et al., *Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System*, 3rd ed. (New York: Foundation Press, Inc., 1988), 270–94.

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so ill-defined as to make it impossible to predict what the courts would do. What is of controlling significance, however, is that legislators sworn to support the Constitution are obliged to respect its requirements whether the courts tell them to do so or not.

Instructive on this score is the Supreme Court's opinion in *Luther v. Borden,*[47] the 1849 decision that gave birth to the political question doctrine. In the course of what was known as Dorr's Rebellion, two factions in Rhode Island each claimed recognition as constituting the lawful government of the state. A case arising from this controversy came before the Supreme Court, obliging it to consider its duties, if any, under the constitutional clause that provides: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion."[48]

The Court concluded that responsibility for effectuating these provisions rested exclusively with the political branches, ultimately Congress. "Unquestionably," said the Court, "a military government, established as the permanent government of the state, would not be a republican government, and it would be the *duty* of Congress to overthrow it."[49]

In sum, even assuming that Congress is not answerable to the courts for refusal to appropriate, it does not follow that Congress may refuse to appropriate for any reason it pleases. Congress may never ignore the dictates of the Constitution.

[47] 48 U.S. (7 How.) 2 (1849).
[48] U.S. Const. art. 4, sec. 4.
[49] 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 47. (Emphasis added.)

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Book Reviews

The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change *by Gerald Curtis. New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. 310 pp. $27.95.*

The 1990s represent arguably the most important decade in the history of postwar Japan, because during this period the political and economic features that came to define that country changed dramatically. In 1993, the Liberal Democratic party (LDP), after heading all governments for the previous thirty-eight years, was forced into temporary opposition, and in the 1990s Japan experienced its worst economic crisis since it rebuilt itself and evolved into the world's second largest economy. These watershed events are worthy of scholarly attention in and of themselves, but they demand explanation for one other reason. In the late 1980s, a revisionist view of Japan emerged, particularly in the worlds of journalism and policy, which constructed Japanese politics and economics in a way that, if true, precluded the events of the 1990s from ever happening.

Explaining Japan in the 1990s is essential for understanding that important nation's past and future, and the latest book by Columbia University political scientist Gerald Curtis is directed to the political side of this task. As is the case with his earlier work on postwar Japanese politics, Curtis's attempt to explain this important decade reflects not only his intimate knowledge of Japan but also his sharp instincts for politics in general and how that process should be understood. This is evident from the beginning of the book, with its emphasis on the roles played by Japan's political actors in this drama and with Curtis's scrupulous attention to the contexts that helped define the political events that unfolded. These characteristics can be found in Curtis's treatments of all the significant events of the 1990s; and even for those of us who watch Japanese politics through field research and its many vernacular sources of information, there is still much that can be learned by reading this instructive book.

Consider, for example, Curtis's discussion of the political struggles that led ultimately to the LDP being tossed out of power for the first time in thirty-eight years. While the LDP's problem of containing its factional disputes is well

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known, the details involved in the events that led individuals like Ozawa Ichiro and Hata Tsutomu to bolt the party and form a new party (the Japan Renewal party) that would ultimately join in coalition against the LDP is illuminated in a way that has generally not been done. This is not simply because Curtis provides more details to the story than others have, but rather because his insights into the conflict that existed between such individuals as Kajiyama Seiroku, who ". . . led the forces in the Takeshita faction opposed to letting Ozawa or one of his associates occupy the post of faction chairman" (p. 190), and Ozawa tell the story more completely than has been done before.

Curtis's discussion of the creation of Japan's new election system is equally as effective. He begins with the idea that electoral reform in Japan is not a new issue, something he brings to light not only by his discussion of all of Japan's past election systems but also by his attention to electoral reform efforts that occurred throughout the postwar period, particularly the "Electoral-System Advisory Council created by Diet legislation in 1961." Curtis explains that this council was convened seven times and then abandoned until it was resurrected in 1989, when the issue of election system change came to encompass the larger issue of political reform in the wake of that period's political scandals. Curtis also is quite persuasive in his argument that the whole idea of election system reform was oversold to the Japanese public and as such led to a very negative reaction in the aftermath of the 1996 election.

Because Japanese politics in the 1990s is such an interesting and important subject, one wishes that Curtis would have spent more time with some topics and less time with others. An example of the former concerns the drawing of Japan's new district boundaries, which is dealt with in three paragraphs and does not cover the important political drama that guided the placing of incumbents in new districts. The overwhelming majority of candidates who stood for election under the new rules in 1996 did so in the sections of their old districts where they were strongest electorally. Also, where there were conflicts and an incumbent could not be accommodated, that candidate was generally allowed to run on at or near the top of his or her party's list in the proportional representation district that subsumed that new single member district. Concerning the latter, there is an underlying theme in this book that plays like a leitmotif at different times in each of the book's chapters. This theme is addressed to the discipline of political science at large, especially those scholars who work in the rational choice tradition, and involves Curtis's message that Japan's political drama of the 1990s cannot be understood through the use of such methods. The problem here is not that Curtis has in a sense used Japan as a laboratory to speak to the discipline at large. Indeed, this is a commendable effort. Rather, the problem is that so much of what he criticizes is not rational choice but a caricature of that approach, and the evidence he offers in support of his criticisms often substantiates the view he criticizes. Because the book is otherwise a well written and argued discussion of Japanese politics in the 1990s, Curtis's

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time would have been better spent staying with the issues that advance his overall interpretation of Japanese politics.

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Pluralism and the Politics of Difference: State, Culture, and Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective *by Ralph Grillo. New York, Oxford University Press, 1999. 272 pp. $35.00.*

This is a fascinating, argumentative, and convincing *tour d'horizon* of the many ways in which states have responded to ethnic pluralism on four continents during the past half-millenium. As that sentence implies, its strength lies in breadth rather than depth, although Grillo packs in a lot of telling detail about each of the dozen or so societies he examines. It all culminates in a thoughtful set of queries about how postmodernity might change states and ethnicities and their relation to each other, so it is presentist history in a positive sense—seeking to understand the past in order to show the range of possibilities we have available or have foreclosed for the future.

Ralph Grillo is a social anthropologist; his interests lie more in the connections between state and society than in the internal workings of the state. In his words, "how do politics and political processes, working through . . . the state, shape and reproduce 'difference'? It [the book] is thus about pluralism, and the politicization of culture . . . in societies where there coexist peoples who . . . believe they are 'different' from each other" (Preface). After worrying over definitions of key terms, Grillo answers his question through a series of chapters organized in roughly chronological order, each corresponding to a different type or location of state responses to difference. In three patrimonial states in pre-colonial Africa—the Alur, the Azande, and the Nupe—"patriarchal rulers were generally concerned less with their subjects' ethnic identity and cultural values than with their ability to render tribute, taxes, and labour. . . . Ethnic identity was not a key motif in the formation of state and society" (p. 17). The Aztecs in Mexico were similarly pragmatic rather than moralistic, argues Grillo contra some anthropologists' claims that they were trying to develop an "incorporative" state. The Ottoman empire, which elicits the most enthusiastic language from the normally cool and analytic author, took several crucial steps toward both incorporation and cultural pluralism. It permitted or required a few young non-Islamic men to become Islamic slaves, an ambiguous move that sometimes resulted in very high status and great rewards. But it organized people of different faiths into "autonomous confessional communities" (p. 87), thus creating a rough prototype of multicultural tolerance.

European colonialists in Africa and South America initiated a period of forced assimilation of "tribes," along with taxonomically compulsive classifica-

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tion and "the transformation of ethnic space" (p. 98). Catholic Spaniards had a passion for proselytizing as well as for gold; the French sought to treat their colonies "as if they and their inhabitants were part of France" (p. 107); and the British wanted to organize their subjects into tidy geographical and political boxes. The colonial impulse degenerated in France into the Dreyfus affair, the shame of Vichy, and continued contestation over whether Jews can really become Frenchmen. Chapters on American immigration policy around the turn of the twentieth century, and contemporary British and French debates over multiculturalism follow. Both wind admirably through the various paths that led to and away from the American "melting pot," the resurgence of ethnicity in the 1960s in the United States, assimilation or multiculturalism and antiracism in Great Britain, and debates over how to "be French differently" (p. 186).

Finally, Grillo concludes with the two most interesting chapters from my perspective. The former parses the various meanings of and justifications for multiculturalism as an educational policy and political philosophy, as well as arguments against it. The latter explains as clearly as anything I have read what people mean by a postmodern society, why and how it connects with anxieties over ethnicity, and what options we face for the future. The distinctions among cosmopolitans, transnationals, hybrids, and separatists is elegant and useful. Grillo's respectful challenges to scholars of cultural studies and self-reflexive anthropologists are breaths of fresh air.

I have little to criticize with regard to what is *in* this book; my main complaints have to do with what is *not*. Grillo is disturbingly silent about the exclusion of Asians in American immigration policy, and he has very little to say on whether African Americans (or Asian Americans) can be thought of in the same analytic terms as European immigrants to the United States. He does not take the many opportunities he offers himself to discuss the very different ways in which the United States, Britain, and France treat questions of group rights through, for example, affirmative action policies or treat questions of whether to collect racial and ethnic data in national censuses. I wish he had discussed pluralism in India, since efforts to create and much later to reject the caste system would be a fascinating comparison case. After all, if he can handle four continents, why not five?

But it would be churlish to end on a carping note; we have here a wealth of concepts, narratives, references, and arguments. This book should do a lot to broaden debates over multiculturalism that so often occur within a framework that is embarrassingly narrow in space and time.

JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD
Princeton University

African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation *by Peter J. Schraeder. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000. 378 pp. $35.00.*

A new and worthy competitor on the market for texts on African politics enters the lists with the publication of this worthy volume. Moreover, the book is far

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more than a simple text; it serves as a valuable and comprehensive summary statement of the field, of value as basic reference to specialists and students alike. The knowledgeable and judicious appraisal of events and explanatory concepts, and the commendable erudition of the author, make this compact volume a worthy addition to the field.

Peter Schraeder has solid credentials for this venture. Still early in a very productive career, he has taught, worked, and conducted research in several regions of Africa, and he has visited nearly half of the fifty-three states. Thus he is able to bring to his analysis a broadly comparative perspective informed by extended residence in such widely separated sites as Djibouti, Somalia, Zimbabwe, and Senegal.

The great merit of the book is its success in synthesizing extant knowledge in relatively brief compass over chronologically, geographically, theoretically, and thematically broad terrain. Although the focus is upon contemporary politics, he gives extended treatment to the pre-colonial political heritage and the colonial state. The scope is continental, although perhaps North Africa is slighted; the Horn—often marginal to treatises on African politics—receives welcome attention. Theoretically, Schraeder provides careful summations of the broad orientations that have marked Africanist conceptual debates, from the diverse currents of Marxist analysis to those rooted in various forms of liberalism. Topically, he offers informed distillation of concept and substance around such key themes as ethnicity, class, regime ideologies, state, and civil society. The international dimensions—home terrain for Schraeder in much of his published work—receive skilled treatment.

An exceptional aspect of the book, which sets it apart from other works, is the excellent chapter on the politics of African literature. Since the 1950s, a series of African novelists have captured the experiential essence of politics far more vividly than academic analysis can achieve; a large fraction of courses on African politics includes novels for this reason. Schraeder casts his net widely in the discussion of contemporary writers, but is especially useful in foregrounding the eloquent and politically engaged works of the Somali writer Nuruddin Farah. The value of the book as text and reference is enhanced by excellent chapter bibliographies, a guide to useful web sites, and a roster of post-colonial regime changes in all fifty-three countries.

With so sweeping a coverage, most readers will succeed in finding a passage here and there that invites a quibble. For this reviewer, there is more food for thought in the relative absence of ethnic self-determination movements than in the existence of a few. Given the absence of historicity beyond the colonial partition of most African states, the degree to which separatist movements have grounded their demands on territorial subdivisions rather than a culturally derived sovereignty claim seems the more striking aspect of those challenges to the current state order that have arisen. The degree to which the British utilized the Indian army in colonial occupation is exaggerated. The Schraeder critique

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of colonial failure to integrate the continent in its railway schemes, for example by the absence of a trans-Sahara linkage, overlooks the large sums wasted by the French in just such a wildly uneconomic aborted venture.

The triviality of these points serves to make a larger observation: Schraeder succeeds remarkably well in providing us with a reliable and accurate guide to African politics. There is no pretense of breaking new intellectual ground, but as a comprehensive synthesis the book succeeds admirably.

CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin–Madison

Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict 1946–1970 *by Steven Heydemann. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1999. 226 pp. $39.95.*

To anyone teaching the politics of the Middle East, this book comes as an extremely welcome addition to a somewhat sparse covering of Syria in academic writing. Except for Volker Perthes's 1995 excellent book that covers the political economy of Syria under the Assad regime, few works exist that not only provide a good overview of internal political and economic developments inside the country, but as well a more abstract, interpretive framework that illuminates continuities and discontinuities across time. Heydemann attempts to explain these continuities and discontinuities in part by a "neo-institutional emphasis" that nevertheless accounts for "the fluid quality of institutions . . . [and their effects] on the strategic choice of actors" (p. 9). In so doing, the author casts his lot with a number of recent works in Middle Eastern studies that have attempted similar interpretations.

The outcome is a tightly reasoned work that across eight chapters clearly delineates the contradictions that make him question the customary description of Syria as a country run by a succession of populist authoritarian regimes. Going beyond those more customary explanations of repression, sectarianism, or simplified political economic approaches as the modus operandi of Syrian political life, the author's careful investigations and conclusion lead him to focus on "changes in the organization of social conflict during . . . phases of Syrian state formation" as the basis for explaining the country's political life (p. 8). The argument is tightly reasoned and pursuasive; the theoretical framework is marvelously conceptualized and executed. Along the way, the book provides, among many other insights, a highly insightful interpretation of the rise of the Ba'th party and its consolidation of populist authoritarianism between 1963 and 1970, which despite its relative parsimony, provides a persuasive account that stands in contrast to earlier explanations.

One limiting factor to the book's usefulness for the more general audience

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lies in the fact that Heydemann's inquiry only covers the 1946–1970 period in detail. Syria's political economy since then has witnessed major new developments, including an economic crisis in the 1980s and an attempted recovery, which forced the Hafiz al-Asad regime to recombine and reshape the complex network of patronage, interests, and institutional arrangements that emerged in the earlier period. The somewhat perfunctory attempt to address these changes in the final chapter and to encapsulate almost thirty years of political and economic development in a few pages, while attempting to accentuate similarities with the earlier three decades the book covers, is somewhat unsatisfactory. While this reviewer would agree with the author that in today's Syria "[I]nterest groups and associations remain embedded within top-down, corporatist institutional frameworks" (p. 206), the refashioning of those groups and associations, and the regime's "flexibility and adaptability" as a new private sector emerged, have been dramatic and novel enough to warrant a fuller treatment than that provided here.

Despite this caveat, Heydemann's book is a first-rate contribution about the 1946–1970 period against which subsequent works will need to be measured. His analysis of how political continuity proceeded across a number of decades that witnessed often severe challenges to the country's leadership goes far beyond the unidimensional caricatures of brutal suppression that often mark less sophisticated studies of Syria. The author's mixture of theoretical inquiry and carefully gathered data from an array of resources makes it an example of the kind of second-generation studies on the Middle East that prove not only informative but, more importantly, also deliver new and significant insights based on careful abstraction from gathered data. In combination with the Perthes book, this volume on the earlier period of Syrian political and economic development is indispensible reading for any professional, whether academic or not, who deals with matters Syrian.

DIRK VANDEWALLE
Dartmouth College

Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America *by John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1999. 487 pp. $30.00.*

John Haynes and Harvey Klehr have analyzed a large number of Soviet intelligence cables from the 1940s. The cables were intercepted and decoded by the American government; the project was called Venona but not made public until the 1990s. The cables show, according to the authors, that roughly 350 U.S. citizens and permanent residents joined or aided Soviet intelligence activities in

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the 1930s and 1940s. Haynes and Klehr claim that about half of those identified by code names in the cables can now be identified.

Many of the 350 people with whom the book is primarily concerned were members of or closely linked to the American Communist party (CPUSA). *Venona* is part of the authors' series on American Communism in the 1930s and 1940s. In *The Secret World of American Communism* (1995) they showed that the Communist party maintained a clandestine apparatus and used it both to undertake its political projects and to further the political aims of the Comintern and the Soviet Union. Their second volume, *The Soviet World of American Communism* (1998), showed that the CPUSA depended on Soviet decisions in all respects. Both volumes considered the CPUSA a radical political organization and a political agent of the Soviet Union. In this book, the Communist party also appears as an instrument of Soviet intelligence efforts, "working inside and against the United States" (page 7). The authors provide enough evidence to make this interpretation persuasive and thus change one's view of the character of American communism.

Venona's findings have mainly been accepted, but there has been debate about their meaning. One claim, made by the authors and seconded by several reviewers, is that Soviet espionage shows that deep Soviet hostility to the United States predated the cold war. This allegedly supports the idea that the cold war was caused by Soviet policies, which treated the United States as an enemy in the 1930s and during World War II. This argument may involve beating a nearly dead horse with a not very strong stick. Evidence for a significant degree of Soviet responsibility for the cold war proliferates.

Venona does help to settle some of the toughest and most durable cases of the cold war. In most instances the verdict is guilty, as with Harry Dexter White and Alger Hiss. In a few it is mixed, as with the Rosenbergs, who turn out to be guilty but not as distinctively (Julius Rosenberg) or seriously (Ethel Rosenberg) guilty as the government charged. The book also raises a question about the many people referred to in the cables for whom no clear positive identification is now possible. Who were they?

CPUSA subservience to the Soviet Union was always a form of political corruption. There was also financial and organizational corruption. Aiding Soviet espionage to the extent that *Venona* indicates raises a new issue. After the early 1930s, the public political position of the CPUSA became support for a broad Popular Front. This view was proposed not only as an account of new alliances and objectives, but as a deeper political shift. The new course presented communism as consistent with American traditions and values and as loyal to democratic practices.

Popular Frontism produced much kitsch and also led to the largest political successes ever achieved by the CPUSA. Evidence for substantial Communist involvement in Soviet espionage during the Popular Front years (roughly mid-1930s through the mid-1940s) suggests that Popular Frontism was a partial, cynical, and unprincipled shift by CPUSA leaders. *Venona* thus links the spectacu-

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lar post-World War II failures of the communist Left in the United States to its shallow and opportunistic notions of popular democratic politics.

The authors are careful in finding several notable figures of the American Left innocent of espionage. These include I. F. Stone and J. Robert Oppenheimer. Yet their evidence provides no comfort for supporters of the noncommunist Popular Front Left. Both Stone and Oppenheimer appear as misleading or dishonest in their relations with the government and the public. Stone was repeatedly approached by Soviet agents. He refused to cooperate, but he behaved as though he viewed the affair as a messy business among friends. He clearly knew more than he was willing to say in public. Oppenheimer's story is very complicated and probably included secret membership in the CPUSA into the early 1940s, and did not include any clear political break with that organization. He most likely knew more about Soviet espionage efforts than he was willing to acknowledge. In each case the defense of these figures emphasized their honesty and rejected the claim that they were moved by pro-Soviet political loyalties. Thus Stone was a fearless journalist with no compromising ties or commitments, while Oppenheimer was a scientist whose deep moral concerns put him beyond cold war politics. *Venona* causes problems for any effort to identify and honor a distinct Popular Front Left whose rejection of American policies was judicious and independent.

Venona and the authors' prior volumes have changed the debate about American communism. This is a major accomplishment. I hope the authors will present parts of their three volumes in a single book that can be more widely available. Yet one wishes for more analysis and explanation than they provide in over a thousand pages of documents, explication, and narration. In all its dense and interesting detail the story of American communism and the Soviet Union is far from transparent.

Venona raises important issues that are contemporary as well as historical. One question is whether evidence of CPUSA espionage and other covert activities provides retrospective justification for McCarthyism. Such justification will be claimed, but it will not be with good reason in my view. McCarthyism was intolerant and dangerous, whether there were thirty communist spies for the Soviet Union or three hundred.

Another issue concerns the reluctance of the post-Vietnam Left to recognize the extent of CPUSA corruption. Over the decade after the end of the Soviet Union, what sustains the *Nation*-like position that anyone attacked by anticommunists in the 1940s and 1950s warrants our deep sympathy and a near presumption of virtue?

The big political question remains: in a democratic polity, when if ever is it legitimate for citizens to provide information intended to aid another country's political and military projects? Democrats and liberals across the political spectrum do not have easy answers, because in principle they recognize many claims beyond national boundaries. But what lines should be drawn, and how? The obvious response that one should obey the law has a strong democratic basis.

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The retrospective defenders of pro-Soviet espionage rarely argue that American laws in the 1940s and 1950s had no compelling legitimacy that democrats were obliged to respect. Yet referring to the law cannot be enough as it leaves open the problem of when civil disobedience can be justified in matters of foreign policy and security.

In the United States there is no consensus for a nationalist self-understanding in which spies simply deserve severe punishment for betraying the nation-family. Democratic political commitments are supposed to do much of the work of providing civic bonds. This framework makes espionage based on principle a serious issue because such espionage challenges the basic claim that American institutions are decently democratic and thus legitimate. Those who imagine that all this ended with the cold war have a limited memory and imagination. Recall recent arguments about Israli spying in the United States. Or think about the activities of some members and allies of the Reagan administration in covertly aiding combatants during the Central American wars. If things had gone differently in the 1980s and South African conflicts became a civil war, it is easy to imagine that some Americans would have sought to aid a besieged anticommunist regime. As national attachments are widely questioned but national realities persist, we have not yet seen the last of what some too easily dismiss as antique cold war debates about betrayal and loyalty.

DAVID PLOTKE
New School University

Edward M. Kennedy: A Biography *by Adam Clymer. New York, William Morrow and Company, 1999. 692 pp. $27.50.*

In writing this book, Adam Clymer has accomplished a rare feat. He has produced a work that has great value to scholars of American politics as well as the general public, because it explains a single legislative career in the context of the changes in the legislative process that have occurred over the past thirty years. That career happens to belong to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, who just may be the most famous senator in the latter part of the twentieth century.

Rather than focus on Senator Kennedy's family triumphs and tragedies, and his personal travails, most of the book is devoted to drawing a comprehensive picture of a master legislator. Whether one agrees or disagrees with Kennedy's partisanship or ideology, it is without dispute that he has been involved in more major legislation (and even minor) than any other senator or representative. Clymer points out that Senator Kennedy has a reputation today of being involved in the areas of health care and civil rights, but his long career has encompassed a far broader spectrum of issues, including arms control, foreign policy, immigration, crime, and even some pork barrel politics. The author

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adeptly shows how Kennedy increased his standing and influence in the Senate by watching, listening, and learning in his early years, and always offering the possibility of compromise. Kennedy has consistently relied on negotiation and outreach to those with whom he disagrees in order to get bills enacted into law. Over time, he has worked successfully and repeatedly with conservative Republican senators, including Senator Ted Stevens (R–AK), Senator Orrin Hatch (R–UT), and even former Senator Lauch Faircloth (R–NC). At the same time, Senator Kennedy was no stranger to manipulating the complex rules of the Senate to ensure consideration of legislation on the Senate floor, even at the risk of incurring the wrath of his colleagues—Democrats and Republicans alike.

But Clymer is also careful to balance the picture he draws of the hard working and dedicated Senator Kennedy with the man who makes repeated mistakes in his personal life. He does not elaborate on these mistakes but they are included in the book at the points at which they highlight the limitations that personal mistakes can have on a political career. Of course there is a good deal of discussion of the ever potential run for the presidency that never truly materialized, but this biography highlights the transition Kennedy made from potential presidential candidate to full time senator. Some senators never rebound from a failed stab at the presidency; given how much pressure Kennedy endured for over a decade, it is remarkable that he emerged to be the legislator that Clymer so accurately portrays.

As with any book, however, there are some drawbacks, but none so severe as to deter the reader. In his efforts to be clear and analytical, Clymer sometimes writes with too little emotion or enthusiasm about a particular event, or gives too little of his own thoughts about Kennedy's actions in and outside the Senate. Along these lines, the author might have included more excerpts from Kennedy's floor speeches, particularly on South Africa and civil rights, so that readers could get a sense of Kennedy's true passion for particular issues. Lastly, Clymer pays too little attention to the relationship between Kennedy and his committee and personal staff. Though he describes several key staff members over the years, the book does not adequately explore the amount of leeway and flexibility that Kennedy gave to his staff to act in his name while negotiating the legislative process.

In showing us how Kennedy has accomplished so much over these past three decades, Clymer provides an important window into the future of American politics. In a time when partisanship in the Congress seems to be at an all time high, the story of Senator Kennedy—the legislator—should be required reading for all students and scholars of American politics, as well as more than a few new members of Congress.

WENDY J. SCHILLER
Brown University

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Progressivism and the New Democracy *edited by Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur. Contributing authors Alonzo L. Hamby, Martha Derthick and John J. Dinan, Wilson C. McWilliams, Morton Keller, Eileen L. McDonagh, Philip J. Etherington, Eldon J. Eisenach. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1999. 302 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $16.95.*

In this richly informative set of essays, the customary portrait of America's Progressives is revisited. We continue to see a middle-class reform movement with an agenda that seeks far-reaching goals: to prod the national government into confronting the social and economic problems of a rapidly changing industrial society (child labor, impure food, and drugs); to tame the corrupting influence of monopolies (antitrust legislation); to scrub clean of corruption urban political machines and their county-courthouse counterparts. And in so doing, the movement tries to reduce the influence of state and local legislatures and their venal political parties through a clutch of reforms—nonpartisan ballots, legislative referenda, voter recall of elected officials, and replacing powerful state and local executives with the divided authority of elected boards and commissions.

The old portrait still stands, but it is overshadowed by a new one. Here the figures are no longer quite so heroic, and in the background and foreground, new and unsettling images appear. The new portrait reveals an assembly of reformers with oftentimes conflicting goals. Animating this portrait is the assertion that much of reformist zeal rested on mistrust of and animus toward immigrants and immigrant-supported urban political organizations. To purify American politics it was necessary to rescue it from the baneful influence of immigrants (read: Catholics, Jews, Eastern and Southern Europeans) not yet attuned to American ideals of civic virtue. First, their numbers would be reduced by national-origins immigrant quotas. And second, not only would they be pushed to the margins of politics, but their lifestyles would be brought into conformity with American mores and morals. (Here, the subtext reads Prohibition.)

What then of the lasting consequences of Progressives' reforms? First, and on the positive side of the ledger, is what Progressives proclaimed as a New Nationalism: putting paid to the doctrine of Dual Federalism; replacing it with a national government empowered to deal with problems of an increasingly interdependent society. Second, is our post-New Deal consensus that government must underwrite the welfare state or in Progressive terms that private charity be replaced by government programs.

But other consequences are more troubling. The participatory democracy installed by the Progressives has helped give rise to a republic of special interests: wealth and energy get poured into never-ending referenda that mock the Framers' hopes for a representative republic, governed by reasoned judgment and careful deliberation. Equally important are the consequences, rich with irony, of the Progressives' assault on political parties. Historically, parties have

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served to select and screen candidates for public office. Parties also worked to mobilize political loyalties and in so doing brought voters and party activists into a harmony of trust and trustworthy behavior. Today, the race for office too often goes to the swiftest fund-raiser and to those who boast of being outsiders to the political process. Party identifiers are on the decline; independent voters are on the rise; and the ultimate consequence of the Progressive assault on political parties may be the election of 1992, where a new political party was launched on a television talk show by a wealthy, self-chosen candidate who captured an instant following by proclaiming himself ready to repair all that was wrong with America.

LAWRENCE J. R. HERSON
The Ohio State University

The Necessity of Politics: Reclaiming American Public Life *by Christopher Beem. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999. 256 pp. $28.00.*

For Common Things: Irony, Trust, and Commitment in America Today *by Jedediah Purdy. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. 226 pp. $20.00.*

Avoiding politics is impossible, but we Americans keep trying. Our efforts take various forms: at best, we try to cultivate personal goodness unsullied by politics. More typically, we twist our faces into a permanent, ironic smirk, aiming to distance ourselves from it all. Lately, scholars and commentators of all stripes have conceived another way of avoiding politics by saying that to revive American democracy, all we need are more small, local, face-to-face associations, from the neighborhoods, families, and churches that form the refrain in many political speeches, to the bowling leagues whose demise Robert Putnam has famously mourned. Reviving face-to-face associations is important; without the warm, personal feelings of togetherness that such gatherings cultivate, it is hard to imagine any civilization thriving. But the problem is that popular prescriptions for cultivating warm community life usually leave specifically political associations out; commentators—and most citizens, as well—assume that no good comes from politics, that we can puff life back into the American spirit without resuscitating politics simultaneously.

As Christopher Beem's *The Necessity of Politics: Reclaiming American Public Life* and Jedediah Purdy's *For Common Things: Irony, Trust and Commitment in America Today* both argue, without a revival of politics, none of these private or communal goods are within reach. Both authors take Americans' quest for community very seriously, but both push this quest farther than the popular imagination usually does by showing just how deeply political life matters. Beem puts this urgently needed message well, saying that reviving voluntary associations is "a necessary but insufficient condition" (p. 57) for the revival of good citizenship.

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Purdy starts from the inside out, beautifully describing the corrosive irony that gives a sense of unreality to our personal lives. But he does not stop there to say that we should all just individually snap out of it, though that is the message that most popular media have gotten from this book. Private methods of escaping irony—pop psychology advice books' private faith in spiritual goodness or the hyperactive, disembodied, global unity portrayed in magazines like *Wired*—are unsatisfying even to their proponents, says Purdy. The only satisfying escape is one that squarely, honestly confronts our morally spoiled political environment in order to change it.

As Purdy says, politics has until recently been the secular route to salvation; it aims to transform the world on earth. But now, few Americans have faith in politics of any kind, and especially in what he calls "transformatory politics." Is there any other kind worth our devotion? Here, Purdy is the most original. He calls for a politics that would not imagine changing human nature so much as vigilantly attending to it, training our attention to the sacred details of everyday life, maintaining what we will never fully understand. This may seem a simple restatement of the liberal idea that "we each must cultivate our own garden"—the final words of Voltaire's *Candide*. But Purdy insistently reminds us that our gardens feed on aquifers that they share with everyone else's plots. Unlike people in earlier eras who could perhaps escape to their own gardens, we are inevitably responsible to people and environments across the globe.

Thus a chapter on strip mining shows how our energy policies build irresponsibility into the economy; Purdy proposes cultivating a political imagination and political policies that would make us take responsibility for our everyday energy consumption and our strip mines. A chapter on recent events in Poland and Czechoslovakia explores the tension between the magical, effervescent moment of visionary transformation and mundane governance. In all of these, his point is that everyday mindfulness requires attention to and nourishment from political institutions; our current institutions starve our ability to pay attention. While Purdy says he is not advocating visionary transformation, his book makes crystal clear that publicly sharing such exquisite attentiveness to everyday life would be just the radical transformation that our society needs.

Like a contemporary painting that perfectly imitates Renaissance chiaroscuro, this lovingly rendered essay revives an antique form; the medium is the message. A scholar will hear clear echoes of the Frankfurt School, Alisdair MacIntyre, Robert Bellah, Thich Nhat Hanh, and others, but nonscholars will relish the ideas and the writing, as well: I eagerly look forward to assigning the book to students at all levels.

Beem's book is a different genre; it draws us deeply into scholarly debates that connect or detach the political realm from the quest for moral community. Beem brilliantly recaptures the term "civil society" from its currently popular antipolitical incarnation; his goal is to show how deeply civil society depends upon, and even includes, a good state. He carefully combs through works of major theorists of civil society, including the oft-cited and often misused works

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of Alexis de Tocqueville, to rescue him from the pundits who use his name to justify ignoring politics and dismantling the government. While Tocqueville did indeed wax enthusiastic about Americans' fervor for joining associations, he also considered the specifically political association to be the mother of all associations, and thought that legal and political institutions were necessary anchors for the democratic ethos, says Beem.

Similarly, Beem painstakingly shows why Hegel's concept of civil society included a strong state. The state brings together all the disparate, local, particular groups under a common banner; membership in national society bridges differences that local institutions strengthen. Beem's smart and careful argument is that a good democracy requires both the warmth of local, personal, often parochial groups and the universalism of national, political institutions. The civil rights movement's connection to the Voting Rights Act is his paradigmatic case.

Recapturing the term "civil society" might seem to be an arcane exercise in philosophy, but it is not, and the stakes are high: if all American democracy needs is more social capital-building institutions like bowling leagues, we have a very different political agenda from one that gives politics and the state a central role. Against the current of antipolitical zeal, both of these books wonderfully reassert the centrality of politics.

NINA ELIASOPH
University of Wisconsin–Madison

Stirrings in the Jug: Black Politics in the Post-Segregation Era *by Adolph Reed, Jr. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 288 pp. Cloth, $47.95; paper, $18.95.*

Adolph Reed, Jr. is one of the most prominent scholars of African-American politics writing today. *Stirrings in the Jug* reminds us of why this is so. The book is a collection of previously published articles and a speech. The oldest of the contributions dates to 1986, the most recent to 1999. Despite these origins, there is a commendable coherence to the collection, especially among the first four essays. The three concluding essays include a nice case study of politics in Atlanta, a deeply cranky and well known piece on the myth of the underclass, and a penetrating analysis of the contemporary cultural significance of Malcolm X.

With respect to the first four chapters, Reed's question is basically this: In the wake of the demise of the regime of racial segregation, might African-American politics serve as a vehicle for promoting a populist progressivism that resists "monopoly capitalism," but pursues instead a program for "social justice?" Reed's answer is that black politics has failed to achieve its "emancipatory and egalitarian" potential. Part of the reason, he argues, resides in the inte-

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rior dynamics of black politics. On the Right, black politicians and scholars have simply abandoned the goal of social justice. On the Left, black politics has devolved into a concern for ideological purity and manipulative evasion. In the center, the incorporation of blacks into the mainstream of American political life has not engendered the progressive forms of politics that one might have expected.

Why has this been so? One reason is that the working conceptions of politics that were useful and to some degree accurate under Jim Crow are outmoded today. These conceptions include: the "black community" is an organic whole; there is an essential, "authentic" way of being black in the world; and black politics requires mediation by a talented elite. In mainstream politics, some of the practical consequences of these persistent conceptions have been the degradation of a geniunely democratic politics, the suppression of accountability of black officials to black constituents, and the perpetuation of the hegemony of a black petite bourgeoisie, whose members tend to pursue a politics of accommodation and/or self-aggrandizement. Thus, black mayors can end up pursuing strategies of economic development the benefits of which do not trickle down to ordinary black citizens.

The overall picture Reed paints may seem bleak from the perspective of one on the progressive Left, but Reed avoids despair. Agency matters. Even in a space as small as a city there is room for political actors to maneuver, even against an increasingly global capitalism. That space can be effective, however, only if political practices are truly democratic (open to those with few material means) and political ideas reflect social realities (as opposed to worn verities).

Reed is an equal-opportunity combatant who pulls no punches. This is both a strength and a weakness of these essays. One strength is that his aggressive frankness can be disarmingly refreshing. On the down side, however, Reed sometimes surrenders too quickly to his more polemical impulses. I worry, for example, that he overreaches in evaluating the work of Katherine Tate, Carol M. Swain, and Michael Dawson, criticizing them for not doing the kind of scholarship he thinks they should do and attributing positions to them that each would doubtless resist. Also troubling are Reed's quickness, in ways that seem unfair, to characterize the positions and sometimes the persons of others as being essentially racist or sexist and his glib dismissal of some opponents whose arguments deserve more serious treatment.

These tendencies diminish Reed's deeper insights into American politics, which are always astute and sometimes profound. This consequence is unfortunate given the important contributions Reed makes to the crucial conversation about the future of the nation in light of its history of racial division and stratification.

MARK E. BRANDON
University of Michigan

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Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts *by David T. Canon. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999. 330 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $18.99.*

In its ruling in *Shaw v. Reno*, the Supreme Court cast doubt on the constitutionality of majority-minority districting procedures. The Court majority based its ruling on an assumption that representatives in districts designed to elect African Americans or other minorities would only represent that group and consequently would neglect the needs of whites. David Canon empirically tests the Court's assumption. In addition, he tests whether all black members of Congress elected from Voting Rights Act (VRA) districts can be painted with the same brush in terms of racial representation as the Court majority does. The result is a well-conceptualized and empirically rich argument that presents majority-minority districts in a light much different, and more positive, than the *Shaw* majority.

Canon identifies a range of "representative" activities and seeks to measure differences, if any, between white and African-American officeholders. These activities include traditional measures such as votes, sponsorships, and the race of senior staff to the less traditional, such as the placement of offices within the district, racial content of articles in newsletters, speeches on the floor of the House, and coverage of the members in district newspapers. The focus of this analysis shifts depending on the measure from all members of Congress to the fifty-three Congressional districts that were 25 percent or more African American in the 1990s.

Canon's findings both undercut the *Shaw* majority's assumptions about the consequences to representation of majority-minority districting and empirically demonstrates growing heterogeneity among black officeholders. Across the range of representative behaviors measured, African-American members of Congress represent their white constituents, often more than white representatives represent blacks. Canon thus shows that the *Shaw* majority's fears are unsubstantiated, at least for African-American members of Congress.

Canon finds variation based both on length of service and, among the newer representatives, the degree to which the officeholder faced competition in getting elected. Canon attributes these intraracial differences to a supply-side phenomenon in which victors in multiperson races are more likely to base their representative style on identifying commonality between whites and blacks, while African-American victors who faced no electoral opposition are more likely to focus on differences. This supply-side theory is developed in a chapter-long analysis of North Carolina's post-1990 redistricting and elections in which blacks were elected to Congress. This chapter stands on its own as a significant contribution to scholarship on the Voting Rights Act.

I have two frustrations with Canon's study. Both, I admit, are unfair, since he is able to accomplish so much in this book. First, he undercuts one criticism of VRA districts, but neglects another. Critics also allege that VRA districts

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dampen electoral competition in those districts after the initial election of the minority candidate, an irony since the act was passed to enhance turnout. Canon does not analyze this aspect of post-VRA electoral structure.

Second, the theoretical and methodological insights of the book are applied only to African Americans. After 1975, the VRA also covered Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Americans. Although Latinos are intermittently included in some of the statistical analysis, their experience is never analyzed nor is the supply-side model applied to their experience. This is a disappointment, in part because one of the underlying themes of the book is the significance to black representation of declining ideological unity among members of the Congressional Black Caucus. This theme could be better developed by tapping examples of this process from the experiences of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. Its members share a common ethnic identification but have never had the ideological, partisan, or issue unity of the Black Caucus.

These concerns aside, *Race, Redistricting, and Representation* is a significant empirical and theoretical contribution to the extensive literature on representation and the Voting Rights Act.

LOUIS DESIPIO
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign

The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century
by Richard Rosecrance. New York, Basic Books, 1999. 287 pp. $26.00.

In this worthy successor to his influential *The Rise of the Trading State* (1986), Rosecrance lucidly updates and extends his analysis of the role of economic interdependence in bringing the globe toward a condition of peace and security. Territory is even less important to states now than when he wrote fourteen years ago. Labor can be hired by owning or contracting to factories thousands of miles away. The financial and social capital (technology and information), that produces wealth is far more elusive than ever to state control. Seizing another state's land, natural resources, or populace thus provides little incentive to war; and the ability of other factors of production to flee zones of conflict mightily deters an aggressor, since they would leave its territory as well as that of its prey. Old military disputes must be settled so as to provide a stable basis for attracting and retaining foreign investors. War, fought anywhere near its home territory, is thus unthinkable for any state now well-enmeshed in the global economy. Governments are not fading away, but the successful ones are those that are perceived as honest and impartial. Presumably they need not be especially democratic, since Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan epitomize such "virtual" states. The United States, with 70 percent of its GDP derived from service industries (of which two-thirds is high-tech, high-value, not burgers) is leading the old industrialized economies toward virtual status.

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Readers may think they heard something like this long ago, from the nineteenth century British liberals and from Sir Norman Angell, who wrote just before the Great War of 1914, which he thought would be catastrophic and therefore would be prevented by rational economic actors. War came anyway. The difference, says Rosecrance, is that today's economic links are much wider and deeper than in the early twentieth century. The trade in industrial goods is fully as internationalized now as then, and the major bases of states' contemporary economic strength are much more liquid and mobile. Not only are states deterred from aggression by the prospect of killing their prosperity, third parties closely linked by commerce have an incentive to intervene on behalf of peace so as to protect their own economies.

Rosecrance makes his case persuasively for many parts of the global economy at the present time. For other countries, it remains more of a prediction or admonition than currently applicable. For example, China is already the world's largest recipient of foreign investment; without it, Chinese low-cost labor could not sustain the level of industrial production for sales overseas needed to pay for essential imports. But China is not yet a major exporter of capital or information, and so its profile of economic interdependence is lopsided. While its "tiger" neighbors may be virtual states, China itself is not. Rosecrance clearly thinks that a policy of territorial aggrandizement by force (for example, against Taiwan) would be disastrous to China, but rightly he is concerned whether Chinese leaders sufficiently understand their interests. Since Taiwan's leaders clearly do understand theirs (certainly it is not war, but equally it is not absorption into a political system lacking the transparency and rule of law required of a prosperous virtual state), the basis for East Asian peace over the next decades may be less than Rosecrance hopes. The lesson "should be" (p. 175) that economic hegemony does not require military hegemony. But China's leaders may not understand or agree.

Thus there remains something of an "Angellic flaw" in Rosecrance's argument. His emphasis on new-style economic interdependence as a powerful influence for peace is persuasive, but it does not make a sufficient condition for peace. Rosecrance fully recognizes that states will continue to compete, and to restrain that competition some form of political coherence must be imposed on the global system to supervise and protect the market. That will not be enough, however, since at least some states are likely to continue to compete even over territory, and even violently. Aggression by such states, insufficiently bound by their own interests in the web of peaceful relations, could destroy the global web on which everyone else's prosperity truly does depend.

Though "conflict as usual" "will increasingly be eliminated among advanced countries," "it will continue in retrograde portions of international society" (p. 82). That's the problem, which will require more than just protection of the market itself but some form of organized political cooperation and regulation to constrain the retrograde members. In Angell's 1914, those institutions essentially did not exist. Only an elusive balance of power and a decayed British

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hegemony were available. Rosecrance rejects (as I do) American hegemony as an effective or desirable means of providing that constraint, but he leaves alternative solutions largely unaddressed. Unlike 1914, the world's leaders have built some of the institutions necessary for peace in this century, but they remain weak and fragile. Does the next book need to be about *The Rise of the (Virtual?) Global State?*

BRUCE RUSSETT
Yale University

Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities *by Alexander J. Motyl. New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. 229 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $18.50.*

The themes that are raised in this book could hardly be more challenging: revolutions, nations, and empires. Alexander Motyl's goals are rather more modest: not to discuss those themes directly but to suggest ways of thinking about them. This is, in other words, a study in scientific method and more particularly in concept formation. In each of the book's three sections, Motyl first discusses the concept, then considers the theories that relate to it, and then discusses the theoretical implications of his reconceptualization. The result is a thoughtful and often stimulating study in the history of ideas, but one that, for this reader, was too inconclusive to be entirely satisfying.

What, for instance, are revolutions? Motyl's definition, is unoriginal—a revolution is "rapid, fundamental, and comprehensive change" (p. 26). But what is rapid in this context? Fairly arbitrarily, it seems to be "about five years—more or less" (p. 28). What about "fundamental"? How deep does a change in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres need to be for it to qualify as revolutionary? It must, apparently, affect structures and institutions. But which ones? Just government structures or, for instance, the structures of the rural economy? Would administrative reorganizations count without a change of political regime? And why should we dispense with more familiar attributes of revolution, such as a break in legitimacy?

The next chapter explores theories of revolution, with particular reference to Jack Goldstone's "third generation." Motyl's starting-point is Theda Skocpol's well-known *States and Social Revolutions*. We have, surely, enough books that already offer a critical synthesis of this kind of literature. But in any case, the conclusion is a negative one: revolutionary theory cannot be predictive, and so theories of revolution can at most be "probablistic in a very weak and inexact way," able to do no more than identify the "factor or factors that make possible and facilitate, but do not determine, the occurrence of revolutionary change" (p. 50). Is this a particularly novel conclusion, or one that points us in new directions?

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When he approaches particular cases, Motyl becomes much more interesting and persuasive. In Eastern Europe, for instance, there was no "revolution" but something "more akin to radical reform, transition, or transformation" (p. 53). Societies like Hungary and Poland, Motyl argues, had already acquired many of the attributes of postcommunism, including civil societies and legitimate forms of political contestation. Things were rather different in the former Soviet republics after more than seventy years of single-party rule. All of this has led to two distinct groups of postcommunist states, one based on East-Central Europe and another, lagging behind it, made up of the other countries of the region.

Calls for the rapid construction of a democratic state in the post-Soviet republics are seriously misconceived in this analysis. Unlike East-Central Europe, few of the prerequisites were already in place—markets, the rule of law, a civil society, or nationhood. Accordingly, the current need is for "sequencing rather than big-bangism" and for the patient, incremental construction of the supportive networks that underpin a modern democracy (p. 65). As the West asks, "who lost Russia?" these are insights that deserve the widest audience.

STEPHEN WHITE
University of Glasgow, United Kingdom

Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide: The Twentieth Century Experience *by Howard Ball. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1999. 288 pp. $35.00.*

In the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in the attention focused on international humanitarian law. States have sought recourse to international law to justify military interventions, and individuals have worked through regional and international courts to make claims on national governments. Perhaps the most talked about trend in international law, however, has been the attempt to prosecute individual state leaders in front of international tribunals for the violent crimes they have committed against their own and foreign nationals. Neither former nor sitting heads of state have been spared. In 1998, General Augusto Pinochet while traveling to Britain was indicted by a Spanish lawyer for crimes against humanity. One year later, in May of 1999, Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Yugoslavia, became the first sitting head of state to be indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity by an international tribunal.

In *Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide*, Howard Ball provides a timely account of some of the most notorious war crimes and acts of genocide in the twentieth century. His focus is primarily on the efforts by the international community to define crimes that have a universal jurisdiction and to hold individuals accountable in front of international tribunals. Beginning in 1899 with

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the signing of the Geneva Accords, Ball examines the failed efforts to prosecute the kaiser and to hold the Turks responsible for their efforts to annihilate the Armenians in the aftermath of World War I. He then provides an account of some of the more well known war crimes of the twentieth century, namely those that occurred during World War II in Europe and in the Far East, the genocide committed by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and finally the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. He concludes with an examination of efforts to create a permanent international criminal court.

Despite his occasional references to a conflict between realpolitik and justice for individuals, *Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide* lacks any conceptual framework; and Ball makes little if any attempt to develop a cohesive theoretical explanation of the development of international humanitarian law or of the institutions that have been developed to enforce violations of these laws. While the tension that Ball alludes to between these two approaches—one that emphasizes realpolitik and another that gives priority to justice for victims—is the source of a potentially interesting and dynamic story, Ball fails to develop this theme, and we are left only with scattered references to this problem. Nor is it clear whether Ball thinks this tension is a product of irreconcilable goals or whether it is in fact avoidable. To the extent that efforts to produce sustained focus on the problem of justice have failed, Ball attributes a great deal of blame to the United States.

Ball's clear belief that priority should be given to prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law prevents him from evaluating the potential trade-offs involved in promoting universal principles of justice absent a sensitivity to national context. For example, the failure of the international community to recognize amnesties granted by newly democratic governments viewed as critical to reconciliation of various groups in society and hence to democratic consolidation could have devastating consequences that serve neither the cause of justice nor the realpolitik concern for order. Certainly this depends on the political context. Blind devotion to justice threatens to prevent careful consideration of local politics. In South Africa, a limited amnesty was provided to many of those who agreed to come forward before a truth commission and confess their crimes. One doubts whether South Africans would be better served by an international community that intervened in this delicate political process and prosecuted individuals who had been granted a domestic amnesty.

Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide also fails to consider the potential benefits of the numerous alternative solutions, especially truth commissions, lustration, and amnesty, which have become part of the lexicon of transitional justice. If nothing else, the sheer impracticality of legal proceedings demands attention to these alternatives. This is demonstrated most clearly in cases like Rwanda, where the legal structure cannot begin to cope with the vast number of cases before it and efforts to hold local trials have led to overcrowded prisons, or Cambodia where domestic legal proceedings threaten to make a mockery of justice. Choosing a mechanism for addressing these crimes, however, re-

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quires consensus on the goal. Ball argues that justice is important for the victims—an argument that differs from the human rights organizations that have promoted these institutions that prosecutions are necessary not simply to satisfy the victims but, importantly, to deter future crimes and secure peace. But in the kinds of conflicts normally under consideration, it is unlikely that even the individuals concerned will find justice if peace is not first obtained. If this is the case, then what is needed is a more fine-grained analysis of those conditions under which prosecutions will help achieve this goal and those where alternative solutions might be more appropriate. Quite rightly, Ball brings our attention to one of the most significant problems in international politics. What we are in need of now, however, is a framework for understanding the reasons why states have chosen particular strategies for addressing these crimes. This requires studying both those cases where tribunals have been constructed and those where alternative solutions have been pursued. Moreover, we cannot hope for success absent a clear understanding of the practical and political considerations that must be taken into account when addressing war crimes and genocide.

LESLIE VINJAMURI
Olin Institute for Strategic Studies

Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century *by William B. McAllister. New York, Routledge Press, 2000. 350 pp. Paper, $24.99.*

This book is must reading for any serious student of international drug control. It tells the fascinating story of how the rules and regulations for certain psychoactive substances (such as cocaine and heroin products) emerged and evolved at the international level over the course of the twentieth century. While the various pieces of the story can be found in many other published accounts, this is the first book that puts all the pieces together, providing a comprehensive historical narrative of the making of the global drug control regime. McAllister nicely weaves together secondary and primary source material, including extensive interviews in the United States and Europe.

Some readers may consider the book more descriptive than explanatory. The author certainly favors complexity over parsimony, emphasizing the local, regional, and global contexts that have shaped drug diplomacy at each historical stage. McAllister, who teaches history at the University of Virginia, stresses that no single factor or set of events explains the evolution of the supply-focused global drug control regime. The creation and development of the regime, he argues, must be understood within the economic, social, and political settings of each historical period, including global wars, technological advances, trade conflicts, and domestic and international cultural battles led by outspoken moral entrepreneurs. There was nothing predetermined about the specific form

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that the global control regime took. This is an actor-driven account, and McAllister does a thorough job in identifying the key historical figures that were instrumental in shaping how the drug issue became framed at the international level.

While the title of the book suggests that the general focus of inquiry is "drug diplomacy," this is somewhat misleading. Most of the focus is on drug diplomacy as it specifically relates to the creation and maintenance of multilateral treaties, institutions, and organizations. There is much less discussion of drug diplomacy in terms of bilateral and unilateral antidrug initiatives by individual states. Most strikingly, only eight pages are devoted to covering the 1970s to the present—a period defined by unprecedented international antidrug initiatives, with the United States at the forefront. In the U.S. case, Washington's escalating antidrug campaign has popularized the term "war on drugs," which has come to dominate relations with a number of producer and transit countries. Importantly, U.S. antidrug initiatives have often been carried out in the name of the global drug control regime. Washington has in some respects appointed itself as the regime's enforcer. On 1 March of every year, the State Department issues a report card on which countries have complied with their international drug control obligations. Those countries receiving a failing grade may be "decertified" and can be subjected to a variety of U.S. sanctions. As the American case illustrates, the global drug control regime can be politically used to legitimize the interventionist policies of powerful states, while making resistance by the less powerful more difficult.

The heightened drug diplomacy of recent decades, often of the arm-twisting variety, deserves much greater attention in an otherwise impressive book. The remarkably thin coverage of this more recent history (and America's dominant role) is the book's single greatest shortcoming. In his concluding summary, McAllister also offers few clues regarding where the troubled international drug control regime may be heading in the twenty-first century. If history is any guide, the regime may prove remarkably resilient in the face of serious design flaws and persistent failures.

PETER ANDREAS
Harvard University

Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China *by Yongnian Zheng. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 189 pp. Cloth, $64.95; paper, $19.95.*

The explosion of nationalist passion following the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 caught many outsiders by surprise. It should not have, for as Yongnian Zheng argues in this important new book, Chinese nationalism has reemerged as "[one] of the most important events . . .

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in the late 20th century" (p. 1). The question is how one should view this new expression of an old phenomenon. Many see the reemergence of Chinese nationalism as dangerous, threatening the peace and stability of the western Pacific and perhaps beyond. The growth of the Chinese economy, the modernization of its military, and the outpouring of nationalist expression have all provoked debate in the United States. How should the United States respond to a new and more assertive China? Can China be engaged and integrated peacefully into the world? Should it be contained before it becomes a threat? Are we inevitably headed into a new cold war?

In this well researched and thoughtful book, Yongnian Zheng argues that Chinese nationalism should be viewed in more benevolent terms, as first and foremost a response to domestic issues rather than an expression of aggressive intent vis-à-vis the outside world. This is the distinction Zheng would make between the "old" nationalism of the early twentieth century and the "new" nationalism that emerged in the closing years of that century. The old nationalism contained a greater component of antiforeignism; the new nationalism is a "response to the decline of central power" that occurred in the Dengist period (p. 21). The new nationalism, Zheng argues, seeks to "reconstruct an official nationalism that can strengthen its [the state's] political legitimacy"; it does not seek to overthrow the existing international system but only to achieve "recognition of Chinese power and its rightful place in the world system by other major word powers" (p. 19). Because Zheng sees Chinese nationalism primarily as a response to internal trends, he calls for going beyond Western stereotypes, whether rooted in realist or liberal conceptions of international relations, to get at Chinese understandings of nationalism. Hence, the title of the book: *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China.*

In addition to being a statist response to the perceived decline in the power of the central state in the 1980s, the new nationalism is also a response to the rise of ethnic nationalism in Tibet and Xinjiang, the gap between state and society that resulted from the failure to reform the political system in the 1980s, and, most importantly for Zheng, the psychological need to answer the identity question. What does it mean to be Chinese in the contemporary world?

Most of this book is devoted to efforts to define a contemporary Chinese identity, including those by the so-called New Left and Confucian nationalists. This is a very good discussion, one that should be widely read, but it must also be said that it is easier to define what the new nationalism is against than what it is for. This is not Zheng's problem, but that of the authors he is dealing with. As he points out, these intellectuals are trying to define a Chinese form of modernization in contradistinction to Westernization. They hope to define a unique Chinese path to modernity—emphasizing, depending on the author, the new collectivism, Confucian nationalism, economic independence, or institutional innovation.

Zheng is certainly right that the new nationalism is an effort to define Chinese identity in response to domestic trends that have emerged over the last

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decade. But he also points out that Chinese nationalism has always been linked to the twin concerns of *neiluan* (domestic chaos) and *waihuan* (foreign aggression). Zheng does a good job showing how the new nationalism responds to *neiluan*, but there is correspondingly less attention paid to perceptions of *waihuan*. This emphasis is perhaps because Zheng is concerned with showing how nationalism is linked to national identity. He is certainly right in this regard, but there is also a very real antiforeign component of the new nationalism, which raises the question: Just how different is the new nationalism from the old nationalism? It should also be pointed out that Zheng has a good discussion of official efforts to promote nationalism (patriotism), but does not develop as much as one would like the tensions and overlap among official nationalism, intellectual nationalism, and popular nationalism.

These comments in no way diminish the importance of this book. Anyone interested in where China is going should read and assign this book.

JOSEPH FEWSMITH
Boston University

The Presidency and the Politics of Racial Inequality: Nation-Keeping from 1831–1965 *by Russell L. Riley. New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. 373 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $22.50.*

U.S. political culture, suggests Riley, seeks and appreciates the heroic, "monumental presidency" (p. 7). The Lincoln Memorial and presidential holidays are such testimonials. Yet, in matters of racial equality, the historical record indicates that presidents are less than heroic. They play, instead, the very conservative role of nation-keeper to a "prevailing [white, male] social structure" (pp. 74, 83–84, 137, 218).

As nation-keepers, Abraham Lincoln, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson—Riley's key but not sole presidential foci—aimed to avoid roles as emancipators. They sustained a constitutional inheritance formed by George Washington's responses to the Whiskey Rebellion and the Alien and Sedition Acts, which, in turn, reinforced in practice what the constitutional convention and the Federalist Papers theorized: a strong, unitary president capable of acting upon foreign and domestic conflict. Presidential responses to conflict raised by demands for racial equality meet the same test for nation-maintenance, that is, security and stability.

Utilizing an historical approach, Riley shows how pre-emancipation presidents from Andrew Jackson to James Polk to James Buchanan were dedicated to the cause of nation-keeping, whether in upholding Fugitive Slave law or in "laboring mightily behind the scenes" (p. 86) to influence territorial acquisition on the slavery issue. Lincoln opposed the liberation of slaves proposed by his Congress, and in 1861, he contravened John C. Fremont's plan to free slaves as part of the Confiscation Act. Emancipation was a last resort for Lincoln—not to abolish slavery, but to maintain the Union. From Rutherford Hayes to Her-

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bert Hoover, such negative control over race relations was apparent. Formal incentive structures and an informal political culture prevented all from active advancement of race equality.

Presidents have responded to civil rights matters similarly, and Riley restricts his investigation to the case of African Americans. While Kennedy appointed some African Americans to executive positions, provided symbolic support, and brought on a staff of qualified attorneys to assist in civil rights litigation efforts, he did not produce executive orders nor initiate social-changing legislation. His "limited political capital" could not be sacrificed on civil rights, and he was unwilling to "exercise leadership" where "electoral, political and social forces continued against quick or meaningful changes . . ." (pp. 205, 207).

A president might be unwilling, but not entirely unable. In Birmingham, Alabama, the Freedom Rides of 4 May 1961 were created intentionally "to provoke a reconsideration by the president [Kennedy] of his nation-keeping responsibilities" (p. 208). If initiating civil rights action had once meant abandoning one's nation-keeping responsibilities, Kennedy, like Lincoln, was forced to redefine the nation in opposite terms. Early in his administration, Kennedy's "nation-keeping powers" favored the southern "white power structure" (p. 212). Birmingham forced a deployment of those powers in favor of African Americans. So did the right to vote.

A theoretical quirk pervades the book. Riley explicitly addresses Stephen Skowronek's study, *The Politics Presidents Make*, suggesting that, "the politics presidents make are [instead] routinely overwhelmed by the politics that make them" (p. 21). But what Riley shows so well is that from 1831 to 1965, all presidents actively engaged in the antipolitics of racial equality, consciously positing antileadership in this realm.

Riley briefly notes that women, Native-Americans, and labor received similar treatment. Rather than advance opportunities for racial or gender equality, all presidents engaged in a historically defined, nation-keeping role, and worked actively to suppress such advancements. In matters of race we look to the wrong visages for heroic gratification. The heroes and by implication the monuments we should really see are of the likes of William Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Harriet Tubman, Marcus Garvey, and Martin Luther King.

GREGORY PORTILLO
Arizona State University West

The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America *by Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999. 417 pp. $32.50.*

In spite of the history of enslavement, hostility, and continued discrimination experienced by African Americans, it is possible to put together an optimistic portrait of racial progress in the United States. In a series of constitutional amendments following the Civil War, former slaves were recognized as Ameri-

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can citizens and promised constitutional rights, including full political participation. And in spite of many setbacks along the way, there have been significant improvements in the social, political, and economic conditions for most black Americans over the last fifty years. However, it is also possible to assemble a very pessimistic account of the historical and contemporary status of African Americans. The promise of racial freedom and progress of the Reconstruction Era ended in little more than a decade after the Civil War. The rise of Jim Crow, sanctioned by state law throughout the South, and the system of de facto segregation and semi-official discrimination in the rest of the country were only ended by the power of the Civil Rights movement and the threat of a second civil war. In spite of significant economic improvements and the creation of a sizable black middle class, there has been only modest progress in the racial integration of neighborhoods, schools, churches, and other social institutions. Playing the race card to mobilize white voters based on their fears of blacks has been a perennial feature of American politics.

Social science has not had an easy time providing a plausible theoretical explanation of this complex and often contradictory history of race relations in the United States. Any theory of continuity, whether of unremitting white racism or of gradual enlightenment, is inconsistent with the zigs and zags of history. Historians tend to eschew broad theoretical accounts in favor of interpretations of trends and events in specific periods. Most social scientists focus on the contemporary period that usually allows for an assumption of stability or only one major historical change that requires an explanation. In a very bold volume, political scientists Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith take on the task of explaining the entire fabric of American race relations, from seventeenth century Virginia to the political dynamics of the Reagan and Clinton administrations of the late twentieth century. Even though the authors fall short of their ambitions, *The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America* is a book with a novel interpretation that deserves serious discussion and debate.

In a nutshell, Klinkner and Smith argue that African Americans have only made progress when black soldiers were essential for winning a war. During the Revolutionary War, somewhere between five and eight thousand blacks served as soldiers; and perhaps one-hundred thousand slaves, about one-fifth of the total slave population, gained their freedom through one means or another during this period. The authors argue that the service of black soldiers combined with the ideological fervor of the revolution led to the end of slavery in the northern states in the late eighteenth century. Just as the manpower shortage of soldiers during the revolution had forced George Washington to recruit slaves as soldiers, President Lincoln's initial refusal to enlist black soldiers was overridden by military pressures caused by the heavy casualties experienced by the Union army in the first year of the Civil War. Approximately 180,000 black men eventually served in the Union Army and are thought to have provided the margin of victory for the North.

Klinkner and Smith provide similar accounts of the importance of black soldiers during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Progress

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during wartime is produced by political concessions from the government (for example, the Emancipation Proclamation) necessary to recruit black soldiers and by the growth of militancy among blacks who are asked to risk their lives but are denied basic rights as citizens. A recurring theme is that the bravery of black soldiers in battle inevitably makes a profound impression on white soldiers (and politicians) that erodes, at least temporarily, their prejudices and assumptions of black inferiority. The overall interpretation of American history is one of short-term racial progress during periods of war (or because of international pressures during the cold war) followed by longer periods of backsliding as race baiting is used for political gains by unscrupulous politicians.

The book also provides a solid history of American race relations, which is based on the standard references in the field. While much of this history will be familiar to scholars in the field, the novel thesis of wartime progress adds a new dimension to the standard accounts. In general, the book is well written and would provide an excellent supplementary reading for upper division courses on American race relations.

CHARLES HIRSCHMAN
University of Washington

Tocqueville's Revenge: State, Society and Economy in Contemporary France *by Jonah D. Levy. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1999. 386 pp. $55.00.*

Debates about civil society and its relation to democratic governance have been a highlight of political science during the last decade, capturing the interest and imagination not only of academics but of practitioners and the public as well. Robert Putnam's 1993 study of Italian regional politics became an instant classic by arguing that civil society was the key to "making democracy work." Other scholars followed Putnam's lead and proclaimed it the solution to a wide range of political, social, and even economic problems, giving rise to a second, more skeptical wave of literature that criticized many of the arguments and conclusions of the first.

Jonah Levy's *Tocqueville's Revenge* blends elements of both waves. The author shares the "normative perspective of civil society's boosters—the belief that a vibrant set of societal and local actors is essential to good governance and economic prosperity," but "part(s) company with their understanding of how civil society is constructed and maintained" (p. 11). Civil society does not necessarily emerge from a long evolutionary process, he claims, but rather can be purposively created by states and societies in relatively short periods of time. To prove this point, he analyzes a political experiment not unlike the one examined by Putnam: the decentralization of power to the French provinces that began in the 1980s.

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The designers of the French reform hoped it would facilitate the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises and the development of a German-style economic system that could avoid the downsides of both planned and Anglo-Saxon free-market capitalism. In the event, however, it turned out to be an almost uniform failure. Whether they started with left or rightwing governments, favorable or unfavorable economic conditions, almost all of the regions and localities in question were unable to truly reform business and industrial relations. Levy blames this failure on the poor choices of officials and the nature of the state that carried out the reforms. Decentralization could have been made to work, he argues, but it would have required not "less state, but a different kind of state—an empowering state, a state that gives societal and local actors the financial, regulatory and institutional means to assume their responsibilities" (p. 12).

Without positive examples from his French case to build on, however, Levy is forced to rely on counterfactuals and cursory consideration of other cases (such as post-World War II Germany and Japan) to prove his point that the "right" kind of state can foster the "right" kind of civil society and social capital. The counterfactual arguments seem plausible in the abstract, but Levy's own thorough analysis points to a wide range of historical and structural factors that stood in the French reformers' way. Local actors from shopkeepers to militants, for example, strenuously resisted the reforms, since they had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, while local authorities often lacked the skills, resources, and experience to carry them out. The German case, moreover, seems so unique as to be of little comparative value, as the destruction of potential antireform forces during the war together with the immense influence of the American occupying forces made decentralization and economic transformation far easier to implement than it would have been otherwise.

Ultimately, therefore, Levy is more persuasive in showing what can't be done than what can. His analysis demonstrates that state withdrawal alone is not sufficient to create "good" civil society and social capital, but he is less successful in providing relevant examples of purposive reforms that actually achieved their ends. Thorough, well-researched, and important, *Tocqueville's Revenge* deserves a wide audience among students of France, political economy, and civil society.

SHERI BERMAN
Princeton University

The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control *edited by Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1999. 202 pp. $39.95.*

Positive incentives—defined here as transfers of positively valued resources from one actor to another with the aim of influencing the recipient's behavior—

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are among the most understudied if frequently employed tools of international statecraft. An explanation for their neglect by scholars may be found in the intellectual history of the discipline as well as the particular set of issues that arose during the cold war, when international relations theorizing flourished. With the cold war's end, when the challenge of deterring a nuclear superpower appears less immediate, scholars have begun to redress the longstanding bias toward analyses of threats and threat-based strategies that came at the expense of a more comprehensive understanding of the sources of influence in international relations.

The authors of this volume make a solid contribution to the emerging body of research on the role of positive incentives in international politics. In search of "generalizable insights into the conditions under which positive incentives are successfully used to facilitate international collaboration," they ground their analysis in theories of externalities management (p. 7). Their basic proposition is that when transaction costs of negotiating and implementing cooperative agreements are significant, it can be efficient for one country to pay another for compliance. Whereas realist and many institutionalist scholars regard the opportunities for cheating or defection for unilateral gain as the chief obstacles to international cooperation—thus their emphasis on the need for information and transparency as well as mechanisms of enforcement or punishment—a focus on the costs and/or impediments to implementing agreements suggests that noncompliance is not always synonymous with defection. States may wish to comply with the desires of others but lack the capability in terms of know-how or material to do so. In such cases, positive incentives can succeed where threats and punishments cannot.

Although readers will find a number of interesting hypotheses in the Introduction and Analytic Framework, these are not tested in any systematic fashion. Josef Goldblat offers a largely descriptive review of the incentive structures in major multilateral arms control agreements that is followed by chapters devoted to more detailed case studies, each an apparent triumph for arms control. Amy Smithson argues that positive incentives were crucial to securing the October 1994 agreement between North Korea and the United States to freeze and eventually dismantle North Korea's nuclear-weapons program. Similarly, Thomas Bernauer, Stefan Brem, and Roy Suter find that positive incentives contributed to the decision of the Ukraine to turn over its nuclear arsenal and to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear-weapon state in 1994.

The reader will learn a great deal from these chapters, but the validity and generalizability of the explanatory claims remain open to question. The absence of references to North Korean or Ukrainian primary sources is understandable, but it makes the failure to consult native-language sources, at least for the Ukraine, all the more regrettable. Lacking access to official documents, the authors infer the causes for putative changes in preferences or outcomes from public statements and/or observable behavior. Yet, if threats and prom-

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ises are held to affect behavior by changing the net values associated with particular outcomes, then data on decision-making processes are essential. Finally, the question of whether a particular category of arms control negotiations is representative of a wider class of influence attempts is never seriously discussed.

JAMES W. DAVIS
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The Activist Advocate: Policy Making in State Supreme Courts *by Charles S. Lopeman. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1999. 144 pp. $55.00.*

In this normative assessment of why some state supreme courts engage in judicial activism (defined as a judicial decree that conflicts with those of other policy makers, including predecessor courts) while others do not, Lopeman posits that the existence of at least one activist judge on a state supreme court may result in the majority accepting the minority view that activism and judicial policy making are appropriate roles for judges in the political system. The author maintains this steadfast belief in the psychological phenomenon of "minority influence" and concludes that the "judicial role" model is more influential than the "attitudinal" model, because it allows a singular judge who endorses judicial activism to transform a state's highest court into a policy-making body.

Upon providing an overview of judicial policy making, separate case studies of activist advocates on the Indiana, West Virginia, and Ohio supreme courts ensue covering approximately ten-year periods in each state beginning in the late 1970s or early 1980s. In each state, one specific judge (Randall Shepard in Indiana, Richard Neely in West Virginia, and Frank Celebrezze in Ohio) is identified as the activist advocate who is instrumental in transforming his court from a restrainist tribunal to a body that accepts activism as an acceptable alternative to judicial deference to the state legislature or to judicially-established doctrine. A bit more discussion on the criteria employed in selecting these three states would have been illuminating; presumably, the author identified them as having an activist advocate during the period analyzed. The supreme courts of Idaho, Florida, and Pennsylvania are then compared to their midwestern counterparts during similar time periods. The judges on these courts did not make policy in their states, nor did they have an advocate for judicial policy making. As a side note, it would be plausible to present full names for all the judges discussed for uniformity purposes.

In this six-court comparison, Lopeman maintains that the courts are located in five different regions with different economic bases. This dissimilarity, to him, makes the primary conclusion more valid, for it is unrelated to local ecological factors. He may be absolutely correct in this assertion. While this book is

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certainly a contribution to the scholarship on judicial policy making, this issue, particularly Lopeman's advocacy approach, is ripe for quantitative analysis. He does assess a number of factors that can influence whether a court engages in policy making. These include institutional factors such as the degree of control a court has over its docket, the presence or absence of an intermediate appellate court, and the use of an elective or merit system in the selection of state supreme court judges. Environmental factors including the existence of political gridlock in lawmaking, the political party of the court's majority, and whether one party dominates a court are also analyzed. The author concludes that none of these factors, including ideology, are sufficient causal explanations of judicial activism. The only factor that Indiana, West Virginia, and Ohio had in common is the presence of an activist advocate. Measuring many of the explanatory variables would be fairly straightforward by using dichotomous variables and ordinal scales. Measuring activism as an ultimate dependent variable could also be achieved by using a dichotomous variable, though regression on dichotomous dependent variables is somewhat challenging.

To his credit, Lopeman does not suggest that the experiences in the activist-court states are conclusive proof that an activist advocate is a sufficient or necessary condition for judicial policy making under all circumstances. He does clearly demonstrate, however, that activist advocacy must be accounted for in any consideration of the determinants of judicial policy making.

BRIAN L. FIFE
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Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO *by James M. Goldgeier. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1999. 218 pp. Paper, $18.95.*

The U.S. decision to extend NATO membership to countries formerly belonging to the Warsaw Pact was highly controversial, and it remains so today. But was it inevitable? The title of James Goldgeier's book, taken from the text of Bill Clinton's news conference with Visegrad leaders in January 1994, suggests that it was. The author himself, however, believes that things might have turned out differently. Both the theory and history of international politics strongly suggest that NATO should have dissolved, not expanded. No alliance has ever survived victory; and the possession of overwhelming power in the hands of one state typically induces balancing, not bandwagoning, behavior among contenders. Thus, in the wake of the Soviet Union's self-dismemberment, it was entirely reasonable to expect that the United States would either disengage militarily from Europe or be forced out by the Europeans, who should have been eagerly defecting from the victorious American alliance to form a counter-hegemonic coalition.

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Early on, this is more or less what seemed to be happening. When President Clinton took office in January 1993, NATO expansion had few supporters within the United States or abroad. Moscow resolutely opposed NATO enlargement for obvious reasons, while the European members of NATO were at best unenthusiastic about the idea. On the domestic scene, only a handful of members in Congress and the bureaucracy supported NATO expansion. The military was adamantly opposed to enlargement, because it would jeopardize U.S.–Russian security cooperation. Moreover, Pentagon officials warned the administration about the military consequences of extending a commitment to defend new countries that were unable to meet the 1,200 Atlantic Alliance standardization agreements. For its part, the American public had elected Clinton to focus on the economy (stupid) and to reap the peace dividend, not to entangle U.S. security with the uncertain fate of East Central Europe. Yet, one year later, Clinton declared in Prague that it was no longer a question of whether NATO would enlarge but rather when and how (he might have added why); and three years later, in May and June 1997, NATO issued membership invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. How did this happen?

Based on extensive interviews with key policy makers, James Goldgeier concludes that the U.S. decision to expand NATO was largely the result of two political entrepreneurs, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, who used their superior access to the president to outmaneuver the overwhelming opposition to enlargement inside the executive branch. What is truly surprising, if not downright frightening, is that there never was a formal decision within the administration to expand NATO. Instead, Lake and Holbrooke "drove enlargement not through a series of decision meetings but through presidential language" (p. 153). Armed only by presidential speeches, Lake and Holbrooke essentially rammed the policy down the bureaucracy's throat. In the most dramatic passage from the book, Holbrooke, whom Goldgeier calls the enforcer, tells an interagency group that included enlargement opponents General Wesley Clark, Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter (who had already walked out of the meeting in response to Holbrooke's abrasiveness), and Deputy Secretary of Defense Joseph Kruzel: "Anyone questioning [NATO enlargement] is disloyal to the country and to the president" (p. 74).

Leaving process aside, politics played a central role in the story. Against the backdrop of the administration's policy fiasco in Bosnia, Bill Clinton needed to demonstrate U.S. leadership in the post-cold war environment. NATO expansion became the policy instrument to accomplish that goal. Thus, from the beginning, NATO enlargement was more of a symbolic gesture than a practical measure to enhance U.S. national security. The administration decided the "when" and "who" questions before addressing "why" (aside from domestic political concerns) and how enlargement would actually be carried out.

Once the decision to go forward had been made in a presidential speech in the summer of 1994, the policy stalled for two years as the administration tried

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to balance opposing forces and concerns within a very tricky political landscape. Moving too quickly on the issue risked jeopardizing Russian reform and Boris Yeltsin's reelection chances; moving too slowly allowed Central Europeans and Republicans, who had adopted NATO enlargement as a plank in their ten-point "Contract with America," to accuse the president of being weak and of holding Central Europeans hostage to Russia's interests. By October 1996, however, the political climate had changed dramatically in favor of pushing forward on NATO expansion: Yeltsin had been reelected, the Dayton accords had ended the war in Bosnia, the Senate had voted overwhelmingly in favor of enlargement, and the Republican presidential candidate, Robert Dole, was hammering Bill Clinton for not answering the questions "when" and "who." It was not mere coincidence that President Clinton finally answered the question "when" at a campaign speech in Hamtramck, a heavily Polish suburb of Detroit.

Not Whether But When is clearly the best historical account of the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO. It is a superbly researched study, written in brisk and concise prose, that delivers insightful and fair-minded analysis of the process, politics, and policy that drove the U.S. decision. It is not, however, an especially ambitious work of social science, and it does not pretend to be one. Goldgeier shows that bureaucratic politics is not a useful theory for explaining this particular case and that policy entrepreneurs with access and strong beliefs can override the bureaucracy as long as the president provides leadership on the issue. In Goldgeier's words: "when the president gets involved, he wins . . . " (p. 153). Yet because Goldgeier only investigates a single case, it is difficult and unwise to generalize the study's findings to other cases of U.S. foreign policy decision making. We cannot even conclude that other foreign policy decisions by the Clinton administration followed the same pattern as this one. What Goldgeier does show, however, and this is truly important and puzzling, is that even momentous decisions can be made in an informal manner without serious debate or consideration of their long-run consequences. The book serves as a cautionary tale of how foreign policy should not be made. Unfortunately, paper commitments have a nasty habit of eventually biting those that make them. We can only hope that NATO enlargement proves an exception to this rule.

RANDALL L. SCHWELLER
The Ohio State University

Television and Its Viewers: Cultivation Theory and Research *by James Shanahan and Michael Morgan. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 267 pp. Cloth, $57.95; paper, $19.95.*

In the 1920s, when print was still the dominant media, Walter Lippmann pointed to Plato's allegory of the cave to explain the difference between reality

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and pseudoreality. The idea here was: Just as the prisoners perceived the reflections thrown onto the wall before them as the real thing, modern man's views of the world are far more based on second-hand media-reality rather than first-hand experience. Yet the switch from person-to-person story telling to print-based mass entertainment and information was not as consequential as the more recent ascendance of television. While the mass media's, especially television's, influence on literally all aspects of our lives is hardly disputed, media scholars disagree about the ideological biases of media elites and organizations (that is, liberal, conservative, procedural, structural, etc.) as well as their impact on the pseudoreality that television programs project and, most of all, on the nature of television's effects on heavy viewers. Whereas most communication scholars examine how specific television messages during specific time periods affect audiences in specific ways (agenda setting, priming, framing), the authors of this volume focus on the entrenched systemic patterns in television content and their long-term impact on regular viewers' belief systems about the social, economic, political arrangements and the roles of ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, and other markers. Thus, whether newscasts affect the outcome of this year's presidential and congressional elections or whether the political jokes of late-night talk show comedians influence the approval ratings of Bill or Hillary Clinton is of no particular interest to the "cultivation" school that is interested in "the bucket, not the drops" (p. 28). Cultivation theory starts with the idea that people who watch television for many hours a day think differently about the social reality than people who rarely or never watch. Since George Gerbner pioneered cultivation analysis more than twenty years ago with his work on the effects of television violence that transcended the notion of copy-cat actions and increased fear of crime, he and other scholars have added a great deal of research designed to demonstrate the consequences of people's long-term exposure to "stable, repetitive, pervasive and virtually inescapable patterns of images and ideologies that television (especially dramatic, fictional entertainment) provides" (p. 5).

In their comprehensive description and analysis of the theory, history, and research methodology of cultivation research, the authors remind the reader repeatedly that they themselves belong to this school. Not surprisingly, although Shanahan and Morgan devote one chapter to critics of cultivation theory, they refute the opposition's major arguments one by one in the process. Still, the reader who is not familiar with the field is introduced to cultivation critique. While much of the volume examines more than two decades of cultivation research, the authors also present their new research findings. After applying various data analysis techniques to the entire body of cultivation research, they conclude that the findings of the last twenty years confirm collectively the original hypothesis that long-term exposure to television programs cultivates a view of society and the world consistent with the prevalent patterns of TV's pseudoreality.

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Who shapes this "reality" with what ends in mind? Cultivation theorists suggest that television programming cultivates a mainstream world view that reflects and perpetuates the interests of social and political elites and their stakes in maintaining the status quo. Like C. Wright Mills before them, they do not allege a conspiracy among the power elites; they point to systematic structural patterns in cultural institutions such as television that more often than not favor messages that are in the long-term interest of society's privileged strata. How the invisible hand that is said to produce "propaganda without propagandists" (p. 19) supposedly works in today's rapidly changing mass media market needs more exploration than offered here, as does the question whether the new media—from cable and satellite television to the internet—enhance or diminish television's dominant cultivation function. One also wonders about the trend to infotainment in television news and its overall impact on television's cultivation abilities.

Although especially useful for students of mass communication, this interesting and especially well-written book is also recommended to the general reader who is interested in a compelling explanation of television's power that is absent from popular media discussions.

BRIGITTE L. NACOS
Columbia University

Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process *by Adnan Abu-Odeh. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace, 1999. 322 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $19.95.*

Three nations—Jordanians, Palestinians and Israelis—but to date only two states, Jordan and Israel: it is this unresolved tripartite relationship that serves as the broad framework of this study. Focusing on the state-building process in the Emirate and subsequently the Kingdom of Jordan, Abu-Odeh details how in particular the evolution of the changing relationship between the West and East Banks of the Jordan affected the construction and understanding of the notions of Palestinian, Jordanian, and Transjordanian.

Although itself once a contested concept, over the past twenty years Palestinian identity has been dealt with by numerous scholars and journalists. Not so, however, Jordanian or Transjordanian identity. For years, resentful of what they saw as Hashemite collusion with the Zionists, Palestinians in effect ignored the original inhabitants of the East Bank or treated them as inseparable from the Hashemites. Many Zionists, on the other hand, eager that Jordan be considered "the Palestinian state," also dismissed Transjordanians as little more than a handful of Bedouin guards. Only in recent years has serious study of modern Jordan begun to come into its own, and the book under review must be considered an important contribution to that literature. It places Jordan's identity as

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a state and its leaderships' problematic attempts to mold Palestinians and Transjordanians into one people at the center of the analysis.

Abu-Odeh rightly understands that to tell his tale he cannot separate domestic developments from regional ones. He devotes more than half the book to largely regional developments prior to the September 1970 military showdown between the Jordanian state and the Palestinian Fedayeen. This is a huge undertaking, and the author only in part succeeds. The novice will likely be a bit overwhelmed, while the expert will find little new in the treatment, with the exception of the (unfortunately too few) instances in which the author relates personal experiences.

The most important contribution of the book lies in the chapters dealing with 1970 and beyond. Certainly the author's personal experiences in government service give these sections a feel of greater depth and freshness. It is also clear that understanding the state of Palestinian-Transjordanian relations today is what is of greatest concern to Abu-Odeh. Those unfamiliar with Jordanian domestic politics may not realize how daring an undertaking this is. Under the banner of national unity, public discussion of "intercommunal relations" in the kingdom was long taboo. The author cites several studies conducted in the mid-1990s on the topic. These were unprecedented and were widely criticized, even though everyone in Jordan was and is well aware of the reality of intercommunal tensions.

For someone who has been and continues to be a high-level political insider, Abu-Odeh has written a remarkably honest book. From his presentation and his service to the Jordanian state it is clear that he accepted and later served the Hashemites' political projects: from the unity of the two banks, to the suppression of the Palestinian resistance, and the separation of the East Bank from the West Bank. Nevertheless, unlike some previous works on Jordan, Abu-Odeh's avoids panegyrics, apologetics, or defensiveness.

As a result, this work is likely to be criticized in both Palestinian and Transjordanian circles, in part simply because the author is of Palestinian origin. Yet the critics will be hard pressed to counter Abu-Odeh's concluding call for greater democracy in Jordan and for the regularization of the triangular relationship in the only way that is a sound basis for a future comprehensive peace—the establishment of a Palestinian state. No one concerned with the future of the triangular relationship can afford to miss this book.

LAURIE A. BRAND
University of Southern California

India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality *by Sanjib Baruah. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999. 280 pp. $36.50.*

Resurgence of ethnic conflicts across the globe has made the problem of nationalities and violence the central issues in our times. This book studies the prob-

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lem of nationalities in Assam and the northeast of India, an area that has been largely ignored by analysts of Indian politics and ethnic conflicts. It provides an authoritative account of ethnic strife and political turmoil, but it is more than a case study. Sanjib Baruah challenges the established interpretations of ethnic conflicts, why they arise, and how they deteriorate into stubborn insurgencies. He examines the relationship between India and its ethnic constituents in Assam, a potential separate state. Two broad themes run through the book.

First, is the conditional and tentative nature of the Indian nation-state. Baruah demonstrates this in the first four chapters by examining the evolution of Assamese nationalism before Indian independence, the compulsions of geography, the coercive and exploitative manner in which the British sought to incorporate Assam into their empire, and the impact of colonial policies on Assam's ethnodemography and economy. He argues that economic neglect and fears of cultural marginalization created by large-scale migration from within India and neighboring Bangladesh have dominated the Assamese nationalist narrative. Baruah is persuasive in arguing that the northeast remained poorly integrated, more an indeterminate zone characterized by the impact of inner and outer lines drawn by colonial power than an integral part of India marked off by firm boundaries.

Baruah argues that such boundaries were artificial, because they divided ethnic nations into parts of separate sovereign states. The attitude of the post-independence Indian governments retained the impress of imperial policies. In Chapter Five, Baruah analyzes why Indira Gandhi divided Assam into several separate federal states of the union. According to the author, this division reflected the strategic and political interests of the central state and not the interests or popular wishes of ethnic Assamese, who had vehemently opposed the division.

Similarly, in Chapter Six, Baruah shows how Rajiv Gandhi's promises to the Assamese nationalists were honored in their breach not in fulfillment. The second theme logically follows from the first. The denial of autonomy to Assam and the arbitrary nature of policies pursued by the central leaders led, according to Baruah, to popular protest and violence. It is not surprising then that he should advocate decentralization, autonomy, and more democracy as a preventive and a solution to ethnic conflict in India and elsewhere.

While Baruah's advocacy of democratic federalism is unexceptional, this book leaves several questions unanswered: why is there no let-up in militancy although the post-1990 Indian politics is more decentralized than ever before? Most South Asia observers would agree that government by coalition has become the rule, not an exception, as ethnically-based regional parties have gained at the expense of the central governments. The chief representative of Assamese nationalism, the Asom Gano Parishad party, has frequently been a part of such ruling coalitions during the past decade. A closer look might suggest that decentralization is necessary but not a sufficient condition for ethnic peace. Explanation for turmoil and militancy might lie in the nature of competi-

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tive politics within the frame of an unconsolidated nation-state. Baruah touches upon these questions only too briefly. Gaps not withstanding, this is a superb interpretation of Assamese nationalism that is rich in theory and provocative insights.

MAYA CHADDA
William Paterson University

Crafting Coalitions for Reform: Business Preferences, Political Institutions, and Neoliberal Reform in Brazil *by Peter R. Kingstone. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $22.50.*

Where successful, Latin America's shift from import-substituting to export-led industrialization should have created considerable pain in the industrial business community. At the outset of the reform process in the 1980s, most scholars expected resistance to changing trade policy from industrial sectors that were internationally inefficient and support from those industrial sectors already successfully competing internationally. In a thorough account of Brazilian stabilization and structural adjustment in the late 1980s and 1990s, Kingstone tries to unravel the pattern of industrialist response and shows that this sector-based view offers little explanatory power in the Brazilian case. Signaling the potential for a major shift in the political economy of reform literature, Kingstone hints at an approach where business preferences are endogenous, shaped by their environment, hence the title, "Crafting Coalitions."

Kingstone departs from the puzzle of deepening reform in the face of anticipated societal opposition. One view in the literature is that reform doesn't fall victim to opposition from those groups hurt by neoliberal reform, including industrialists, because the government makes compensating side-payments to buy support. A second view is that once credible, the government's reform agenda induces business adjustment, and the resulting sunk costs turn industrialists into reform allies. Kingstone builds on this latter argument. Business, in his view, constrains government action weakly at best. Kingstone sees government decisions on economic policy driven by voter response. This brings him down on the liberal/pluralist side of the general debate over the structural power of business in capitalist societies and on the particular issue of whether or not Latin American business is politically powerful. Kingstone shows how business was a "price-taker" in the reform process. By looking at the "micro-level" foundations of business action, Kingstone reveals that even businesses in less competitive sectors adjusted to reform.

Beyond a detailed and unbiased chronology of government reform from the late 1980s through 1996, the book provides detailed case studies of three industries—pulp and paper (highly competitive), machine tools (not competi-

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tive), and auto parts (moderately competitive). Another major empirical contribution is Kingstone's wealth of information about Brazilian business associations and how they changed in response to the pressures of neoliberal reform. These empirical contributions make an important contribution to the historical record of late twentieth-century Latin American political economy.

The book should not only be required reading for those embarking on research in Latin American political economy, but it reflects an important theoretical view that graduate students in political science should understand: industrialists' economic situations predict relatively little about their political actions. This view of government-business relations goes hand in hand with a strong resurgence of interest in political institutions spurred by the shift from authoritarian to democratic government.

The book raises important questions and provides fodder for many Ph.D. dissertations. In arguing that political institutions and government actions shape business response to neoliberal reform, Kingstone leaves us wondering what systematic relationship between political institutions and business action we might expect to find across the Latin American region. Apart from one paragraph on Chile, the book includes no comparison to other Latin American countries. Perhaps Kingstone believes government-business relations in Brazil are exceptional. If so, this must be theorized and demonstrated. Of the many variants of institutionalist analysis, which models does Kingstone believe will prove most fruitful in studying business politics?

Considered within the context of literature on comparative government-business relations, Kingstone's book is a gem. In the first and last chapters he ties his case study into that literature admirably; the book constitutes a major contribution to the existing literature on business politics.

SYLVIA MAXFIELD
Harvard University

Spain at the Crossroads: Civil Society, Politics, and the Rule of Law *by Victor Perez-Diaz. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1999. 217 pp. Paper, $39.95.*

This compact volume is the best available treatment in English of Spanish politics and society during the 1980s and 1990s. Written in a highly accessible manner, the book is replete with acute observations about the dynamics of elite and mass behavior during a pivotal era of Spanish history. Perez-Diaz gives particular attention to sociocultural changes and continuities during the period of Socialist government (1982–1996) and portrays a country that, despite noteworthy progress, is still struggling to assimilate fully the principle that the rule of law and standards of accountability apply equally to all citizens.

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The author echoes the consensus view that the seeds of Spain's peaceful transition to democracy were planted by processes of modernization that unfolded rapidly during the last fifteen years of the Franco dictatorship. Determined not to replicate the nightmare of polarization that culminated in the bloody Civil War of 1936–1939, following Franco's death in 1975 political elites and voters chose not to settle old scores, preferring instead to leave behind the wounds of the past. Although ideally suited to the task of shepherding the country through a peaceful regime change, Adolfo Suarez and his centrist party (UCD) were unable to consolidate a middle-of-the-road political party that could withstand the pressures of democratic competition. Factional bickering led to an implosion of the UCD, which in turn paved the way to the landslide triumph in 1982 of the Socialists (PSOE) under the youthful leadership of Felipe Gonzalez.

Perez-Diaz's account of the PSOE's rise and fall is perhaps the book's greatest strength. Neither cheerleader nor implacable foe, his interpretation offers a useful corrective to most of what has been published in Spain and abroad, though it will elicit protests from both the Socialists and their detractors. Thus, he suggests that rather than a signal of overwhelming popular support for the Socialists, the large margins of PSOE victories in parliamentary elections of 1982, 1986, and 1989 reflected the failure of competitors to advance plausible programs for governing. Similarly, while praising the PSOE for easing Spain's entry into the European community and NATO, Perez-Diaz is less favorable in his assessment of Socialist economic policies, citing a record of spiraling unemployment and uneven growth. His emphasis on the role of persistently strong family ties in attenuating the social impact of unemployment is highly perceptive and reflects broad command of the social scientific literature concerning demographic trends and labor markets. Most importantly, Perez-Diaz portrays vividly—and with considerable bitterness—the abuses of power and deafness to criticism from the press, civic associations, the judiciary, and the political opposition that characterized much of the Socialist period in office. He suggests that this arrogance, rather than the mixed record in overseeing the economy, ultimately accounted for the PSOE's March 1996 electoral loss to the center-right Popular party.

I remain unconvinced by several recurring themes of the book. The significance of Basque violence during the 1980s is exaggerated, in my view—just as it was by those in the government and security apparatus whose role in the organization of death squads targeting the armed separatist organization, ETA, in France helped to trigger the Socialists' downfall. Nor were the PSOE's macroeconomic policies as statist or ineffective as Perez-Diaz implies. And though sometimes intriguing, the many pithy speculations about the social psychological roots of Spanish elite behavior and public opinion often struck me as excessively simplistic. A final quibble, not of a substantive nature, is that the book has obviously been translated. Though the original meaning is never unclear,

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significant sections of each chapter read awkwardly and there are occasional mistakes. A more careful translation or closer editing would have been in order.

ERIC HERSHBERG
Social Science Research Council

Power of a Third Kind: The Western Attempt to Colonize the Global Village *by Hisham M. Nazer. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1999. 200 pp. $23.95.*

The thrust of Hisham Nazer's book is that much of the emerging "global consciousness" resulting from the information revolution is deeply imbued with Western premises and values, despite the fact that the technology itself and the consciousness that arises from it are of themselves value neutral. Nazer urges intellectuals from developing countries to become active in the world marketplace of ideas, aggressively defending their countries and traditions from the encroachment of Western biases via their virtual monopoly of the products of the information revolution.

The "power of a third kind" that Nazer refers to in his title is the power of extra-human consciousness that arises from being part of huge communications networks that transcend individuals. He views humans on the cusp of developing this third kind of power, after millennia of exercising the "first power"—a search for shelter—and the "second power"—human consciousness and self-awareness.

Nazer's book fits into more than a century of Arab efforts to separate technology and its benefits from Western culture. Beginning with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in nineteenth-century Cairo, Arab Muslim thinkers have pondered the distinctions between modernity as a concept and modern society as it manifests itself in Western Europe and North America.

Much of what Nazer argues is incontrovertible. It is true that the developing media sphere (and its corresponding emphasis on Western-style consumption) carries with it deeply imbedded messages of individualism, and such thinking is inimical to more group-centered conceptualizations of the self common in traditional Middle Eastern societies. It is true, too, that American foreign policy goals of democratization and free markets carry within them assumptions about rights and individuals' roles in society that may conflict with prevailing notions of society in other parts of the world.

Nazer makes a weaker case, however, for the possibility of Third World exceptionalism to the Western model. He observes that a movement toward critical thought is global, and argues that "non-Western nations' concept of Man must grant the primacy of thinking as an act" (p. 138). But Nazer wants to separate valuing critical thought from its Enlightenment products of democracy and individual agency, thereby creating room for a "modern" society that

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enjoys many of the benefits of critical thinking without empowering those thinkers to act on their thoughts or beliefs. What he is urging, in other words, is a model for a vibrant modern society that puts extensive constraints on individuals' actions.

At the core of this is a variation on the long-standing effort to separate science from modernity. Nazer's call is essentially one to separate social science from modernity, and this latter task is even more difficult than the former. Nazer gives little indication how an alternate social science rubric not predicated on the individual might be constructed, nor what it might look like. The difficulty of the task ahead is suggested by Nazer's bibliography, which lists only seven works written in Arabic, one of which was written more than six centuries ago.

One might also argue with the order of magnitude he ascribes to the information revolution in the broad sweep of human existence. Ideas have always flowed across borders, and evangelism has existed for millennia. While current developments are certainly noteworthy, it is doubtful that they deserve the rank Nazer ascribes to them.

Nazer's perspective may be influenced by where he sits. A former minister of petroleum in Saudi Arabia and chairman of Saudi ARAMCO, he has no doubt argued for long hours about Saudi exceptionalism in the face of Western pleas for democratization and transparency in his country. The political options available to Saudi Arabia differ from those available to most other countries, however, and his experience is likely not generalizable.

JON B. ALTERMAN
U.S. Institute of Peace

State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity *by Marc Lynch. New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. 330 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $18.50.*

Once upon a time, international relations scholars explained important episodes in world affairs—such as the outbreak of wars, the formation of alliances, and the creation of trading regimes—in terms of changes in the distribution of power among states, the level of interdependence in the global economy, and shifts in the relative potency of offensive and defensive weaponry. National interests played only a subsidiary role in such arguments: they merely reflected such permanent features of the situation as a state's niche in the international hierarchy of power and prestige, its geographical location, and perhaps its historical role in diplomatic practice.

In Marc Lynch's words, conventional explanations assume that "the most basic and essential state interests can be deduced from the state's position in the international system, rather than being contingent upon variation in domestic systems or personal leaderships" (p. 18). It is precisely this assumption that ex-

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ercises constructivist critics, who claim instead that national "interests change or are reproduced through interaction, as states produce collective meanings and interpretations of the situation, as well as interpretations of themselves and others" (p. 19). Lynch sets himself the ambitious task of evaluating these two approaches on the basis of how well they account for four recent episodes of Jordanian foreign policy: "the [1988] disengagement with Palestine, the [1994] peace treaty with Israel, the [1990–1991] Gulf crisis, and the 1995 turn against Iraq" (p. 27).

What emerges is a set of tests that would make the Pentagon blush. Amman's decision to cut its ties with the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, for instance, is simply asserted to have been inconsistent with "the combination of international rent-seeking, strategic interaction with the PLO, and material interests [that] provides a solid foundation for the assumption of an enduring Jordanian preference for a role in the West Bank" (p. 84). Lynch later concedes that "considerable evidence supports the argument that competition with the PLO drove Jordanian behavior," but nevertheless insists that "it does not follow from the existence of strategic interaction that communicative action and public sphere structures do not matter" (p. 88).

Saddling structural realists with a simplistic notion of power—"power is a function of aggregate material capabilities"—greatly facilitates his conclusion that "a public sphere analysis, in which strategic interaction between the PLO and Jordan takes place within contested normative and communicative structures, better explains the changes in power relations" (p. 89). The constructivist alternative is dismissed equally handily: "Public deliberation, rather than deeply embedded norms, explains change" (p. 90). In place of the structural realist and constructivist approaches, Lynch advances a "public sphere" account, in which "leaders engage in argumentation with public actors over the definition of [national] interests" (p. 40).

With regard to the occupied territories, "the contestation of Jordanian identity in the Jordanian public sphere institutionalized a new conception of Jordanian identity and interests which became embedded in Jordanian state and civil society institutions as well as in political discourse" (p. 99). Moreover, "after 1989 debate about Jordanian state and national identity after the severing of ties erupted inside a reconfigured Jordanian public sphere. This deliberation produced a powerful consensus around a Jordanian state identity separate from Palestine, generating dramatically different conceptions of Jordanian interests in the West Bank and facilitating the Jordanian move to a peace treaty with Israel" (p. 72).

Whether or not this sort of narrative can explain why Amman disengaged from the occupied territories in 1988 and signed a peace treaty with Israel six years later remains an open question. But it does offer an innovative and sometimes counterintuitive way to describe the main contours of recent Jordanian foreign policy.

FRED H. LAWSON
Mills College

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City Making: Building Communities without Building Walls *by Gerald E. Frug. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999. 256 pp. $35.00.*

Cities are located in a precarious position in the American political system. Considered creatures of states and deriving all of their powers from them, municipal governments cannot control their borders, prevent runaway businesses, or stem suburban expansion. Yet cities are entrusted with the delivery of most of the basic government services that citizens demand.

Gerald Frug contends that the root of this municipal powerlessness is the American legal system. Seeking to rethink the authority and role of cities in America, the author draws upon postmodern theories of subjectivity to recast municipal governments so that they take on a regional decision-making perspective. He begins by contrasting the power of private corporations to cities or municipal corporations. Over time, municipal and private business corporations evolved distinctly, with the former given very limited powers that were not expansive and the latter broad expansive authority. This placed municipal governments in the untenable situation of lacking the power to address the most basic problems facing them.

Frug offers several ideas to reconceptualize municipal legal authority. Drawing upon postmodern and other theories of identity and subjectivity, he claims that cities do not obtain their identity on their own but within a context or web of relationships. For example, cities can only be understood in relationship to suburbs, and vice versa. In addition, commuting trends for work are a sign to Frug that city borders are less meaningful than in the past. Thus, instead of viewing cities as sovereign political entities, we need to view regional governments as a new form of local power to supplant city governments. Regional governments better express the reality of urban areas and would have the authority to address metropolitan-wide needs. Within these new regional governments, the goal is not to create homogenized communities such as the all-white suburbs we have now, but to foster "city making," a space premised upon difference and diversity.

The final four chapters describe what an alternative regional government based upon diversity might look like. It would have regional planning and zoning authority. Delivery of city services would be oriented around community building, and education would seek to foster a more integrated learning that would not be limited by current municipal boundaries.

City Making is ambitious. The author is correct that current state law limiting city power is at the root of many of its problems. The book provides a fascinating analysis of the evolution of cities vis-à-vis private corporations and a thoughtful argument about what cities should be and how they foster an enriched life. The claim that metropolitan areas need more regional authority to plan is cogent. Yet the book bogs down in places. The extended discussion of postmodernism and situated subjectivity, while of interest to philosophers, often gets in the way of the argument for regional governments and planning.

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Moreover, the implications of giving local governments some type of sovereign power may come at the expense of state power. Frug recognizes the possibility of parochialism but dismisses it. The assertion that geography no longer matters to people and that is why city borders no longer matter is not entirely correct. Even the author notes that geography is critical to the delivery of services and where people opt to live. The point is that the postmodern deconstruction of the city and the suburb may not necessarily support the practical innovations of regional government that Frug advocates. Finally, Frug ignores how many areas of the United States have already opted for regional planning solutions along the way he suggests, and it would have been good had he discussed them.

DAVID SCHULTZ
Hamline University

Eco-Wars: Political Campaigns and Social Movements *by Ronald T. Libby. New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. 256 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $21.50.*

Ronald Libby's ambitious work is an attempt to bridge academic boundaries to understand how and why some social movements successfully pursue their political goals, while others fail. The integration of social-movement research and framing analysis from the field of sociology with insights on interest groups and political campaigns from political science is long overdue and represents one of the main strengths of Libby's work.

His central goal is to investigate the campaign strategies and political influence of expressive groups—the current generation of public interest groups. Rather than examine expressive groups in isolation, Libby's analysis contrasts these groups with their opponents in business to assess whether Charles Lindblom's assertion that business interests have a "privileged position" in American politics remains accurate (p. 5).

To analyze these exciting topics, Libby investigates five campaigns waged by expressive groups. The struggles are diverse and represent a wide range of social movements. Some of the campaigns are centered in Congress and the executive branch, for instance an antibiotechnology effort to ban bovine somatotropin (that is, bovine growth hormone) and attempts by property-rights advocates to abolish the Endangered Species Act. Other cases depict electoral initiative campaigns. These campaigns include a Massachusetts animal rights organization's proposal to regulate meat and dairy production and California initiatives to limit exposure to second-hand smoke and promote Big Green, an omnibus environmental protection policy.

Libby weaves the arguments, strategies, successes, and failures of the main participants to create very compelling and enlightening case studies. The

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strength of these cases is to demonstrate the tactics and strategies used by participants. The cases are must reading for anyone interested in leading or defeating a legislative, regulatory, or initiative campaign by a public interest organization.

While *Eco-Wars* is best when highlighting campaign techniques, a general lack of precision limits the book's usefulness for answering other questions regarding interest groups and social movements. The imprecision and inconsistency in defining and justifying the cases selected and the classification of key actors as well as the application of theory make for frustrating reading and lead to dubious conclusions. Moreover, there are many missed opportunities to connect the analysis to key issues in interest group, social movement, and public policy literature. Finally, there are far too many little errors, such as incorrect data (albeit on minor points), inconsistency between the text and related tables, and discrepancies between the citations and the references. Although in isolation no single error or imprecision significantly damages Libby's work, the cumulative effect of these problems seriously weakens the power of his commentary and conclusions.

As an example of this imprecision, Libby makes little effort to justify either his choice of movements or the specific campaigns within those movements. Although he does state that the cases were selected to "illustrate the tactics and strategies used by expressive groups in political campaigns" (p. 16), many questions remain unanswered. For example, exactly how these cases best illustrate political strategies—aside from the fact that three are initiative campaigns and the other two are focused on regulatory or congressional politics—is not addressed in the text. Readers are left to determine whether these cases represent an ideal example of a tactic or, perhaps, the first use of a particular strategy. Stronger justification of these cases is needed to answer questions about their generalizability, strengths, and weaknesses.

A similar problem ensues when Libby classifies the actors of each campaign. The classification scheme that includes expressive groups, social movement organizations (SMOs), and nonmovement allies all working in favor of the campaign is used to illustrate that interest groups are imbedded in social movements. This illustration is based on alliances between expressive groups and SMOs. However, throughout *Eco-Wars* this distinction is unclear and the classification of one organization as an expressive group and another as a SMO seems mostly arbitrary. No significant effort is made to explain why one organization is an expressive group and another is a SMO. Given that many of Libby's conclusions rest on the relationships between expressive groups and SMOs, the absence of systematic criteria to differentiate between the two types of groups and lack of explanation for Libby's classification decisions are especially troublesome.

Eco-Wars also overgeneralizes when applying theoretical concepts. Two key political science concepts are frequently used in the analysis—the privileged position of business and Mancur Olson's free-rider problem. Unfortu-

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nately, Libby oversimplifies and extends both theories to make them little more than synonyms for business victories and nonparticipation, respectively.

Libby's work does a fine job of describing the strategies and tactics of expressive groups' campaigns and counter-offensives of their opponents. Libby also deserves commendation for asking important questions and integrating a diverse literature. However, *Eco-Wars* tends to falter when it ventures beyond descriptive analysis to offer general conclusions about interest groups, social movements, and their places in American public policy making and democracy.

DAVID H. COLNIC
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

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Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1999: The National Data Book, 119th Edition *prepared by the U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC, National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration, 1999. 1005 pp. Paper, $39.00.*

The Jewish Political Tradition—Volume One: Authority *edited by Michael Walzer, Menachem Lorberbaum, and Noam J. Zohar; coedited by Yair Lorberbaum. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2000. 635 pp. $35.00.*

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







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

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

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